Civil Litigation - Plaintiff - OCA

The Ontario Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal of Robert Paul Ireland from a judgment declaring his Facebook posts defamatory of the Ontario Federation of All Terrain Vehicle Clubs, ordering their removal, and enjoining further defamatory posts.

The court found no procedural unfairness or error in the application judge’s decision, holding that Mr. Ireland’s failure to file a notice of appearance precluded him from participating in the application, and that the Federation’s courtesy in providing him with information did not create further obligations.

The court also rejected arguments regarding service and limitations, and found no reviewable error in the application judge’s findings on defamation and available defences.

The appellants, Amber Baptiste and Every Girl Counts LLC, appealed two Superior Court orders: one recognizing a California judgment against them in favour of the respondent, Michael Goguen, and another allowing enforcement of that judgment by seizing funds in Alberta.

The appellants argued the Ontario court lacked jurisdiction over funds outside the province.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, affirming the Ontario court's in personam jurisdiction over the appellants and CIBC (whose head office is in Ontario), finding it irrelevant that funds were transferred to Alberta.

The court applied principles from *Chevron Corp. v. Yaiguaje*, emphasizing that requiring assets to be present in the jurisdiction at the time of enforcement is not conducive to fairness in a globalized world.

The self-represented moving party sought an extension of time to review a single judge's decision that had dismissed his motion to extend the time to perfect his appeal.

The underlying action sought Charter damages against a municipal employee for failing to provide services in French.

The court dismissed the motion, affirming that an individual cannot be held liable for damages under the Charter and that the underlying claim had no chance of success.

The self-represented appellant appealed a judgment of the Superior Court of Justice.

The Court of Appeal found no error in the lower court's reasons and dismissed the appeal, awarding costs to the respondents in the fixed amount of $2,500.

The appellants appealed the trial judge's assessment of damages for future loss of income in a personal injury action arising from a motor vehicle accident.

The appellants argued the trial judge erred by failing to order disclosure of settlement amounts from two subsequent accidents and by failing to deduct those amounts from the damages award.

They also argued the statutory trust for future collateral benefits should extend to future pension benefits.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the global assessment method prevented double recovery and the claim regarding pension benefits was speculative.

The appellant appealed the dismissal of her counterclaim for loss of profit arising from a contract for the supply of manufactured parts.

The appellant argued that the respondent's defective delivery of the first instalment of parts amounted to a repudiation of the entire contract under s. 30(2) of the Sale of Goods Act.

The Court of Appeal upheld the trial judge's finding that the defective delivery was a severable breach and did not constitute repudiation, as there was no reasonable inference that similar breaches would occur in future instalments.

However, the Court granted leave to appeal the costs order, reducing the trial costs awarded to the respondent from $60,000 to $40,000, finding that substantial indemnity costs were not warranted given the prominence of the counterclaim.

The Court of Appeal for Ontario issued a costs endorsement following an appeal.

The appellant was ordered to pay the respondent's costs of the appeal on a partial indemnity scale, fixed at $8,000 inclusive of disbursements and GST.

The appellant appealed a trial judgment regarding an easement claim based on the doctrine of Lost Modern Grant.

The appellant argued the trial judge erred in limiting the relevant 20-year period to the time before the property's conversion to the Land Titles system in 2001.

The Court of Appeal agreed the trial judge erred in law but found the error did not result in a substantial wrong or miscarriage of justice.

The sole witness relied upon by the appellant was deemed unreliable, and the evidence was insufficient to establish the required 20 years of open and continuous use.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant applied for a disability pension and submitted a medical opinion stating she was totally and permanently disabled.

The respondent's physician agreed she was totally disabled but disputed that the condition was permanent.

An independent medical referee was appointed under the pension plan but concluded the appellant was not totally disabled, despite this not being in dispute.

The motion judge granted summary judgment for the respondent, finding the referee was entitled to make a full determination.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, holding that the referee's role under the plan is to resolve the specific dispute between the physicians, not to substitute a new opinion on undisputed matters.

The appellant appealed the dismissal of her slip and fall claim following a jury trial.

She argued the trial judge erred by failing to discharge the jury after the respondents' counsel made allegedly prejudicial comments in his closing address regarding the credibility of independent witnesses.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the trial judge properly exercised his discretion to retain the jury and provide a correcting instruction, and that the jury's verdict would inevitably have been the same given the evidence.

