Civil Litigation - Plaintiff - OCA

Police officers appealed a motion judge's decision striking their negligence claim against the Crown while allowing their misfeasance in public office claim to proceed.

The officers alleged that Crown attorneys negligently and misfeasantly failed to adequately investigate assault allegations against them during criminal prosecutions, resulting in reputational harm.

The Court of Appeal upheld the motion judge's decision to strike the negligence claim based on established Crown immunity principles, but affirmed that Crown attorneys are not immune from claims of misfeasance in public office.

The court also upheld the motion judge's dismissal of the Crown's motion to strike the action as time-barred, finding that limitations issues should not be determined under Rule 21.01(1)(a) unless pleadings are closed and facts are undisputed.

The appellant property owner appealed a forfeiture order made under the Civil Remedies Act, 2001.

The property, a 12-unit apartment building, was the site of extensive drug-related criminal activity.

The Court of Appeal upheld the application judge's findings that the owner was not a 'responsible owner' because he knew of the criminal activity and failed to take meaningful steps to prevent it.

The Court also agreed that the appellant failed to establish that forfeiture was clearly not in the interests of justice, given that the unlawful activity permeated the entire building.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant insurer appealed a jury-based judgment awarding life insurance proceeds to the respondent beneficiary.

The sole issue was whether the trial judge erred in instructing the jury on the meaning of a change in insurability under s. 180(1)(c) of the Insurance Act.

The court held that, given the insurer's own delivery form and underwriting evidence, insurability was properly linked to the insured's state of health in the circumstances of this case.

The appeal was dismissed and appeal costs were fixed at $10,500 inclusive.

The appellant appealed the dismissal of his application seeking to compel the respondents to consent to severing a one-acre parcel of land pursuant to a memorandum of agreement.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, agreeing with the application judge that the relevant clause lacked sufficient certainty on essential terms, such as location, dimensions, title, and price, to be legally enforceable.

The appellants appealed a judgment interpreting the Constitution of a religious society and upholding a freezing order on memberships.

The Court of Appeal affirmed the application judge's finding that a 'bona fide member' only required payment of dues for the last two calendar years, rejecting the appellants' argument for a 24-month probationary period.

The Court also upheld the freezing order, finding it was validly passed by the Executive Committee in response to a forcible takeover and was justified to restore calm.

The appeal was dismissed with costs.

The appellants appealed a judgment, arguing that minutes of settlement foreclosed the complaints that were before Tarion.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, agreeing with the application judge that the minutes of settlement did not foreclose the complaints.

Appeal and cross-appeal arising from limited partnership investment litigation involving an offering memorandum for a real estate tax shelter.

The court held that, read as a whole and in light of the financing and refinancing structure, the offering memorandum contemplated repayment of accrued interest and principal on the second secured loans only upon acceptable refinancing of the first loans; because that refinancing never occurred, the investors were not contractually obliged to repay the second loans.

The court also held that the cash flow loans were not expressly made repayable by investors under the offering documents.

On the cross-appeal, the court held that the contractual deemed-reliance clause was included to satisfy securities-law requirements and did not create a broader right to sue for misrepresentation outside the clause's 90-day notice period.

Both the appeal and cross-appeal were dismissed, with no costs.

The appellants appealed a decision applying the doctrine of res judicata based on prior CCAA proceedings.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding that the appellants were neither parties nor privies in interest to the prior proceedings.

The court noted that the appellants only participated as witnesses and that respondents' counsel had previously indicated that findings in the CCAA proceedings would not affect proceedings against other parties.

The appellant appealed a judgment finding that the fair market value of collateral was less than the debt owed to the respondent.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no basis to interfere with the motion judge's finding, as the receiver's efforts to sell the asset supported the respondent's position and the appellant offered no contrary evidence.

The appellant appealed an order regarding liability for a claim based on delay.

The Court of Appeal agreed with the motion judge that the Agreement and the Bills of Lading had to be read together, requiring the appellant to give 60 days written notice of liability.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellants, a corporation and its chairman, appealed a Divisional Court order permitting the respondent to amend its statement of claim.

