Civil Litigation - Plaintiff - OCA

The appellant municipality appealed an application judge's interpretation of a development agreement regarding the costs of operating a pumping station.

The Court of Appeal found no error in the application judge's conclusion that the costs of operation, as distinct from maintenance and repair, are to be borne by the municipality and not the developer.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellants, two insurance companies, appealed a declaration that the respondents were entitled to coverage under an automobile insurance policy.

The insurers argued that the application judge erred in her interpretation of a policy exclusion for a 'race' or 'speed test'.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the application judge correctly applied the rule that insurance contracts are to be strictly and narrowly interpreted.

Furthermore, there was ample evidence to support the conclusion that the insured was participating in a driver education program to improve driving skills, rather than engaging in a speed test.

The appellant insurer appealed a decision finding that it owed a duty to defend the respondents.

The insurer argued that coverage was excluded under a clause for claims arising from damage to property the insured owns.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that the exclusion clause was written in the present tense and did not apply to property that the respondents formerly owned but no longer owned at the time of the claim.

The respondents were awarded costs on a full indemnity scale.

The appellants appealed an order granting an adjournment.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the adjournment was an interlocutory order and therefore the court lacked jurisdiction.

Costs of $700 were awarded to the respondent, reduced due to the late filing of materials.

The appellant was injured in a motor vehicle accident after losing control of her car on an icy patch of a municipal road.

She sued the municipality for negligence, alleging a failure to adequately salt the road.

The trial judge dismissed the action, finding the municipality had met the standard of care by promptly salting the road, though light blowing snow delayed the salt's effectiveness.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that the trial judge's findings of fact were well-supported by the evidence and that the municipality had taken reasonable steps to address the winter road conditions.

The appellants appealed a trial judgment finding that a Memorandum of Understanding regarding a joint property purchase was a binding contract that they had repudiated.

The appellants argued the respondent breached fiduciary duties by attempting to obtain a secret commission.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no palpable and overriding error in the trial judge's conclusion that the unsuccessful attempt to gain a secret commission did not amount to a breach of fiduciary duty, especially since the issue was raised late in the trial.

The court also upheld the remedy of rescission.

The appellant physician appealed a trial judgment finding them liable for medical malpractice following a colonoscopy procedure.

The trial judge found the physician breached the standard of care by failing to order an urgent CT scan when the plaintiff presented with severe abdominal pain and low haemoglobin, which would have diagnosed an intra-abdominal haemorrhage.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no palpable and overriding error in the trial judge's assessment of the expert evidence on standard of care and causation.

The appellant and respondents engaged in negotiations and signed a letter of intent regarding a joint venture to develop a retail outlet mall and other properties.

When the respondents terminated the relationship, the appellant sued for breach of contract and, alternatively, quantum meruit for services rendered.

The trial judge dismissed the action, finding no binding joint venture agreement existed and rejecting the quantum meruit claim.

The Court of Appeal upheld the finding that no binding contract was formed, as essential terms were missing and the parties' conduct indicated further negotiations were required.

However, the Court allowed the appeal regarding the quantum meruit claim, finding the trial judge erred in law by requiring a contractual relationship for restitutionary relief.

A new trial was ordered to determine the value of the services provided by the appellant.

The appellants, former employees receiving pensions under the Bank of Canada Pension Plan, brought a proposed class action alleging the Bank improperly extracted funds from the Plan to cover administration costs.

The Bank successfully moved under Rule 21 to strike the claim for direct distribution of the extracted funds to class members and obtained a declaration that the action could not proceed under the Class Proceedings Act due to s. 37(a).

On appeal, the Court of Appeal upheld the striking of the direct distribution claim, finding that restitution to the Plan was the appropriate equitable remedy.

However, the Court allowed the appeal in part, holding that s. 37(a) does not preclude the action from being brought as a class proceeding simply because it could be brought as a representative proceeding under Rule 10 of the Rules of Civil Procedure.

Following the dismissal of two related appeals brought by groups of developers, the successful municipal respondents sought costs.

The City of Mississauga sought partial indemnity costs of $70,379.25, while the Region of Halton and City of Burlington sought full indemnity costs of approximately $176,000.

The Court of Appeal determined that costs should follow the event on a partial indemnity scale.

Considering the complexity of the issues, the prior proceedings before the Ontario Municipal Board and Divisional Court, and the consolidated hearing, the court awarded $50,000 to Mississauga and $50,000 to Halton and Burlington.

The moving party sought leave to re-argue a Charter issue that was not addressed by the Supreme Court of Canada when it reversed the Court of Appeal's earlier decision based on the Canadian Bill of Rights.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the motion, noting that the moving party was seeking relief not originally sought and had an alternative route to raise the issue by appealing a recent decision of the class action motion judge.

