Civil Litigation - Plaintiff - OCA

This appeal concerns the applicability of the tort of intrusion upon seclusion to "Database Defendants" (entities that collect and store personal information) when a data breach occurs due to the alleged negligence or recklessness of the defendant, but the actual intrusion is committed by independent third-party hackers.

The Court of Appeal for Ontario affirmed the Divisional Court's decision, holding that the tort of intrusion upon seclusion, as defined in Jones v. Tsige, requires an act of intrusion by the defendant itself, not merely a failure to prevent intrusion by others.

The court dismissed the appeal, concluding that the plaintiffs' claim, which alleged Equifax's failure to protect data from hackers, did not disclose a viable cause of action for intrusion upon seclusion against Equifax.

The appellants appealed the orders of a motion judge who granted a declaration that previous court orders survived the appellants' bankruptcy.

The motion judge provided no reasons for her decision or for the costs order.

Both parties asked the Court of Appeal to set aside the order.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding that the failure to provide reasons incapable of meaningful appellate review constituted an error in law, and ordered a new hearing before a different judge.

The appellant appealed a judgment of less than $50,000 to the Court of Appeal for Ontario.

The Court of Appeal quashed the appeal, holding that it was properly brought to the Divisional Court due to the monetary amount.

No costs were awarded.

The appellant City of Toronto appealed a trial judgment finding it liable under the Occupiers' Liability Act for injuries sustained by the respondent when a glass door shattered at a community centre.

The trial judge found the City breached its duty of care because the door was made of annealed glass rather than the safety glass required by the Ontario Building Code.

On appeal, the City argued the trial judge improperly applied a strict liability standard rather than assessing whether the City took reasonable care to install the correct glass.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that the trial judge correctly decided the case based on the theories and issues expressly advanced by the parties at trial.

The appellant, a police officer, was criminally charged following an SIU investigation into a training exercise explosion.

After the charges were stayed, he sued his fellow officers and the police board for malicious prosecution and misfeasance in public office, alleging they intentionally misled the SIU.

The motion judge dismissed the claim, finding it was a workplace dispute governed exclusively by the collective agreement and the Police Services Act.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, holding that the essential character of the claim involved an independent criminal investigation outside the workplace, and therefore the court's jurisdiction was not ousted.

The appellants, a real estate agent and broker, appealed a trial judgment ordering them to pay damages to the respondents (purchasers) for water and mould damage to a residential home, due to the agent's negligence.

The appeal primarily concerned the measure of damages.

The Court of Appeal found that the trial judge erred by applying the cost of repair measure, as the appellants' negligence did not cause the property defect itself, but rather caused the respondents to enter into a transaction they would have otherwise avoided.

In such cases, the proper measure of damages is the diminution in value of the property.

The Court upheld the trial judge's findings on mitigation of damages and the foreseeability of frost heave damage.

The matter was remitted to the trial judge for reassessment of damages based on diminution in value and for a redetermination of costs from the first trial.

The respondent, an undischarged bankrupt, discovered a potential professional negligence claim against his deceased wife's insurance agent.

He commenced an action after his discharge, but the cause of action had vested in his trustee in bankruptcy.

The motion judge granted an order nunc pro tunc regularizing the proceeding.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal held that the motion judge lacked authority to grant a nunc pro tunc order because it was sought after the expiry of the applicable limitation period.

The appeal was allowed and the action dismissed.

The appellant, a manufacturer and supplier of touchscreens, appealed a trial judgment finding it liable for breach of implied conditions under the Sale of Goods Act.

The trial judge found that touchscreens supplied to the respondent, a manufacturer of mobile display terminals, were defective due to poor lamination caused by the appellant's subcontractor.

The trial judge awarded damages of $355,193.49 to the respondent for replacement costs, labour, and shipping, offset against outstanding invoices.

The appeal court upheld the trial judgment on both liability and damages, finding no palpable and overriding error and rejecting all four grounds of appeal.

On appeal from a trial judgment involving an oil tank leak at a residential property.

The trial judge found Thompson Fuels negligent for failing to conduct required comprehensive inspections and water testing of fuel oil tanks, but found the Technical Standards and Safety Authority (TSSA) not liable.

The plaintiff was found 60% contributorily negligent and Thompson Fuels 40% liable.

The appellate court upheld the trial judgment with one adjustment regarding betterment related to a line of credit.

The court addressed complex issues including the enforceability of exclusion clauses in consumer contracts, the application of regulatory obligations to civil liability, Pierringer agreements, and the calculation of damages in environmental contamination cases.

This is a costs endorsement addressing the allocation of costs for certification and summary judgment motions in the Superior Court and the costs of the appeal to the Court of Appeal for Ontario.

The plaintiffs appealed from orders of Justice Paul M. Perell denying certification and granting summary judgment.

On appeal, the plaintiffs achieved partial success: they obtained certification on some common issues but not on their negligent misrepresentation claim, and they reversed summary judgment on some claims while others remained time-barred.

The Court of Appeal awarded costs to the plaintiffs reflecting their overall success.