The amendments sought to add claims for intentional interference with economic relations and conspiracy to injure against the chairman personally.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal in part.

It struck the claim for intentional interference because the respondent failed to plead the requisite unlawful means.

However, the Court permitted the conspiracy to injure claim to proceed, holding that it was not plain and obvious at the pleadings stage that the Said v. Butt exception—which protects corporate officers acting bona fide in the company's interests—would immunize the chairman from personal liability.

The appellant employer appealed the refusal to dismiss a proposed class action seeking recovery of employee benefits allegedly tied to employment insurance premium reductions after collective agreement language was removed.

The Court of Appeal held that the core dispute—whether the employer actually satisfied its undertaking to share the benefit of the premium reduction—was not a question reserved exclusively to the statutory Commission under the governing Act and regulations.

The court further held that an officer's ruling did not create issue estoppel because it was not a determination made within the decision-maker's statutory jurisdiction on the question sought to be litigated.

The appeal was dismissed with costs.

Investors appealed the dismissal of their action against a law firm arising from a failed investment transaction in which they lost all monies advanced.

The appeal challenged findings that a prior judgment did not retroactively create a constructive trust, that no solicitor-client or fiduciary relationship existed between the solicitor and the investors, and that the solicitor had not breached any duty of care in relation to disclosure, mortgages, or fund disbursements.

The court held the factual findings were supported by the record, applied the fiduciary-duty indicia from Lac Minerals, and emphasized the conflict concerns in imposing fiduciary obligations on solicitors toward non-clients.

The appeal was dismissed with costs.

The appellant challenged a trial judgment holding that s. 13 of the Public Hospital Act answered the claim arising from a memo written by the respondent in the course of the business of a medical education committee.

The Court of Appeal agreed that the memo was written during an investigation or other business of the committee and saw no reason to disturb the finding of good faith.

Although leave to appeal the costs aspect was granted, the court held nothing had been shown to displace the usual order for part-and-party costs.

The appeal was dismissed and appeal costs were awarded to the respondent.

The appellant challenged the reasons of the motion judge.

The Court of Appeal was not persuaded that any error had been shown on the facts of the case.

The appeal was therefore dismissed with costs.

The appellant challenged the registration of a Finnish judgment.

The Court of Appeal held there was no dispute that the appellant had been properly notified, when served with the default judgment, of the automatic right to a trial on the merits in the original proceedings and had failed to avail himself of that right.

Finding no error in the motion judge's decision to register the foreign judgment, the court dismissed the appeal with costs.

The insurer appealed from a ruling in an action brought under s. 132(1) of the Insurance Act after the respondents obtained a negligence judgment against the insured and execution was returned unsatisfied.

The Court of Appeal held that the statutory cause of action permits recovery of the amount of the judgment, up to the face value of the policy, subject only to the same equities the insurer would have against its insured.

The insurer could not relitigate the insured's liability or the respondents' damages, nor could it allege that the original judgment was vitiated by the respondents' own fraud.

The appeal was dismissed with costs.

Following release of the appeal reasons, the respondent requested an opportunity to make further submissions on trial costs and advised that the trial judge had reduced the general damages award to account for additional workers' compensation benefits.

The court considered the further submissions from both sides and remained satisfied that the trial judge's costs order should stand.

The corrected general damages amount was noted.

The appellant insurer argued on appeal that a 1989 letter did not create a binding agreement and, alternatively, that the respondent's claim was out of time after the insurer indicated in 1991 it would no longer be bound.

The court held the trial judge properly relied not only on the letter itself but also on the agent's cross-examination evidence acknowledging an agreement.

The court further held that the 1991 letter constituted repudiation, but because the respondent did not accept that repudiation, the contract remained in force and the respondent was not required to commence proceedings by the date asserted by the appellant.

The appeal was dismissed with costs.

The appellant insurer appealed in an insurance dispute.

The Court of Appeal stated it was in substantial agreement with the reasons of the judge below and found no merit in the appeal.

The appeal was dismissed with costs fixed at $3,175.