OCA 2012

The Union appealed a Divisional Court decision that quashed an Ontario Labour Relations Board (OLRB) decision.

The OLRB vice-chair had ruled that he had jurisdiction under s. 133 of the Labour Relations Act, 1995 to extend the time for referring a grievance to arbitration, despite the mandatory 14-day time limit in the collective agreement having expired.

The Divisional Court found this decision unreasonable, holding that once the time limit expired, the grievance was deemed settled and there was nothing left to refer to arbitration.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the Union's appeal, agreeing with the Divisional Court that the OLRB's interpretation of s. 133 was unreasonable and that the OLRB cannot ignore the express mandatory timelines in a collective agreement.

The appellant, a shipping agent, was sued in Ontario for the loss of cargo stolen from a Quebec warehouse.

The appellant brought a third-party claim against the Quebec warehouse operator.

The motion judge stayed the third-party claim for lack of jurisdiction.

On appeal, the appellant argued that the existence of a proper third-party claim under Rule 29 should be recognized as a new presumptive connecting factor under the Van Breda framework.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that a third-party claim without a factual connection to Ontario does not establish a real and substantial connection to assume jurisdiction over a foreign party.

The appellant appealed the dismissal of its motion to stay or dismiss an Ontario action commenced by the respondent.

The appellant relied on a forum selection clause in a Confidentiality Agreement designating Pennsylvania courts.

The motion judge had found the agreement unenforceable for lack of consideration because the respondent provided services through a corporate entity.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding that the Consulting and Confidentiality Agreements must be read together as a composite whole, and that the mutual promises regarding access to and protection of proprietary information constituted valid consideration.

The cross-appeal was dismissed, and the Ontario action was stayed.

The plaintiff brought a class action against the Attorney General of Canada alleging Health Canada was negligent in regulating temporomandibular joint implants.

The defendant moved to decertify the action, arguing the pleadings did not establish a private law duty of care.

On a special case stated to the Court of Appeal, the court held that while a regulator's public statements alone do not create proximity, the plaintiff's allegations that Health Canada repeatedly misrepresented the safety of the implants and failed to correct the misrepresentation despite knowing the risks could arguably establish a prima facie duty of care.

The motion was granted, allowing the claim to proceed.

The appellant appealed his sentence of five years' imprisonment for robbery and related offences, arguing it violated the parity and jump principles.

The Court of Appeal dismissed these arguments, finding the appellant's circumstances and criminal record differed significantly from his co-accused, and the jump principle did not apply due to the dramatic increase in the seriousness of his crimes.

However, the court allowed the appeal in part to quash a restitution order, as the Crown conceded the stolen funds had been fully recovered.

The appellants appealed an order dismissing their claim for statutory rescission of a franchise agreement.

The Court of Appeal agreed with the motion judge that the notice of rescission was provided more than two years after the franchise agreement was entered into, pursuant to s. 6(2).

The appeal was dismissed, as it was plain and obvious the claim could not succeed.

The appellant appealed the sentence imposed by the trial judge.

The Court of Appeal found that the trial judge was fully aware of and took account of the relevant factors, and found no error in the sentence.

The sentence appeal was dismissed.

The appellant real estate agent sued the respondent vendor for unpaid commission and brought a motion under Rule 45.02 to have the proceeds of the sale, held in trust by the vendor's solicitor, paid into court pending trial.

The master granted the motion, but the Divisional Court allowed the appeal.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appellant's appeal, clarifying that while Rule 45.02 does not require a plaintiff to claim a proprietary right to a specific fund, the plaintiff must claim a legal right to the fund.

Because the appellant's claim was for damages for breach of contract rather than a legal right to the specific trust funds, the test for payment into court was not met.

The appellant appealed a decision finding that a prior order declaring the jurisdiction of the Ontario court was a final order, rather than a temporary one.

The Court of Appeal agreed with the motion judge that the parties had consented to the jurisdiction of the Ontario court for all purposes.

The appeal was dismissed, along with a motion to introduce fresh evidence, and costs were awarded to the respondent.

The appellant, a youthful first offender, appealed his sentence.

The Court of Appeal found the sentence excessive and held that the trial judge erred by relying on unsworn, uncontested statements from the appellant's father regarding the appellant's need for drug treatment.

The appeal was allowed, and a sentence in the terms of the joint submission was substituted.

