Civil Litigation - Defendant - OCA

This motion concerns applications for leave to intervene as friends of the court in an appeal involving a municipal transit authority's refusal to post a political advertisement.

The motion judge considered four proposed interveners: Egale Canada, Free Speech Union of Canada, Charter Advocates Canada, and Association for Reformed Political Action.

The court applied the established test for intervention in constitutional cases, which is more relaxed than in non-constitutional matters.

The motion judge granted leave to Egale Canada and Association for Reformed Political Action, finding they had distinct perspectives and real, substantial interests in the subject matter.

The motions by Free Speech Union of Canada and Charter Advocates Canada were dismissed as they failed to demonstrate how their participation would assist the court or provide perspectives distinct from the immediate parties.

This endorsement addresses the costs arising from an appeal where VAC Developments Limited's counterclaim against Mr. Williams was dismissed.

The Court of Appeal had previously dismissed VAC's appeal from that judgment.

Mr. Williams sought full indemnity costs for the appeal and a fresh evidence motion, but the court awarded partial indemnity costs for the appeal, finding no grounds for a heightened award.

For the fresh evidence motion, which was occasioned by an unsupported allegation in Mr. Williams' factum, the court awarded reduced costs to Mr. Williams and also to Mr. Lakhani, a third party who intervened, acknowledging their partial responsibility for the motion's necessity.

Stahle Construction Inc. appealed a trial judgment ordering it to pay general damages, out-of-pocket expenses, and costs to its former employee, Roberto Soave, for improper termination of long-term disability (LTD) coverage.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, affirming the trial judge's finding that Mr. Soave was disabled and eligible for LTD benefits prior to a car accident, despite Stahle's arguments regarding evidentiary burden and pleading.

The court found no palpable or overriding error in the trial judge's mixed findings of fact and law regarding disability and upheld the decision to determine the remitted issue.

The applicant, Songfu Liu, sought an extension of time to appeal the dismissal of his medical malpractice action against Dr. Jonathan Chan.

The original action alleged fraud and misrepresentation regarding a prostate cancer diagnosis and subsequent surgery.

The motion judge had dismissed the applicant's claims, finding no evidence of fraud and that the applicant's own expert supported the respondent's medical care.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the motion for an extension of time, finding that while the delay was short and excusable (due to a common self-represented litigant's mistake about appeal period commencement), the proposed appeal was entirely devoid of merit, seeking to re-argue factual findings without identifying legal errors.

The court emphasized that the "justice of the case" required an end to the unfounded allegations.

The appellant, Trevor Goble, appealed an order declaring him a vexatious litigant under s. 140 of the Courts of Justice Act.

He argued the motion judge erred in assessing evidence, credibility findings, and that Marie Pyper lacked authority to bring the application for Onyx Community Services, and that there were no prior matters to support the finding.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the motion judge's application of principles or assessment of evidence, including the appellant's long history of vexatious proceedings.

The court also found the application was properly authorized.

Costs were awarded to the respondents on a substantial indemnity basis, deeming the appeal frivolous and vexatious.

The appellants, an investment syndicate holding a first mortgage, appealed an order denying their priority over a second mortgagee (Greenpath) for certain disputed amounts from a power of sale.

The application judge found these amounts were not properly part of the first mortgage and constituted prohibited penalties under s. 8(1) of the Interest Act.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, affirming that the forbearance agreement was separate from the first mortgage and not enforceable against the second mortgagee, and that the disputed prepayment and default fees were unlawful penalties under the Interest Act due to lack of evidence proving they were legitimate costs.

This appeal concerned a dispute over loan repayments within a complex tax shelter scheme.

The appellants, two corporations (Fincos), sought repayment of loans advanced to an investor.

The investor argued that earlier loans were statute-barred and later loans were satisfied by preferred shares held in trust.

The Court of Appeal upheld the trial judge's findings: the claims for earlier loans were statute-barred due to an agency relationship establishing the commencement of the limitation period, and the later loans were indeed repayable and satisfied by the transfer and cancellation of preferred shares, interpreting the various agreements holistically.

The court dismissed the appeal and the cross-appeal, finding the cross-appeal moot given the main findings.

This is an appeal from a judgment dismissing an action against the Regional Municipality of Durham for failing to keep a roadway in a reasonable state of repair, following a motor vehicle accident that caused life-altering injuries to the plaintiff.

The trial judge found the road was not in a state of non-repair and did not pose an unreasonable risk to an ordinary reasonable driver, also noting the driver's excessive speed and distraction.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no extricable error of law in the trial judge's analysis.

The appellate court affirmed that the trial judge correctly applied the four-part test for municipal negligence, considering the driver's conduct as one factor among others in assessing the road's condition relative to an ordinary reasonable driver, without conflating the driver's negligence with the road's state of non-repair.

The appellant appealed an order striking his statement of claim without leave to amend and dismissing his action.

The action alleged mistreatment by professors and York University, and sought damages, an investigation by the Ministry of Advanced Education and Skills Development, and the establishment of an independent tribunal.

The motion judge found no reasonable cause of action.

The Court of Appeal affirmed, holding that the Ministry owed no duty of care to post-secondary students regarding administrative complaints and could not intervene in the internal management of an autonomous university.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant appealed a summary judgment dismissing his claim for constructive dismissal and other related relief.

