Civil Litigation - Plaintiff - OCA

The appellant, TELUS Communications Inc., appealed a Superior Court decision regarding the constitutional validity of the Wireless Services Agreement Act 2013 (WSAA) and a class action.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, affirming the motion judge's findings that the WSAA was within provincial legislative jurisdiction and was not rendered inoperative by paramountcy or interjurisdictional immunity.

The court also rejected the appellant's request to stay the class action for CRTC determination, confirming the Superior Court's jurisdiction.

The moving party brought a motion for an extension of time to serve and file a notice of cross-appeal.

The responding party opposed the motion, raising concerns about delay.

The court found that extending the time with appropriate directions would not delay the scheduling and hearing of the appeal.

The motion was granted, and the moving party was ordered to serve and file its notice of cross-appeal by a specified date.

The appellants commenced a civil action for misfeasance in public office against a Canada Revenue Agency investigator and the Attorney General of Canada, alleging that the investigator had intentionally sworn a false Information to Obtain search warrants.

The action was discontinued on consent during trial after the appellants failed to establish key elements of their claim.

Approximately one month later, the appellants received Notices of Reassessment from the Minister of National Revenue reversing the original tax assessment.

The appellants moved to set aside the discontinuance based on these reassessments as fresh evidence.

The motion was dismissed, and the appeal was dismissed on the grounds that the reassessments could not establish the elements of misfeasance in public office and did not meet the high threshold for setting aside a consent discontinuance.

The appellant doctor appealed a decision dismissing his summary judgment motion to dismiss the respondent's medical malpractice action as statute-barred.

The respondent suffered severe complications following breast reduction surgery, and the appellant continued to perform ameliorative surgeries for over a year.

The Court of Appeal upheld the motion judge's finding that under s. 5(1)(a)(iv) of the Limitations Act, 2002, the respondent did not know that a legal proceeding would be an appropriate means to seek a remedy until the ameliorative treatments concluded.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant appealed a decision ordering the return of US $250,000 held in trust by the respondent law firm to the respondent client.

The appellant argued the funds were impressed with a trust in its favour and that the application judge erred in denying an adjournment to cross-examine a deponent.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no evidence of a trust or escrow agreement and concluding the appellant had ample opportunity to cross-examine prior to the hearing but made a tactical decision not to do so.

The appellant, a lawyer, sued the Law Society of Upper Canada and its investigator for defamation based on emails sent to victim institutions during an investigation into mortgage fraud.

The motion judge dismissed the action on summary judgment, finding the communications were protected by absolute privilege.

On appeal, the appellant argued that section 9 of the Law Society Act superseded the common law defence of absolute privilege and that the privilege did not apply in the circumstances.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that section 9 supplements rather than ousts the common law, and that the investigator's communications were protected by absolute privilege as they were made in connection with a disciplinary proceeding.

The appellant insurer appealed an order determining insurance priorities in a tort action involving a rental car.

The Court of Appeal held that under the Ontario Insurance Act, as amended by Bill 118, the appellant's policy was required to respond first, regardless of whether the policies were limited to Ontario.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellants appealed an order of the Superior Court of Justice.

The Court of Appeal found no merit in the appeal, agreeing with the reasons of the motion judge.

The appeal was dismissed with costs fixed at $10,000, and the certificate of stay was set aside.

The moving parties (defendants) sought an extension of time to appeal an order that struck their statement of defence for failing to comply with disclosure obligations and a costs order.

The court applied the Kefeli test for extending time to appeal.

While the moving parties had an intention to appeal and a satisfactory explanation for the delay, the court found that the appeal lacked merit, the responding party would suffer prejudice due to ongoing delays and deterioration of partnership property, and the justice of the case did not favour an extension.

The motion was dismissed.

The appellant, acting in person, brought a motion to remove the solicitors of record for the respondents on the appeal, alleging conflict of interest and misconduct.

The court dismissed the motion, finding no evidence to support the serious allegations.

The court emphasized the importance of a litigant's right to counsel of choice and noted that removing counsel would cause prejudice to the respondents, who relied on their counsel's ability to communicate in Farsi.

The original minority shareholder of a closely held corporation brought an oppression action against the majority shareholder and the company.

Due to ill health, he assigned his shares, contractual rights, and the oppression claim to the appellant.