This appeal concerns a proposed $2.5 billion class action involving more than 230,000 universal life insurance policies sold by Metropolitan Life Insurance Company between 1985 and 1998.

The plaintiffs alleged misrepresentation in the sale of policies and breach of contractual duties relating to premiums and fees.

The motions judge dismissed the certification motion for misrepresentation claims and initially declined to certify breach of contract claims.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal in part, certifying the breach of contract common issues and allowing the plaintiffs to pursue individual misrepresentation claims.

The court found the motions judge erred in principle by failing to conduct individualized and contextual analyses of the limitation period defences and by improperly deciding the merits of the breach of contract claims at the certification stage.

The appellants appealed the dismissal of their claim for a mandatory order requiring the respondents to relocate the venting of a furnace and hot water heater from the side to the top of the respondents' house.

The appellants had claimed that emissions from the side venting were obnoxious, caused fumes and vapours that made one appellant ill, caused ice buildup on their walkway, and posed potential future danger to their siding.

The trial judge found that the appellants' complaints did not constitute a substantial interference with their enjoyment of property under the law of nuisance, as the expert evidence was insufficient, health claims were unsupported by medical evidence, ice buildup was insignificant, and future damage claims were speculative.

The appellants did not appeal the dismissal of their damages claim but only the dismissal of the mandatory order claim.

The Court of Appeal found no merit in the appeal.

The respondent commenced an action alleging he was induced to enter into a shareholders' agreement by fraudulent misrepresentations.

The appellants moved to stay the action under s. 7 of the Arbitration Act, relying on an arbitration clause in the agreement.

The motion judge refused the stay, finding the pith and substance of the claims were tortious rather than contractual.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, holding that the motion judge erred by assuming tort claims and allegations of fraud fall outside the scope of a broadly worded arbitration agreement, and by failing to apply the competence-competence principle which requires jurisdictional challenges to be resolved first by the arbitrator.

The appellant appealed the dismissal of its application for a declaration that it had the exclusive right to terminate a real estate agreement.

The agreement contained a clause allowing either party to terminate if severance approval was not obtained by a specified date.

The Court of Appeal upheld the application judge's finding that the final executed offer contained a mutual termination clause, rejecting the appellant's argument that uninitialed handwritten portions should be disregarded.

The court also rejected the appellant's promissory estoppel argument, finding the relationship was governed by contract.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant, a Minnesota company, appealed the dismissal of its motion to stay the respondent's Ontario breach of contract action on the basis of forum non conveniens.

The appellant argued the motion judge erred in assessing the location of witnesses, documents, and geography, and that a default judgment obtained in a parallel Minnesota action should trump all other factors.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the motion judge's assessment of the factors was supported by the evidence and that a foreign default judgment is merely one factor to be weighed in the forum non conveniens analysis, not a determinative one.

A law firm acting on a contingency fee basis was discharged by its clients, who retained successor lawyers.

The original law firm sued the successor lawyers for inducing breach of contract and intentional interference with economic relations, alleging they assisted the clients in avoiding payment of fees.

The motion judge struck the claim for failing to disclose a reasonable cause of action.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the statement of claim contained only bald, unsupported assertions of professional misconduct and no facts capable of supporting the alleged causes of action.

The appellants appealed a jury verdict that attributed 15% responsibility for a motor vehicle accident to the appellant driver and 85% to an unidentified driver.

The jury found the appellant negligent for failing to speed up and lacking defensive driving when an erratic driver approached from behind.

The Court of Appeal held that it was unreasonable to find negligence in the appellant's failure to speed up, as there was no evidence it would have avoided the accident.

The appeal was allowed, the jury verdict against the appellant was set aside, and 100% liability was attributed to the respondent.

The Court of Appeal for Ontario issued a costs endorsement following an appeal.

Costs were awarded to the respondent, Air Canada, against the appellant, Global Payments Canada Inc., on a partial indemnity basis fixed at $46,000 inclusive of disbursements and GST.

The plaintiff commenced an action against his insurer for statutory accident benefits.

The plaintiff's counsel sent a settlement offer to the insurer's adjuster, which the insurer's counsel accepted.

When the plaintiff refused to proceed with the settlement because costs were to be assessed rather than fixed, the insurer moved for judgment under Rule 49.

The motions judge dismissed the motion, finding the offer was improperly served and the insurer failed to provide a notice under section 9.1 of the Automobile Insurance Regulation.

The Court of Appeal allowed the insurer's appeal, holding that the technical defect in service did not invalidate the Rule 49 offer, and that section 9.1 does not apply to settlements reached after litigation has commenced.

The appellant husband sought a stay of enforcement of a warrant of committal for contempt pending his appeal.

He had been found in contempt for failing to remove a mortgage and a joint line of credit from the matrimonial home as ordered in a family law judgment, and was sentenced to six months in jail.

The husband argued he was insolvent and could not legally comply with the order without creating a fraudulent preference.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the motion for a stay, finding no serious question to be tried regarding the contempt finding, but expedited the appeal to address the length of the incarceration period.