The Court of Appeal found no error in the motion judge's decision to focus on the constructive dismissal claim, as it was central to all other claims (intentional infliction of mental distress, human rights violation, punitive damages).

The court also upheld the motion judge's refusal to grant an adjournment and her approach to summary judgment, noting that the employer had made reasonable efforts to accommodate the appellant, which were frustrated by the appellant's non-compliance.

The appeal was dismissed, and costs were awarded to the respondent.

This appeal concerns a motion to change a custody and access order.

The trial judge rejected a proposed settlement negotiated by the parties during trial without providing reasons, then proceeded to hear the trial and rendered a decision maintaining the children's primary residence with the respondent in the Niagara region rather than allowing them to move to Ottawa with the appellant.

The majority upheld the trial judge's decision on the merits, finding that although the trial judge erred in failing to provide reasons for rejecting the settlement, the findings made after trial confirm the custody order was in the children's best interests.

The majority reduced the costs award from $40,000 to $30,000.

Justice Nordheimer dissented, arguing that the trial judge's knowledge of the settlement terms compromised his impartiality and that the settlement should have been approved.

The appellant appealed from a motion judge's order dismissing his claim against the respondent regarding unauthorized charges to his credit card.

The Court of Appeal found no basis to interfere with the motion judge's decision.

The court noted that while the respondent's first affidavit contained inaccuracies regarding credit agency collections, these were corrected in a second affidavit before the motion judge.

The appellant failed to adduce evidence regarding two new charges he raised at the initial return of the motion, despite the motion judge adjourning to permit him to do so.

The court also found no error in the motion judge's cost order and dismissed the appeal with costs awarded to the respondent.

The respondent bank sought indemnity under an insurance policy for losses arising from a Ponzi scheme operated by a customer.

The bank obtained partial summary judgment on the interpretation of the "direct financial loss" element of the fidelity coverage section.

The appellants (insurers) appealed, arguing the motion judge erred in granting partial summary judgment on a constituent element of a claim rather than on the claim itself, failed to interpret the policy as a whole, adopted a theory of liability not advanced by the parties, and misconstrued the relief sought by the appellants.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, set aside the order, and directed the action to proceed to trial.

The appellant appealed an order of Justice Pollak of the Superior Court of Justice.

The Court of Appeal agreed with the decision of the lower court and dismissed the appeal.

The insured, a pizza delivery company, was sued after a pedestrian was struck by one of its delivery vehicles.

The plaintiff alleged the insured's '30 minutes or free' delivery policy and failure to screen drivers constituted negligent business practices.

The insurer denied a duty to defend, relying on an automobile exclusion clause in the commercial general liability policy.

The application judge found the business practice claims were independent of the automobile use and ordered the insurer to defend.

The Court of Appeal allowed the insurer's appeal, holding that the non-automobile claims were derivative of the negligent operation of a motor vehicle and therefore caught by the exclusion clause.

The appellants appealed a trial judgment awarding damages for a brain injury sustained in a motor vehicle accident.

They argued the trial judge erred in relying on the opinion of a psychiatrist over other specialists who found no brain injury.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that the expert was qualified to give the opinion and the trial judge made no palpable and overriding error in preferring it.

The court also upheld the trial judge's findings on lost income and the application of a tax gross-up on future care costs.

The appellant's personal injury action arising from a motor vehicle accident was dismissed by the motion judge due to her failure to fulfill undertakings given during examinations for discovery while self-represented.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal and reinstated the action, finding that the motion judge failed to balance the prejudice to the appellant against any prejudice to the respondents, who provided no evidence of prejudice.

The court emphasized that a potentially meritorious claim should not be dismissed on procedural grounds unless the defendant demonstrates prejudice to their ability to defend the claim.

The appellant appealed a trial judgment dismissing its claim for breach of fiduciary duty arising from commercial negotiations.

The appellant argued the trial judge erred in applying the law of fiduciary obligations to parties negotiating towards an agreement.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no palpable or overriding error in the trial judge's conclusion that none of the indicia of a fiduciary duty were present, as the appellant did not repose trust of a confidential nature and was not vulnerable.

The plaintiff, an Ontario resident, was injured in a single-car accident in New York State while a passenger in a vehicle owned and driven by Ontario residents.

The plaintiff brought an action in Ontario.

The motions judge applied the lex fori (Ontario law) as an exception to the general rule of lex loci delicti, reasoning that all parties were from Ontario and applying Ontario's no-fault policy was appropriate.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, holding that the lex loci delicti (New York law) must apply.

The Court found that the narrow exception to the rule in Tolofson v. Jensen is only available to avoid an injustice, and mere differences in public policy or damage recovery schemes between jurisdictions do not constitute such an injustice.

The respondent judgment creditor brought a motion to the Court of Appeal for an order allowing the sheriff to seize all assets of a corporation found to be the appellant's alter ego, after the appellant filed a proposal under the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act.

The Court of Appeal declined to grant the relief, finding that while it might have jurisdiction under the Rules of Civil Procedure, matters regarding the enforcement of judgments and bankruptcy stays are properly dealt with by the Superior Court or Bankruptcy Court.

The motion was dismissed, with an interim order preserving the status quo until the matter is brought in the appropriate forum.