The motion judge and Divisional Court held the assignment of the cause of action was invalid.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal found the assignment valid, as it fell within the exception to the rule against champerty and maintenance because the cause of action was ancillary to the assigned property interest in the shares.

The appellants appealed a declaratory order that effectively determined a golf club board made no finding of assault or battery by the respondent.

This was a central contested issue in the pending lawsuit.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal and set aside the order, holding that a contested factual finding cannot be determined in advance of trial merely on the consent of some parties, as this would impermissibly sanction a collateral attack at trial on an existing court order.

The respondent brought a motion under rule 57.07 of the Rules of Civil Procedure for an order that the appellant, a non-party lawyer, personally pay the costs of the litigation.

The appellant moved to strike the motion, arguing it was barred by the two-year limitation period in s. 4 of the Limitations Act, 2002 and was an abuse of process.

The motion judge dismissed the appellant's motion.

The Court of Appeal upheld the decision, confirming that a motion within an existing action is not a 'proceeding' for the purposes of s. 4 of the Limitations Act, 2002, and found no evidence to support the abuse of process claim.

The appellants appealed a decision finding that an exchange of correspondence did not constitute a binding agreement of purchase and sale for the Guelph Storm.

They also appealed the application judge's decision to award substantial indemnity costs to the respondent on a merged contempt and enforcement application.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no palpable and overriding error in the contract formation analysis, and upholding the costs award due to the appellants' prolonged delay and attempts to avoid their obligations.

The appellant suffered a serious brain injury in a single-car accident after drinking at a tavern with the defendant driver.

At trial, the defendants admitted 100% liability for causing the accident, but the jury was only asked to assess the appellant's contributory negligence for not wearing a seatbelt and riding with an impaired driver.

The jury was not asked to apportion fault to the tavern for over-serving the appellant and failing to ensure his safe passage home.

The Court of Appeal held that the failure to instruct the jury to apportion fault among all parties as required by the Negligence Act was an error of law.

To avoid the cost of a new trial, the Court of Appeal invited submissions to apportion fault itself.

The successful appellant brought an application to amend the Court of Appeal's previous reasons for judgment, which had inadvertently omitted the costs awarded in the underlying tort action from the indemnity order against the respondent insurer.

The insurer opposed the amendment on the basis that it was not a party to the tort action.

The Court granted the application, holding that the insurer's obligation to indemnify under s. 258(1) of the Insurance Act applies to the entire judgment recovered against the insured, including costs, regardless of whether the insurer was a party to the tort action.

The Minister of Health and Genpharm appealed a decision granting judicial review that quashed the extension of a cut-off date for generic drug submissions to the Ontario Drug Benefit Formulary.

The application judge had found the process procedurally unfair and ordered a new cut-off date, resulting in all five competing generic drug companies having their products listed.

The Court of Appeal dismissed both appeals as moot, finding that the new Formulary had already been published, the legal landscape had changed, and Genpharm's proposed future action for damages did not justify hearing the appeal on the merits.

The appellants appealed an order allowing the Motor Vehicle Accident Claims Fund to seek restitution through the courts for statutory accident benefits paid to a tort victim.

The appellants argued the Fund was bound by the arbitral dispute resolution model under O. Reg. 283/95.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that the Fund is not an 'insurer' for the purposes of the Regulation and that nothing in the Regulation removes the Fund's common law right to seek restitution in court.

The appellants appealed a summary judgment dismissing their action against the municipality for abuse of public office and conspiracy to injure.

The appellants alleged that the municipality passed zoning by-laws prohibiting 'monster' homes with the true purpose of preventing student housing.

The motion judge found no genuine issue for trial, concluding there was no evidence the by-laws were directed solely at the appellants or that student housing was specifically targeted.

The Court of Appeal found no palpable and overriding error in the motion judge's assessment of the evidence and dismissed the appeal, requesting further written submissions on the issue of costs.

The appellants appealed the trial judge's calculation of prejudgment interest on the respondent's past loss of income and the deduction of no-fault benefits following a jury verdict.

The Court of Appeal found no error in the trial judge's determination that past loss of income began to accrue immediately following the accident, and upheld her treatment of the no-fault benefits deduction.

The appeal was dismissed.