OCA 2010

The accused was charged with defrauding his employer.

The trial judge stayed the proceedings, finding that the Crown breached the accused's section 7 Charter rights by failing to provide a full and independent forensic audit covering his entire employment period, and noting potential section 11(b) delay issues.

The Crown appealed.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal and ordered a new trial, holding that the right to make full answer and defence does not impose a duty on the Crown to investigate possible defences, and that the delay was largely institutional and not unreasonable.

The appellant father appealed a trial decision permitting the respondent mother to relocate from London to Tennessee with their special needs child, over whom they exercised joint custody.

The Court of Appeal found no error of fact or law in the trial judge's decision, noting the substantial deference owed to trial judges in mobility cases and the need for finality in the child's living arrangements.

The appeal was dismissed.

The Crown appealed the accused's acquittal on drug trafficking charges.

The trial judge had found that an undercover police officer entrapped the accused by asking 'Can you hook me up?' without reasonable suspicion, and excluded the evidence under s. 24(2) of the Charter.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, holding that the officer's question was merely an investigative step and did not provide an opportunity to commit an offence.

The Court set aside the finding of entrapment, entered guilty verdicts, and remitted the matter for sentencing.

The Court also noted that entrapment should only be considered after a finding of guilt, and that a stay of proceedings, rather than exclusion of evidence, is the proper remedy.

The appellants appealed an order of the Superior Court of Justice.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no merit in it.

The Court noted that it was obvious on the face of the prior order of Lang J. that it bound only the parties to that litigation.

Costs were awarded to the respondents.

The appellant appealed a judgment finding he breached a lease agreement, which rendered his option to purchase null and void.

The Court of Appeal found ample evidence to sustain the motion judge's findings of fact.

On consent of the respondent, the judgment was modified to delete provisions regarding monies paid into court and a writ of possession.

The appeal was otherwise dismissed with costs to the respondent fixed at $5,000.

The appellant employee appealed the dismissal of his civil action against his employer, which included a claim for malicious prosecution arising from a traffic charge instigated by the employer.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, agreeing with the motion judge that the essential character of the dispute arose from the interpretation, application, administration, or violation of the collective agreement.

As the statement of claim attacked a wide array of employer conduct in managing the workplace, the courts lacked jurisdiction to hear the matter.

The appellant, a mayor, faced a compliance audit of her election campaign finances which revealed apparent contraventions of the Municipal Elections Act.

The municipal council passed a by-law authorizing the commencement of legal proceedings and retained outside counsel to prosecute.

The appellant appealed the dismissal of her application to quash the by-law and strike down s. 81 of the Act.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that s. 81 is not impermissibly vague, does not violate s. 7 of the Charter, and that the delegation of prosecutorial power to outside counsel was lawful and administrative in nature.

The appellant appealed his convictions for sexual interference and invitation to sexual touching involving two children who had been placed in temporary foster care in his daughter's home.

The appellant argued the trial judge erred in admitting out-of-court statements from one of the children under the principled exception to the hearsay rule, and in using the evidence of each child as similar fact evidence on the counts relating to the other.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the trial judge correctly applied the principled exception to the hearsay rule and that the trial judge's findings of guilt did not improperly rely on similar fact evidence.

The Crown appealed a disposition of the Ontario Review Board that granted the respondent limited community access for special purposes.

The Court of Appeal found the Board's order was supported by evidence from the treating psychiatrist and was not unreasonable.

The Court allowed the appeal only to the extent of adding uncontested conditions prohibiting the respondent from possessing intoxicants and weapons, which had been inadvertently omitted from the Board's order.

The appellant appealed her sentence for common assault, which occurred during a noncontact hockey game.

She argued the sentence was outside the appropriate range and that gender played a role in the sentencing.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the sentence was within the appropriate range based on the facts and that there was no basis to suggest gender influenced the sentence.

The appellant failed to surrender into custody as required by his release order.

Consequently, the Court of Appeal dismissed the sentence appeal as abandoned.

The appellant failed to surrender himself as required by his release order.

Consequently, the Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal as abandoned.

The appellant appealed his 12-year concurrent sentence for four counts of robbery using a firearm, related to a series of home invasions.

The trial judge had intended the sentence to run concurrently with a 14-year sentence imposed in a separate jurisdiction for related offences.

After the related 14-year sentence was reduced to 10 years on appeal, the Court of Appeal found the 12-year sentence offended the totality principle.

The court reduced the sentence to 8 years and 4 months to align with the time to be served on the related sentence, while rejecting arguments regarding sentence disparity with co-conspirators.

The Crown appealed a conditional discharge with three years' probation imposed on the respondent following a guilty plea for fraud over $5,000 against his employer.

The Crown argued that a conditional discharge is rarely appropriate for such an offence and sought a six-month conditional sentence.

The majority of the Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error in principle, as the trial judge properly recognized the respondent's exceptional circumstances, including his status as a first offender, strong community service record, and career aspirations.

A dissenting judge would have allowed the appeal and imposed a conditional sentence, emphasizing the seriousness of the breach of trust.

The appellants appealed their convictions and sentences for conspiracy.

They argued the trial judge erred in the jury instructions regarding the elements of conspiracy, that the indictment was deficient for not explicitly invoking s. 465(3) of the Criminal Code, and that trial fairness was compromised by an RCMP officer entering the jury room to fix equipment.

They also appealed their sentences, arguing they should have received credit for time spent in immigration hold.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction and sentence appeals, finding no errors in the jury charge, the indictment, or the trial judge's discretionary refusal to grant pre-trial custody credit for immigration detention.

The appellants appealed a motion judge's decision dismissing their claim for a readjustment to the purchase price paid to the respondent.

The appellants argued that the respondent's potential right to a reassignment of the mortgage created a cause of action against the financial corporation.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no connection between the right to reassignment and any obligation to be bound by the agreement of purchase and sale.

The appellants sought to appeal an order of the Superior Court of Justice.

The Court of Appeal determined that the order below was interlocutory, as the motion judge had deferred the legal issue to trial.

The Court held that its appellate jurisdiction is statutory and does not extend to interlocutory orders, rejecting the argument that it had discretion to hear the appeal due to the issue's importance.

The appeal was quashed.

The appellants appealed a jury verdict in a motor vehicle accident case, arguing the trial judge erred in instructing the jury on negligence, proximate cause, and the onus on a driver who was on the wrong side of the road.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the jury charge, read as a whole, properly instructed the jury that the onus was on the defendant to explain how the accident occurred without his negligence due to an emergency situation.

The jury's conclusion that the defendant acted as an ordinary, prudent person in an emergency was upheld.

The appellant sought leave to appeal from a summary conviction appeal court decision that dismissed her appeal from conviction and sentence.

The Court of Appeal refused to grant leave, finding that no question of law or matter of public importance was raised, and declined to hear a new issue raised for the first time on appeal.

The accused was acquitted of multiple charges, including robbery and sexual assault, arising from attacks on sex-trade workers.

The trial judge found the identification evidence of three victims to be unreliable and concluded the Crown failed to prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.

The Crown appealed, arguing the evidence was overwhelming and the trial judge erred in his approach to similar fact evidence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that the Crown's right of appeal is limited to questions of law alone, and the trial judge's assessment of the reliability and weight of identification and similar fact evidence is a question of fact.