Several First Nations and a mining company brought motions to intervene in an appeal concerning Aboriginal harvesting rights under Treaty 3 and Ontario's jurisdiction to grant logging permits.

The court granted friend of the court status to Grand Council of Treaty 3, Lac Seul First Nation, Big Grassy First Nation, and Treaty 6 First Nations, finding their perspectives would assist the court.

The court granted party status to Goldcorp Inc. and Wabauskang First Nation, finding they had a direct interest in the subject matter and could be adversely affected by the broad declaration under appeal.

The interveners were ordered to accept the record as it is and not expand the issues.

The appellant law firm appealed directions issued by an Administrative Judge regarding the review of legal fees under the Indian Residential Schools Settlement Agreement.

The Administrative Judge had ruled that decisions of the Chief Adjudicator in the fee review process are not subject to appeal or judicial review.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the motion to quash the appeal, finding it had jurisdiction.

However, the Court dismissed the appeal on the merits, holding that a Chief Adjudicator's decision is only reviewable by an Administrative Judge in very limited circumstances where it fails to enforce the provisions of the Settlement Agreement, which the appellant failed to establish.

The appellant appealed a first degree murder conviction, arguing that the verdict was unreasonable because the Crown's case was entirely circumstantial and that police vetting of prospective jurors constituted an abuse of process.

The court applied the unreasonable verdict standard and held that the cumulative effect of the evidence of motive, opportunity, access, and post-offence conduct was capable of supporting findings of unlawful killing, murder, and planning and deliberation.

The court also held that police checks for criminal records and outstanding charges, without Crown involvement and without any resulting unfairness in jury selection, did not amount to a per se abuse of process.

The appeal was dismissed.

The moving party father brought a motion at the Court of Appeal for unsupervised access to his child pending his appeal of a Superior Court decision dismissing his Hague Convention application.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the motion, finding it lacked jurisdiction under the Children's Law Reform Act, which restricts such motions to the Superior Court or Family Court.

In the alternative, the court held that even if it had jurisdiction, it would dismiss the motion on the merits due to a real risk that the father would remove the child to Peru.

The testator left a life interest in the residue of his estate to his wife, directing that upon her death, the residue be divided equally between his son and daughter, 'per stirpes'.

The son predeceased the life tenant, leaving his estate to his second wife.

The application judge held that the phrase 'per stirpes' indicated an intention to benefit the son's children, rather than his estate or the surviving daughter.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that while a gift to named children 'per stirpes' can be contradictory, in this context it conveyed the testator's intention to benefit his children's children if either child predeceased the life tenant.

The appellant appealed a carriage order made by the Superior Court of Justice in a class proceeding.

The Court of Appeal concluded that the carriage order is an interlocutory order, meaning the court lacked jurisdiction to hear the appeal.

The appeal was dismissed, with the court noting that the proper route is to the Divisional Court by way of leave to appeal.

The appellant withdrew its appeal from the order of the Divisional Court.

The Court of Appeal ordered the appeal withdrawn with prejudice and without costs.

The moving party brought a motion to quash the appellant's appeal from a Superior Court order.

The Superior Court judge had dismissed the appellant's appeal of a master's order setting aside a noting in default.

The appellant argued the judge erred in referring the matter to a master and that the master's order was final.

The Court of Appeal rejected these arguments, finding the referral was permitted under Rule 37.15(1.1) and the order remained interlocutory.

The motion was granted and the appeal was quashed.

The appellant appealed a summary judgment ordering him to pay approximately $500,000 and deliver possession of his property to the respondent bank.

The bank had demanded payment on a secured line of credit after the Canada Revenue Agency registered a lien against the property without the bank's consent, which violated the loan contract.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the appellant's allegations of identity fraud did not alter the fact that the contract was breached by the CRA lien.

The court also upheld the dismissal of the appellant's counterclaim and the award of substantial indemnity costs.

The appellant's disability benefits were suspended for failing to provide required financial information.

Two years later, she requested an extension of time for an internal review, which the Director denied.

The Social Benefits Tribunal reinstated her benefits, finding her disabilities prevented timely compliance.

The Divisional Court overturned the Tribunal's decision, ruling it lacked jurisdiction due to the one-year limitation period for appeals.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, confirming that the Tribunal lacked jurisdiction because the appeal was statute-barred and the Director's refusal to extend the time for an internal review was a prescribed decision that could not be appealed.