OCA 2012

The appellant appealed an order varying child support, alleging she did not receive proper notice of the variation motion and therefore did not attend.

The respondent sought an adjournment because the appellant failed to pay two costs orders, which the court declined.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that even if there was a technical defect in service, the appellant had direct knowledge of the motion.

Two first party insurers paid statutory accident benefits to their insureds and made requests for loss transfer from second party insurers.

The second party insurers refused to pay, and the first party insurers initiated arbitration proceedings.

The second party insurers argued the claims were barred by the Limitations Act, 2002.

The Court of Appeal held that the two-year limitation period for loss transfer claims begins to run the day after the first party insurer makes a demand for loss transfer, not from the date the second party insurer definitively refuses to indemnify.

The appeals by the first party insurers were dismissed.

The appellant appealed from his conviction and sentence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error in principle and concluding that the sentence was within the fit range given the trial judge's finding of a pattern of ongoing misconduct.

The appellants appealed a Superior Court decision that set aside an arbitrator's interlocutory orders, an order striking statements of defence, a final arbitral award, and removed the arbitrator.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal in part, holding that the application judge erred in setting aside the interlocutory orders, as the Arbitration Act does not permit judicial intervention for procedural decisions.

However, the Court upheld the setting aside of the order striking the pleadings and the final award, finding that the respondents were treated unfairly because their bankruptcy made compliance with the interlocutory orders legally impossible.

The removal of the arbitrator was also upheld.

The appellant appealed the dismissal of his claim for a share of profits made by the respondent from the purchase and resale of a recreational property.

At trial, the appellant claimed an agreement to jointly purchase and market the property, which the trial judge rejected.

On appeal, the appellant argued breach of fiduciary duty and sought 100% of the profits.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that breach of fiduciary duty was not pleaded at trial, the record did not support an agency or fiduciary relationship, and the appellant had repudiated his agreement to purchase the property before the respondent resold it.

The appellant appealed a summary judgment enforcing a California default judgment against him.

He argued that the California court's jurisdiction was obtained by fraud, specifically alleging that the complaint falsely claimed he signed certain contracts.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding a real and substantial connection between the causes of action and California, and concluding that the appellant failed to present evidence of fraud going to jurisdiction.

The court held that the appellant was improperly attempting to re-litigate facts already determined by the default judgment.

The applicants challenged a City of Toronto by-law imposing an annual tax on third-party signs, arguing it was an ultra vires indirect tax, discriminatory, and that existing signs were grandfathered under the City of Toronto Act.

The application judge upheld the by-law but found existing signs were grandfathered and granted a sealing order over the applicants' financial information.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the applicants' appeals, finding the tax was direct and not discriminatory.

The Court allowed the City's cross-appeal, holding that the grandfathering provision applies only to regulatory by-laws, not taxing by-laws, and that the sealing order was unjustified under the Dagenais/Mentuck test.

The proposed representative plaintiff in a class proceeding alleged misrepresentations by the defendant, Canadian Solar Inc., in its secondary market disclosure.

The defendant's shares traded only on the NASDAQ exchange, not in Canada.

The defendant appealed a motion judge's finding that it was a 'responsible issuer' under s. 138.1 of the Securities Act.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that the definition of 'responsible issuer' does not require the issuer's securities to be publicly traded in Canada, provided the issuer has a real and substantial connection to Ontario.

The appellant, owner of a commercial plaza, was sued after a worker was electrocuted while working on a pylon sign.

The appellant sought a declaration that the respondent insurer, who issued a policy to one of the appellant's tenants naming the appellant as an additional insured 'as landlord only', had a duty to defend the claim.

The application judge dismissed the application, declining to consider extrinsic evidence regarding who hired the worker.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the extrinsic evidence was not undisputed and, even if admitted, would not trigger a duty to defend because the true nature of the claim was against the appellant as owner of the plaza, not as landlord.

The appellant was convicted in two separate trials of assault causing bodily harm, criminal harassment, and drug trafficking offences.

