Civil Litigation - Plaintiff - OCA

This appeal concerned the correct approach to defamation and civil conspiracy pleadings in the context of a motion to strike.

The Divisional Court had struck out the defendant's counterclaim, finding it lacked particularity.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, holding that the Divisional Court misapplied the modern, flexible approach to pleadings and failed to read the pleadings generously.

The Court of Appeal reinstated the motion judge's decision, which had dismissed the motion to strike, emphasizing the high bar for striking pleadings and the deference owed to motion judges.

The self-represented appellant appealed the dismissal of his action and his motion for summary judgment against his former employer.

The motion judge had called on the appellant first, advised him to focus on the cross-motion, and then reserved her decision without calling on the respondent to make submissions.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding a want of procedural fairness.

The appellant was entitled to hear the respondent's oral submissions on the cross-motion and have an opportunity to respond to them.

The order was set aside without prejudice to either party renewing their motion.

The appellant appealed from a trial judge's decision dismissing his malicious prosecution claim against the respondents and upholding a defamation judgment against him and his wife.

The appellant alleged that the respondents falsely reported sexual assault charges against him to police.

The trial judge granted a non-suit motion on the malicious prosecution claim, finding insufficient evidence that the respondents initiated the prosecution.

The trial judge also withdrew the qualified privilege defence from the jury regarding defamatory statements made to a priest.

The jury found the appellants jointly liable for defamation and awarded damages of $25,000.

The Court of Appeal upheld all trial decisions.

The plaintiffs obtained a judgment against the defendant in Belgium and subsequently sought to enforce it in Ontario after discovering the defendant had moved to Canada.

After the plaintiffs obtained summary judgment recognizing the foreign judgment, the defendant appealed, triggering an automatic stay of enforcement.

The plaintiffs brought a motion to lift the stay and for security for costs.

The Court of Appeal partially lifted the stay to allow the plaintiffs to examine the defendant in aid of execution, finding the appeal appeared frivolous and the plaintiffs had suffered hardship due to delay.

The motion for security for costs was dismissed as there was insufficient evidence that the defendant lacked assets in Ontario.

The appellant challenged an order striking his statement of claim against an employee of the statutory home warranty administrator on the basis that no reasonable cause of action was disclosed.

The Court of Appeal held that the motion was properly heard as a Rule 21 motion and that the pleading contained no material facts capable of grounding personal liability against the employee acting within the scope of employment.

The proposed amendments did not cure the deficiencies, including the absence of proper particulars for allegations such as fraud, misrepresentation, breach of trust, malice, or intent.

The court also accepted that the claim was an impermissible attempt to re-litigate issues already canvassed before the Licence Appeal Tribunal.

The appeal and the challenge to costs were dismissed.

The appeal concerned whether a lender could structure a business loan to an on-reserve borrower as a two-step conditional sale transaction in order to obtain effective security over existing chattels situated on reserve.

The court held that the arrangement was merely notional, with no real sale or repurchase, and amounted to an impermissible attempt to circumvent the protection in s. 89(1) of the Indian Act.

Because the transaction was a pure fiction rather than a genuine sale in which rights remained in the seller, it did not fall within s. 89(2).

The appeal from the conversion judgment was dismissed with fixed costs.

The appellants appealed an order that included a final declaration regarding the applicability of the Repair and Storage Liens Act, which was made during an interlocutory motion.

The Court of Appeal found that the declaration was not intended to be a final determination and deprived the appellants of a substantive defence at a preliminary stage.

Despite procedural errors by the appellants, the Court allowed the appeal and set aside the declaration in the interest of justice, but awarded costs of the appeal to the respondent.

The self-represented appellants appealed an order striking their amended statement of claim without leave to amend.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, agreeing with the motion judge that the pleading contained overly broad, conclusory allegations of conspiracy, fraud, and negligence without supporting material facts.

The Court also noted that many allegations were attempts to re-litigate previously determined issues, and the defects could not be cured by further amendment.

The appellant appealed the dismissal of his action for delay.

He had sued the respondent insurer in 2002 for breach of contract relating to disability benefits.

After the exchange of pleadings in 2003, essentially no progress was made for over seven years, during which the appellant declared personal bankruptcy and failed to produce medical evidence.

The Court of Appeal upheld the motion judge's finding that the delay was inordinate, inexcusable, and gave rise to a presumption of prejudice that was not rebutted.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant appealed an order enforcing a Letter of Request (LOR) from a US District Court seeking document production and examination of representatives in relation to a US antitrust class action.

The appellant argued the application judge failed to exercise independent discretion and merely accepted the LOR at face value.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the application judge properly applied the Friction Division Products criteria, sought clarification from the US judge, and correctly concluded that the requested information was relevant, necessary, and not otherwise obtainable.

