OCA 2011

The appellants were injured in a motor vehicle accident and held an insurance policy with a $1 million family protection coverage limit (OPCF 44R).

The tortfeasor also had a $1 million insurance limit.

Because the tortfeasor's limit might be apportioned among four injured parties, the appellants sought to access their underinsurance coverage to make up any shortfall.

The Court of Appeal upheld the summary judgment dismissing the claim against the insurer, confirming that underinsurance coverage is not triggered when the tortfeasor's policy limit equals the family protection coverage limit, regardless of the number of claimants.

The appellant's basement flooded after a municipal culvert became blocked during a major storm.

The appellant sued the city for negligence, alleging inadequate inspection and maintenance.

The trial judge dismissed the action, finding the appellant failed to establish causation because the culvert likely became blocked during the storm itself.

The Court of Appeal found no palpable and overriding error in the trial judge's conclusions on causation or damages and dismissed the appeal.

The appellant sued the respondents for unlawful interference with economic relations, alleging that the respondents' bundling of accounting and TPA services contravened the Rules of Professional Conduct of the Institute of Chartered Accountants of Ontario.

The action was dismissed on summary judgment as statute-barred.

On appeal, the appellant argued the limitation period did not begin until the Professional Conduct Committee issued its disposition on the appellant's complaint.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the appellant knew sufficient material facts to base its allegations well before the committee's disposition, and the discovery of the committee's opinion did not restart the limitation period.

The appellant appealed an order of a Superior Court judge that dismissed his appeal from three interlocutory orders of a Master.

The Court of Appeal quashed the appeal, holding that it lacked jurisdiction because the proper route of appeal from the Superior Court judge's order regarding interlocutory matters was to the Divisional Court with leave.

The appellant appealed his conviction for first degree murder, arguing the trial judge erred in refusing to sever his trial from his co-accused and in his jury instructions on hearsay evidence.

The appellant sought severance to call his co-accused as a witness to support his defence that the killing was not planned and deliberate, but rather the result of an intermittent explosive disorder triggered by taunting.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the refusal to sever, as the co-accused's evidence would not have realistically affected the verdict.

The court also found no error in the hearsay instructions, concluding the appellant had a fair trial.

The appellant appealed a motion judge's decision refusing to permit the addition of lawyer defendants to a statement of claim.

The motion judge had determined the proposed claims were not tenable at law.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding that the proposed fresh as amended statement of claim, which alleged the lawyers provided incorrect advice regarding a share repurchase and litigation exposure, disclosed a tenable cause of action.

The Court also noted the motion judge improperly engaged in an assessment of the merits rather than solely assessing whether the claims were tenable at law.

The Crown appealed a directed verdict of acquittal on a charge of first degree murder.

The trial judge had refused to admit an agreed statement of facts from a youth's guilty plea for the truth of its contents after the youth recanted portions implicating the respondent.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding the trial judge erred in concluding the opportunity to cross-examine the youth was illusory due to solicitor-client privilege and in failing to properly assess circumstantial indications of the statement's reliability.

The appellant appealed a $56,000 restitution order imposed following a joint submission for his minor role in a fraud.

The Court of Appeal found that the trial judge gave insufficient weight to the appellant's future ability to pay, noting he was an immigrant student with limited employment prospects who received little personal benefit from the fraud.

The appeal was allowed and the restitution order was set aside.

The appellant appealed the dismissal of his libel action against the CBC and Warren Kinsella.

The trial judge had dismissed the action as statute-barred because the appellant failed to provide notice within six weeks after the alleged libel came to his attention, as required by s. 5(1) of the Libel and Slander Act.

The Court of Appeal upheld the trial judge's finding that the appellant could reasonably have known of the libel earlier and failed to act diligently to ascertain the facts after learning the gist of the broadcast.

The appeal was dismissed with costs of $25,000.

The appellant appealed a trial judgment that awarded him damages for constructive dismissal but dismissed his claims for aggravated damages, punitive damages, and intentional infliction of mental distress arising from workplace verbal abuse.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no palpable and overriding error in the trial judge's conclusion that the employer's conduct, while creating a poisoned work environment, did not rise to the level required for additional damages.

The respondent's cross-appeal regarding the trial judge's costs award was also dismissed.

The appellant appealed a motion judge's discretionary decision to dismiss his action for delay at a status hearing.

