OCA 2011

The appellant appealed an order allowing the respondent to enforce an arbitration award.

The appellant argued that enforcement should be refused on public policy grounds under art. 36(1)(b)(ii) of the UNCITRAL Model Law because the respondent had brought related proceedings in the United Kingdom.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that a legal dispute over choice of law and legal rights does not rise to the level of a public policy violation sufficient to defeat the enforcement of an arbitration award.

The appellants sought access to the back of their property across a grassy strip of city-owned land bordering a cul-de-sac.

The city council denied the request.

The application judge ruled the appellants had no right of access but found the city's process was tainted by bad faith and ordered a new hearing.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal upheld the finding that the grassy strip was not part of the public road, dismissing the appellants' appeal.

The Court allowed the city's cross-appeal, finding the application judge misapprehended the evidence and improperly applied adjudicative procedural fairness standards to an elected municipal council.

The appellant employer appealed a trial judgment, arguing the respondent employee failed to mitigate her damages by not returning to work.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the trial judge correctly applied the test from Evans v. Teamsters Union and that the evidence supported the conclusion that the respondent was not required to return to work.

The appellant appealed his sentence for impaired driving and driving while disqualified, arguing the sentencing judge failed to apply the 'step' and 'gap' principles and erred by not granting 1:1 credit for time spent in a rehabilitation centre while on bail.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the 24-month sentence reasonable given the appellant's extensive record of similar offences.

The court held that because the sentencing judge had already reduced the sentence length to account for the appellant's rehabilitation efforts, she was not required to grant additional pre-sentence custody credit for the time spent in rehab.

The plaintiffs sued Canada in the Superior Court of Justice, alleging complicity in their torture by foreign governments and Charter violations.

Canada redacted disclosed documents under s. 38 of the Canada Evidence Act, claiming privilege on national security grounds, and applied to the Federal Court to confirm the prohibition on disclosure.

The plaintiffs moved in the Superior Court for unredacted production, arguing s. 38 unconstitutionally deprived the Superior Court of its core jurisdiction under s. 96 of the Constitution Act, 1867.

The Court of Appeal held that s. 38 is constitutionally valid at the pre-trial stage because pre-trial discovery against the Crown did not exist at Confederation, and set aside the motion judge's declaration regarding s. 38's validity at trial as premature.

The appellant appealed the dismissal of his action for abuse of statutory authority and defamation against the Institute of Chartered Accountants of Ontario and its officials.

The appellant argued that an allegedly defamatory e-mail was not protected by qualified privilege because it was made maliciously.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no basis to interfere with the trial judge's conclusion that the e-mail was sent on an occasion of qualified privilege, without malice, and within the scope of a confidential regulatory process.

The appellant municipality was successful on appeal and sought costs for the proceedings before the application judge and the Court of Appeal.

The Court of Appeal awarded costs to the appellant on a party and party basis.

Ontario was ordered to pay the costs of the application ($50,000), factum motion ($2,000), and appeal ($35,000).

Lac Seul First Nation and Northern Nishnawbe Education Council were ordered to pay the costs of the stay motion ($6,000).

No costs were awarded for or against Canada.

The appellant appealed a finding of not criminally responsible (NCR) on account of mental disorder.

He argued that the trial judge improperly reversed the onus of proof and provided inadequate reasons.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that the trial judge correctly required the Crown to prove the NCR status on a balance of probabilities and that the reasons adequately explained the reliance on unchallenged expert evidence.

The plaintiff appealed a decision setting aside a Master's order that allowed her to add an independent contractor and a truck driver as defendants after the expiry of the limitation period.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the plaintiff failed to act diligently after learning of the independent contractor's involvement and did not provide a reasonable explanation for the delay under section 4 of the Limitations Act, 2002.

The court varied the costs order to reflect the proposed defendants' success on the motion.

The appellant requested an adjournment of his appeal, which was dismissed due to his failure to appear despite ample notice.

The appeal itself was dismissed as moot because the appellant had already filed a fourth statement of claim that conformed with the order under appeal, and the respondents had filed a statement of defence.

The appellant was ordered to pay costs of $6,600.