The appellant newspaper intervened in a civil action to challenge an ex parte publication ban and sealing order obtained by a non-party regarding his personal health information.

The motion judge granted the non-party an indefinite publication ban and awarded full indemnity costs against the newspaper.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal upheld the decision to award costs against the intervenor, finding it was motivated partly by business interests and the information was highly personal.

However, the Court set aside the full indemnity costs, finding no reprehensible conduct by the newspaper, and substituted an award of partial indemnity costs.

The appellants appealed an order granting possession of mortgaged property, specifically challenging the determination of the mortgage quantum and the disposition of a share.

The respondent conceded that the order regarding the share disposition could not stand.

The Court of Appeal upheld the quantum determination, noting the appellants had participated in a full hearing on the issue without objection.

The appeal was allowed in part to set aside the share disposition, but otherwise dismissed.

The appellants sought leave to amend their statement of claim in an action arising from a neighbour dispute over a right-of-entry permit and property excavation.

The motion judge denied leave to add claims for negligent misrepresentation and breach of fiduciary duty against the municipality and its by-law officer, and struck portions of the claim as a collateral attack on a prior injunction order.

The Court of Appeal upheld the dismissal of the negligent misrepresentation and fiduciary duty claims, finding no special relationship or reliance.

However, the Court allowed the appeal regarding collateral attack, holding that the appellants were seeking damages for the respondents' actions rather than attempting to invalidate the prior order.

The respondents sought costs for two appeals following the release of the court's reasons.

For the first appeal, the court declined to award costs, agreeing with the appellants that their partial success on appeal warranted an offset against the significant unadjusted costs awarded in the court below.

For the second appeal, where the respondents were entirely successful, the court awarded costs fixed at $7,500, noting the appeal was straightforward and took little time.

The appellants appealed a trial judgment regarding a partnership dispute over a Muskoka business.

The trial judge found that while the parties were partners, their relationship was governed by an Acknowledgment document granting the appellant a conditional option to purchase shares, which he failed to exercise.

The Court of Appeal upheld the trial judge's findings that the shares never became partnership property under the Partnership Act and that the arrangement did not constitute a security interest under the PPSA.

The appeal was dismissed with costs.

The appellant, a police Staff Sergeant, sued her employer and colleagues for discrimination and defamation.

The motions judge dismissed the action, finding the essential character of the dispute was workplace-centred and governed by the collective agreement and the Police Services Act.

On appeal, the appellant limited her claim to defamation, arguing it belonged in the courts.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that the essential character of the dispute was workplace discrimination and harassment, not defamation, and was therefore subject to the collective agreement's grievance procedure.

The appellants, an estate trustee and her former counsel, appealed a trial judgment finding that joint bank accounts held by the trustee and her late father belonged to the estate, and ordering the counsel to repay estate funds taken for legal fees.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the trustee's appeal, holding that while the trial judge erred in law by rejecting the presumption of advancement for adult children, the evidence clearly established the father did not intend to gift the joint accounts.

The counsel's appeal was allowed, setting aside the substantial indemnity costs order against him and directing an assessment of his legal accounts.

The plaintiff appealed a Divisional Court decision setting aside a motion judge's order that appointed judges and judicial officers as referees to determine individual class members' claims under the Class Proceedings Act.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that a court cannot appoint a judge or judicial officer to conduct a reference under s. 25(1)(b) of the Class Proceedings Act without first obtaining the authorization of the Chief Justice or her designate under s. 14(1) of the Courts of Justice Act.

The consent of individual judicial officers is not an adequate substitute for the Chief Justice's overarching responsibility for judicial assignments.

The minor respondent was injured in Florida when his tricycle collided with a school bus.

The respondents settled their Florida action for the maximum amount recoverable under Florida's sovereign immunity legislation.

They then sought indemnification from their Ontario insurer under the S.E.F. 44 Family Protection Endorsement for the shortfall.

The insurer appealed a motion judge's finding that the minor respondent had a cause of action.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that the minor respondent was 'legally entitled to recover' damages despite the Florida statutory cap, and that the tortfeasors were 'inadequately insured' because their excess insurance was unavailable to the respondents.

In a winding-up of a charitable corporation facing extensive institutional abuse claims, the liquidator sought appellate clarification on whether assets allegedly held on special purpose charitable trusts were shielded from tort creditors whose claims arose elsewhere within the charity’s operations.

The court held that Canadian law recognizes no charitable immunity from tort liability and rejects any trust-fund theory that would immunize charitable assets from execution.

In the winding-up context, all assets of the charitable corporation, whether beneficially owned or held on trust for charitable purposes, were available to satisfy legitimate tort claims.

The court also struck out a paragraph of the order suggesting it was not intended to affect related British Columbia proceedings, while confirming that the British Columbia court remained free to make its own factual findings on ownership issues.