The appellant appealed an order of the Superior Court of Justice declaring him a vexatious litigant.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, agreeing with the motion judge that the appellant demonstrated a pattern of behaviour falling squarely within the criteria for a vexatious litigant set out in Lang Michener v. Fabian.

Costs of $10,000 were awarded to the respondent.

The appellant purchased contaminated property at a reduced price.

The respondent, who caused the contamination, agreed to remediate the property to a specified standard and indemnify the purchaser for any loss arising from the contamination.

The appellant later sold the property at a profit but claimed damages under the indemnity for reduced profit due to 'contamination stigma'.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the appellant suffered no loss as the reduced purchase price already accounted for the stigma, and the indemnity agreement did not cover this diminution in value.

The appellants were previously successful in their appeal to stay a libel action brought by the respondent.

The Court of Appeal awarded the appellants their costs of the appeal and the proceeding before the motion judge on a partial indemnity scale.

The parties could not agree on the quantum of costs for the motion.

The appellants sought $32,773.37.

Noting that the case involved a novel application of the real and substantial connection test in a libel context and was a matter of public interest, the court fixed the costs of the motion at a modest $7,500 inclusive of disbursements and GST.

The appellant appealed an order of the motions judge who refused an adjournment and dismissed the counter-application.

The appellant's former counsel had requested an adjournment to allow new counsel to file a Notice of Change of Solicitor, but the motions judge refused because former counsel could not contact the new counsel who was in another court.

The Court of Appeal (majority) held that the motions judge did not reasonably exercise his discretion and should have given the appellant a reasonable time to confirm new counsel.

The appeal was allowed and the order set aside.

Abella J.A. dissented, finding no error in the motions judge's discretion given the appellant's history of delay.

The appellants appealed a judgment granting partition and sale of lands.

They argued there was an existing agreement for the purchase and sale of the lands.

The Court of Appeal upheld the applications judge's finding that the exchange of letters only committed the parties to a process and no binding agreement existed, as several terms had not been agreed upon.

The respondent's prima facie right to partition and sale was affirmed, and the appeal was dismissed with costs.

The appellant appealed the dismissal of its application for a declaration that it owned a Porsche purchased from a third party who fraudulently claimed to have bought it from the respondent dealership.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding that the dealership's act of registering the vehicle in the appellant's name provided prima facie evidence of the third party's authority to sell.

The appellant was declared the true owner, and a cross-appeal was allowed on consent, ordering the dealership to pay a specified sum to a credit company.

Following a successful appeal regarding the jurisdiction to order the conveyance of a cottage property, the appellant sought costs on a substantial indemnity basis due to the respondent's ill-advised interlocutory steps.

The Court of Appeal declined to award substantial indemnity costs, noting the litigation stemmed from the respondent's attempts to secure child support arrears evaded by the other respondent.

Applying the factors from Andrews v. Andrews, the court awarded the appellant modest costs of $3,000.

The appellant appealed a judgment ordering him and related companies to pay $229,080 to the respondents, arguing the claim was statute-barred.

The respondents cross-appealed the trial judge's reduction of the award by $174,944 and the refusal to award pre-judgment interest.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the main appeal, finding the action was commenced within the limitation period.

The Court allowed the respondents' cross-appeal regarding the $174,944 reduction, increasing the damages award to $404,024, but upheld the trial judge's refusal to award pre-judgment interest based on the parties' agreement.

The appellant appealed a decision refusing to set aside a default judgment issued by the registrar.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the registrar had jurisdiction to sign the judgment as the claim was for a liquidated demand in money.

Furthermore, the appellant failed to explain the circumstances of the default or present a triable defence on the merits.

The appellant sought to reopen a family law appeal to vary the costs order following reasons in a child support case.

The Court of Appeal declined to reopen the appeal and clarified that its earlier statement that the paying spouse should ordinarily bear the child support litigation costs was confined to exceptional cases involving income vastly exceeding $150,000 and a huge disparity in ability to pay.

The court further held that any such approach remained subject to Rule 49 of the Rules of Civil Procedure and, where applicable, Rule 18 of the Family Law Rules, as well as the requirement that the payee spouse have acted reasonably.

The relationship between that approach and rule 24(1) of the Family Law Rules was left for another day because those rules did not apply to this case.