Civil Litigation - Defendant - OCA

The appellants appealed an order that foreclosed their ability to defend the action, arguing the motion judge failed to provide reasons.

The Court of Appeal agreed that reasons were warranted for such a serious decision, but found the reasons were discernible from the record.

The appeal was dismissed for the reasons previously given by the court in refusing a stay pending appeal.

The appellants sought a stay pending appeal from an order striking their statement of defence for non-compliance with documentary disclosure obligations and a prior peremptory order.

The motion judge held the proposed appeal was weak, found no irreparable harm, and concluded the balance of convenience and justice of the case favoured refusal of a stay.

The appellants sought a panel review of a motion judge's decision denying their extension of time to perfect materials for a panel review of a prior decision dismissing their appeal for delay.

The underlying dispute concerned unpaid storage costs and the respondents' rights to sell stored property under the Repair and Storage Liens Act.

The appellants requested an adjournment citing injuries from a motor vehicle accident but failed to provide adequate medical documentation.

The appellants also requested recusal of one judge based on alleged bias, which was denied.

The panel upheld the motion judge's discretionary decision to deny the extension of time, finding no reversible error in the application of the governing principles and noting that the appeal had become moot as the property had been auctioned.

The moving party, Stephen Moranis, sought an extension of time to perfect his appeal in a long-running dispute with the Toronto Real Estate Board (TREB) and others regarding access to the Multiple Listing Service (MLS) system and alleged breaches of a settlement agreement.

The Court reviewed the procedural history, including multiple actions, settlements, and motions, and applied the established factors for granting extensions of time.

While expressing reservations about the merits of the appeal, the Court granted a limited extension to August 1, 2025, finding no prejudice to the respondents and that the justice of the case warranted the extension.

The Court of Appeal for Ontario granted leave for the former trial solicitor of Michael Scott De Longte to intervene in the appeal, limited to the issue of ineffective assistance of counsel.

The court found the solicitor’s participation necessary to complete the record and assist in the proper adjudication of the issue, as the allegations of ineffective assistance were central to the appeal and mirrored in a related professional negligence action.

The court also declared that solicitor-client privilege had been waived by Mr. De Longte and set out a schedule for the exchange and filing of fresh evidence, cross-examinations, and facta.

No costs were awarded on the motion.

The appellant sued the respondents for unjust enrichment after providing engineering services for a power generation facility and not being paid by the contractor, N-SCI.

The motion judge struck the claim against the Starwood Defendants under Rule 21.01(1)(b), finding that the contract between the Starwood Defendants and N-SCI constituted a valid juristic reason for the enrichment, and denied leave to amend.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that the motion judge properly considered only the statement of claim, correctly applied the law on juristic reasons, and reasonably exercised his discretion in denying leave to amend a speculative pleading.

The respondent perfected a construction lien and set the action down for trial within the two-year limitation period under s. 37(1) of the Construction Lien Act.

However, the respondent failed to file a defence to the appellant's counterclaim before setting the action down, contrary to Rule 48.01 of the Rules of Civil Procedure.

The appellant moved to discharge the lien, arguing the setting down was a nullity.

The Court of Appeal held that setting the action down while pleadings were open was a procedural irregularity curable by Rule 2.01.

Curing the irregularity did not have the effect of extending the strict two-year limitation period, as the action was factually set down within the required timeframe.

The appellant appealed an order requiring her to file a fresh Statement of Claim in the Superior Court rather than transferring her existing Small Claims Court claim.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the motion judge correctly required a fresh claim because the original included improper references to settlement discussions and presented procedural issues.

The court also found no reasonable apprehension of bias and upheld the motion judge's decision to make no order as to costs.

The appellants appealed an order refusing to grant relief nunc pro tunc.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, noting that the application judge appeared to have treated the failure to obtain leave as a nullity rather than a mere irregularity.

Finding no basis on the record to refuse the order, the Court granted the order nunc pro tunc.