The appellant was convicted of first degree murder for the death of his friend, and acquitted of second degree murder for the death of his estranged wife in a separate trial.

He appealed the conviction, arguing the trial judge erred in instructions regarding intoxication, propensity evidence, Vetrovec warnings, and an 'honest witness' presumption.

The Crown appealed the acquittal, arguing the trial judge erred in excluding evidence of the friend's subsequent murder as after-the-fact conduct.

The Court of Appeal dismissed both appeals, finding the jury instructions in the first trial were adequate overall despite minor errors, and the trial judge in the second trial made no reversible error in balancing the probative value and prejudicial effect of the excluded evidence.

The appellant appealed a summary judgment dismissing her action and granting the respondent bank's counterclaim for monies owed under a residential mortgage.

The appellant argued that as an innocent victim of mortgage fraud, the bank should bear the loss as it was in a superior position to avoid the fraud.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, agreeing with the motion judge that the appellant was in the best position to detect the fraud had she read the documents she signed.

Furthermore, the appellant was not entirely innocent, having agreed to serve as an accommodation mortgagor for a stranger for compensation, thereby actively facilitating the fraudulent scheme.

The applicant brought a motion seeking to appeal a Superior Court decision dismissing its appeal from an arbitration award without obtaining leave.

The applicant argued that section 6(1)(b) of the Courts of Justice Act provided an appeal as of right, despite section 49 of the Arbitration Act requiring leave.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the motion, holding that the specific provisions of the Arbitration Act prevail over the general provisions of the Courts of Justice Act, and therefore leave to appeal is required.

The appellant appealed his convictions for sexual assault, gross indecency, and sexual exploitation of a young relative, as well as his three-year sentence.

The Court of Appeal found no error in the trial judge's credibility assessments or reliance on corroborative evidence.

The court also upheld the sentence, noting the trial judge correctly identified the minimum three-year range for sexual offences against a child by an adult in a position of trust, and appropriately weighed mitigating factors.

The appellant appealed the dismissal of a habeas corpus application regarding the refusal to transfer him from a medium security institution to a minimum security institution.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the appellant was treated fairly and that there were ample reasons for the medium security designation, including his membership in a criminal organization.

The appellant, a lawyer, retained the respondent law firm to assist her at a trial.

The respondent's initial estimate of costs was $50,000, but the final accounts exceeded $150,000.

The assessment officer found the accounts reasonable, noting the work was done at the appellant's behest, and the Superior Court dismissed the appellant's appeal.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the further appeal, finding no error in principle in the assessment officer's conclusion that the accounts were reasonable given the circumstances.

The appellant appealed an order striking his statement of claim against his employer and five co-workers for defamation and other torts arising from workplace disputes.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that the appellant's claims were governed by the Public Service Labour Relations Act, which requires such disputes to be addressed through the grievance procedure in lieu of any right of action.

The court also declined to address Charter allegations not included in the statement of claim.

The appellant was convicted of second degree murder for the brutal beating death of his wife and sentenced to life imprisonment with 15 years of parole ineligibility.

On appeal, he argued the trial judge erred in admitting a statement to police, failing to correct Crown closing arguments, and failing to properly instruct the jury on post-offence conduct and mens rea.

He also appealed the 15-year parole ineligibility period.

The Court of Appeal dismissed both the conviction and sentence appeals, finding no reversible errors in the trial judge's rulings or jury instructions, and upholding the sentence due to the severe aggravating factors of the offence.

The appellant appealed his dangerous offender designation and indeterminate sentence for the aggravated assault of a woman he had been dating.

He argued that the sentencing judge erred in excluding the possibility that his risk to the public could be managed in the community under a long-term offender designation.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the sentencing judge's conclusion that the appellant's risk could not be controlled in the community was amply supported by the record.

The appellant appealed his conviction for sexual offences, arguing the trial judge erred in admitting the evidence of two complainants as similar fact evidence due to potential collusion.

The Court of Appeal found the trial judge thoroughly and correctly addressed the possibility of collusion, both as deliberate concoction and as the potential impact of their discussions on the independence of their evidence.

The trial judge's finding that the evidence was not the product of concoction was upheld.

The appeal was dismissed, with the Court noting the case against the appellant was overwhelming.