The appellant appealed an order of the motion judge who declined to enforce a settlement.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding there was ample evidence to support the motion judge's findings of fact and exercise of discretion.

The appellant husband was seriously injured in a motor vehicle accident, rendering him unable to continue providing caregiving services to his wife, who suffered from a pre-existing medical condition.

The husband elected to receive income replacement benefits rather than caregiver benefits under the Statutory Accident Benefits Schedule.

The wife brought a derivative claim under s. 61 of the Family Law Act for the cost of hiring a substitute caregiver.

The Court of Appeal held that the substitute caregiver expenses were not 'health care' expenses under the Insurance Act, meaning the defendants were not protected from liability.

Furthermore, the court held that the wife's claim was her own statutory cause of action and was not barred by her husband's election of benefits.

The representative plaintiff, a disabled war veteran, brought a class action against the federal Crown for failing to invest or pay interest on pension funds administered by the Department of Veterans Affairs.

The Crown appealed a summary judgment decision that found it had breached its fiduciary duty and declared a statutory bar on interest claims inoperative under the Canadian Bill of Rights.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, affirming that the Crown owed and breached a fiduciary duty to the veterans, the Superior Court had jurisdiction, and the statutory bar was inoperative for depriving the veterans of property without due process and denying a fair hearing.

The plaintiffs were injured in a motor vehicle accident caused by an intoxicated off-duty employee of the defendant employer.

The employee had consumed alcohol before, during, and after his shift, but the employer was unaware of his intoxication on the night in question.

The plaintiffs argued the employer owed them a duty of care because the employee was enrolled in an Employee Assistance Program for alcoholism.

The Court of Appeal held that the employer did not owe a duty of care to the plaintiffs, as the duty to provide a safe workplace does not extend to protecting the public from an employee's off-duty conduct.

The court also held that non-protected defendants are entitled to deduct collateral benefits from damage awards under section 267(1) of the Insurance Act.

The appellant sought repayment of two alleged loans said to have been made to the deceased and challenged the dismissal of one loan claim and the rejection of personal liability against the executrix.

The respondents cross-appealed the judgment granted on the larger loan.

The court deferred to the trial judge's factual findings, holding that the 20,000 DM loan was not proven while the 27,618 DM loan was adequately established against the estate.

The court also rejected personal liability theories based on plene administravit, devastavit, and s. 53 of the Trustee Act, finding no prejudice from the pleading amendment, no wrongful estate dissipation, and no basis to raise a new argument for the first time on appeal.

The appellant solicitor appealed the dismissal of his third party claim for contribution against real estate agents in a negligence action arising from a commercial property purchase involving false zoning representations.

The court held, by majority, that issue estoppel did not apply because the prior mortgage proceeding did not determine the agents' independent liability to the purchaser.

However, the majority concluded that the third party claim was an abuse of process because it effectively attempted to relitigate the same misrepresentation issue that could have been advanced in the earlier proceeding.

The dissent would have allowed the appeal on the basis that the agents' duty of care had never previously been litigated.

Following a motor vehicle accident, the insured received statutory accident benefits until his insurer terminated payment and an arbitrator found that most of his health problems were not caused by the accident.

In the subsequent tort action against the tortfeasor, the motion judge held that the plaintiff was issue estopped from relitigating causation because the tortfeasor was a privy of the insurer.

The Court of Appeal reversed, holding that the statutory scheme under the Insurance Act creates separate alternative proceedings and does not support importing issue estoppel from SAB arbitration into the tort action.

The respondent had no right to participate in the arbitration and lacked the sufficient identity of interest required for privity.

The appeal was allowed and the arbitral findings were held not binding in the personal injury action.

The appellant challenged the dismissal of an action on a livestock mortality insurance policy after a racehorse died from bismuth poisoning.

The Court of Appeal held that, once the trial judge found the malicious or intentional act exclusion inapplicable to the insured and his bailee, the poisoning constituted an accident as between the parties to the policy.

The court further held that the exclusion for administration of drugs, medication or inoculation applies to substances given for a beneficial medicinal purpose, not a lethal substance forced into the animal to injure or destroy it.

The insurer failed to prove the poison was given for medicinal purposes.

The appeal was allowed and judgment was entered for the policy amount plus prejudgment interest.

The appellants challenged a judgment requiring payment for emergency spill cleanup following a gasoline tanker rollover.

The court held that new evidence showing there was no agreement on rates undermined the partial summary judgment premised on payment at the respondent's usual rates.

The court further held that the trial judge failed to address whether mark-ups on subcontracted work were recoverable at usual rates or were otherwise fair and reasonable.

The appeal was allowed, the summary judgment and trial judgment were set aside, and a new trial was ordered.