The appellant appealed a trial judgment awarding the respondent $919,237 in damages following a rear-end motor vehicle collision.

The appellant argued the trial judge erred by discharging the jury at the outset of the trial and by improperly quantifying damages, given the respondent's severe pre-existing fibromyalgia.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that the trial judge's decision to strike the jury due to the anticipated complexity of the medical and economic evidence was not arbitrary, capricious, or unreasonable.

The Court also found no basis to interfere with the trial judge's assessment of damages, which was grounded in the evidence.

The appellants appealed a motion judge's decision dismissing their motion to set aside a default judgment and writ of possession.

The appellants failed to provide a plausible explanation for their delay in moving to set aside the judgment.

The Court of Appeal rejected an attempt to introduce fresh evidence regarding an alleged forbearance agreement, finding it would fail the Palmer test as the evidence was available at the time of the original motion.

The appeal was dismissed with costs awarded to the respondent.

The appellant, an Ontario lawyer, appealed the dismissal of his application for a declaration that his professional liability insurer had a duty to defend and indemnify him in an action brought by a former client.

The Court of Appeal upheld the application judge's finding that the professional services giving rise to the claim were performed in St. Kitts and related to the laws of St. Kitts and Nevis.

As such, the services fell outside the coverage of the insurer's policy, which was limited to professional services with respect to the laws of Canada.

The appeal was dismissed.

The respondents, owners of cottage lots, had historically used the appellants' waterfront lots to access the beach.

The trial judge dismissed the respondents' claim for a prescriptive easement but granted them the right to use the beach based on proprietary estoppel.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding that the elements of proprietary estoppel were not met.

The respondents knew they only had permission to use the beach, there was no inducement by the appellants, the respondents did not act to their detriment, and it was not unconscionable for the appellants to withdraw their permission.

In an addendum to an appeal decision released on January 8, 2010, the Court of Appeal for Ontario fixed the costs of the dismissed appeal.

The respondent was awarded costs fixed in the sum of $40,000, inclusive of disbursements and GST.

The cross-appeal was dismissed without costs.

The appellant appealed a judgment enforcing his personal guarantee of loans, arguing the loans had already been paid.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no palpable and overriding error in the motion judge's conclusion that the record did not support the appellant's claim of payment.

The appellant appealed an order dismissing her action.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the case turned on the application of s. 5(1)(b) of the Limitations Act, 2002.

The court held that the appellant failed to meet her evidentiary burden to establish due diligence.

The appellant appealed the dismissal of his application for the appointment of an arbitrator under the Arbitration Act, 1991.

The application judge had dismissed the application on the basis that the underlying contract, and therefore the arbitration clause, had terminated.

The Court of Appeal found that the application judge erred, as the arbitration clause survived the termination of the contract and the question of termination was itself subject to arbitration.

However, the Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal because the appellant, acting in his personal capacity, was not a party to the arbitration agreement between the respondent and the corporation.

The moving party brought a motion to quash an appeal of an order directing it to pay principal and accrued interest to the respondents and to pay further sums into court.

The moving party argued the order was interlocutory and that the respondents were estopped from appealing because they had derived a benefit from the order.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the motion to quash, finding that the order was final in respect of the respondents' secured priority position.

The Court also held that the respondents were not estopped from appealing, as they had complied with the order and immediately notified the moving party of their intention to appeal.

The appellant appealed an order of the Superior Court of Justice.

The Court of Appeal for Ontario disposed of the appeal by issuing an order on the terms of the consent filed by the parties.

The appellants brought an action against the respondents, who were compliance officers and directors/officers of an investment firm, alleging negligence, fraud, breach of contract, and breach of fiduciary duty related to improvident investments.

The respondents successfully moved to strike the claims against them on the basis that they owed no duty of care to the appellants.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal set aside the order to strike, holding that the claims were novel and the determination of whether a duty of care existed required a full factual record applying the Anns/Kamloops test, rather than being decided at the pleadings stage.