The Court of Appeal found no basis to interfere, noting the appellant failed to provide an acceptable explanation for the delay or demonstrate an absence of prejudice to the respondent regarding his claim for long-term disability benefits.

The appeal was dismissed, and leave to appeal the costs award was denied.

The appellant insurer appealed a trial judgment awarding the respondent insured statutory accident benefits and $25,000 in damages for mental distress following a motor vehicle accident.

The insurer had terminated housekeeping and transportation benefits based on a superficial independent medical examination, ignoring its own occupational therapist's recommendations.

The Court of Appeal upheld the awards for housekeeping benefits, s. 24 assessments, and mental distress, finding that peace of mind is a reasonably contemplated object of an automobile insurance contract.

The court allowed the appeal only to reduce the quantum of transportation benefits from $7,500 to $2,280 due to a lack of evidence supporting the higher amount.

The appellant appealed an order regarding the adequacy of pleadings and whether the respondent was immune from suit.

The Court of Appeal noted that pending judicial review applications in the Divisional Court raised many of the same procedural errors alleged in the pleadings.

The Court adjourned the appeal to await the Divisional Court's decision, as it could impact whether the appellant's pleading could survive based on issue estoppel or res judicata.

The applicant, having been convicted of fraud and having had his conviction appeal dismissed by the Court of Appeal, applied for bail pending his application for leave to appeal to the Supreme Court of Canada.

The court found that while the applicant would surrender into custody and his leave application was assumed not to be frivolous, his detention was necessary in the public interest.

The court held that at this stage of the proceedings, the principle of enforceability of the sentence takes precedence over the principle of reviewability, especially given the tenuous nature of a leave application to the Supreme Court of Canada.

The application for bail was dismissed.

The appellant was convicted of tax evasion after failing to disclose income or pay taxes from 1993 to 1997, based on his belief that federal income tax was unconstitutional.

He appealed his conviction and his sentence of one year in jail.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding he had the requisite mens rea and the trial judge properly handled a juror issue.

However, the Court allowed the sentence appeal, finding the trial judge erred by treating the absence of a conditional sentence in tax evasion cases as an absolute rule and by mischaracterizing aggravating factors.

The jail sentence was varied to a one-year conditional sentence.

The appellant employer was charged under the Occupational Health and Safety Act after an employee was injured by a reversing truck unit that did not have an attached trailer.

The trial judge acquitted the employer, finding the truck was not 'material handling equipment' under s. 56 of the Industrial Establishments Regulation.

The summary conviction appeal court overturned the acquittal.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal restored the acquittal, holding that s. 56 applies only to vehicles that constitute material handling equipment, and not to road vehicles that are not actually or typically used to handle materials.

The insurer appealed an application judge's decision declaring it had a duty to defend the insureds (a mother and her son) in two actions arising from a motor vehicle accident.

The son, a G2 driver, had a blood alcohol concentration greater than zero at the time of the accident, prima facie contravening s. 6(1) of O. Reg. 340/94.

The insurer denied coverage based on a statutory condition prohibiting operation by an unauthorized driver.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, upholding the application judge's findings that s. 6(1) is a strict liability offence, that the son had a reasonable belief his blood alcohol was zero after sleeping for several hours, and that the mother did not know or ought to have known her son was unauthorized to drive when she permitted him to use her vehicle.

The appellants appealed an order of the Superior Court of Justice.

The Court of Appeal found no reversible error in the motion judge's exercise of discretion and dismissed the appeal, awarding costs of $5,000 to the respondents.

The appellant appealed his sentence, arguing that the sentencing judge erred in imposing a consecutive sentence and that there was an unjustified disparity between his sentence and that of his co-accused.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the sentencing judge gave cogent reasons for the consecutive sentence.

The Court also held that the disparity was warranted due to the appellant's longer criminal record, the co-accused's guilty plea, and the co-accused's assistance to the Crown.

The applicant brought a motion to reopen his appeals, which had been administratively dismissed as abandoned.

The Court of Appeal found that the applicant may not have fully appreciated the implications of a court-ordered Not Criminally Responsible (NCR) assessment when he entered his guilty plea, nor that he was abandoning his right to appeal the NCR disposition when he filed his notice of abandonment.

The court ordered the appeal regarding the NCR matters to be reopened in the interests of justice.

However, the application to reopen the appeal from the summary conviction offences was dismissed for lack of merit and mootness.