He received a 5-year sentence for the assault and an 8-year sentence for the drug offences, resulting in a global sentence of 13 years.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal found that the second sentencing judge failed to adequately consider the totality principle.

The appeal was allowed, and the sentence for the drug offences was reduced to 5 years consecutive, resulting in a global sentence of 10 years.

The appellants appealed a Divisional Court decision upholding an Ontario Securities Commission order that imposed significant administrative monetary penalties (AMPs) for failing to report insider trades and failing to adequately supervise trading.

The appellants argued that the AMP provision of the Securities Act, which allows fines up to $1 million per infraction, violates s. 11(d) of the Charter because its magnitude constitutes a true penal consequence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that the constitutionality of an administrative penalty is assessed based on the actual penalty imposed, not the theoretical maximum.

The court found the fines were proportionate to the regulatory goal of deterring non-compliance in capital markets and did not amount to a penal sanction.

The court also upheld the Commission's findings regarding the appellants' failure to supervise and its consideration of the public interest in determining the sanctions.

The appellant appealed a summary judgment dismissing his action for negligence and malicious prosecution against a security guard and other parties.

The action arose after the appellant was arrested based on the security guard's identification, though charges were later withdrawn.

The Court of Appeal upheld the motion judge's finding that the appellant failed to plead necessary facts or establish a causal connection between the security guard's actions and the arrest, which was an independent police decision.

The appeal was dismissed.

The Attorney General of Canada brought a motion to stay an order adding two schools to Schedule F of the Indian Residential Schools Settlement Agreement pending appeal.

The moving party argued the order triggered an automatic stay under Rule 63.01(1) or warranted a discretionary stay under Rule 63.02(1).

The Court of Appeal dismissed the motion, finding the order did not create a fixed debt obligation and the balance of convenience favoured the respondents, as a stay would prejudice former students' ability to apply for compensation.

A cross-motion to determine the effective date of the order found the notice of appeal was delivered out of time, but the court extended the time to appeal and expedited the hearing.

The appellant bank appealed a trial judgment awarding the respondent damages for constructive dismissal.

The respondent, a senior manager, was relieved of his supervisory duties following employee complaints and offered reassignment options, which he declined.

The trial judge found he was constructively dismissed and had no duty to mitigate by accepting the new positions.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no palpable and overriding error in the trial judge's application of the Evans test, as returning to the bank would have subjected the respondent to an atmosphere of embarrassment or humiliation.

The appellant appealed a conviction for sexual abuse, arguing the trial judge reversed the burden of proof, set up a false dichotomy, and gave unreasonable weight to demeanour evidence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the trial judge correctly applied the W.(D.) principles and properly considered demeanour as only one of many factors in assessing credibility.

The appellants sought leave to appeal their sentences for failing to provide the necessaries of life, arguing that previous case law established a sentencing range of four to eight months for first offenders.

The Court of Appeal disagreed that the cited case established such a range.

Finding no error of law, the court refused leave to appeal.

The appellant appealed a treatment order but was found fit to stand trial shortly after the order was made.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal as moot, declining to exercise its discretion to hear the case because the broader issues of principle regarding treatment orders were already under reserve in another case, and the remaining issues were fact-specific.

The appellant appealed a Disposition Order of the Ontario Review Board.

With the advice of counsel, the appellant chose to proceed with a review of that disposition instead.

Consequently, the Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal as moot.

The young person appealed a finding of guilt for extortion.

The trial judge provided only half a page of analysis after a ten-day trial, failing to address significant inconsistencies in the evidence or specify which of the five alleged incidents constituted the extortion.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal and ordered a new trial, holding that the trial judge's reasons were insufficient and demonstrated a failure to consider the whole of the evidence.

Several civil liberties and HIV/AIDS organizations brought motions to intervene in an appeal concerning the constitutionality of the Marihuana Medical Access Regulations.

The Crown opposed the interventions, arguing the appeal was fact-based and the interventions would be duplicative or prejudicial.

The court granted the motions to intervene, finding that the proposed interveners would provide unique viewpoints on the broader legal and constitutional issues without causing injustice to the parties or prejudicing the appeal process.