OCA 2010

The appellants appealed a trial judgment finding them liable for malicious prosecution and wrongful dismissal.

The Court of Appeal rejected the argument that the trial judge's reasons were inadequate, finding they clearly showed the pathway to the result.

However, the Court agreed with the appellants that the trial judge erred by duplicating the award of 'Wallace' or 'Honda' damages and aggravated damages for malicious prosecution, as the same factors were used to justify both.

The appeal was allowed in part to set aside the $15,000 'Wallace' damages award, but otherwise dismissed.

The appellant settled its claim with the hospital and sought to amend its statement of claim to proceed against the remaining defendants for their several liabilities, as contemplated by the settlement.

The motion judge refused to allow the amendment.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding that the proposed amendments fully disclosed the terms of the settlement and restricted the claim against the remaining defendants to what was permitted by the settlement.

The appellant appealed from a judgment of the Ontario Court of Justice that had dismissed an appeal from a Justice of the Peace.

Based on the reasons set out in the joint factum, the Court of Appeal allowed the appeal and entered acquittals on the two charges.

The appellant sought leave to appeal his summary conviction on two grounds related to his right to counsel under s. 10(b) of the Charter.

He argued that s. 10(b) ensures a minimum level of competency from duty counsel and that police should have facilitated a further call.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the application, noting that the Supreme Court of Canada has held police have no obligation to monitor the quality of legal advice, and duty counsel is not a state actor.

The second ground was dismissed due to an insufficient evidentiary record.

The appellant was convicted of attempted murder and break and enter after attacking his former partner and her new partner.

He was designated a dangerous offender and sentenced to an indeterminate penitentiary term.

On appeal, he argued the sentencing judge erred by relying on statements he made during a pre-trial fitness assessment, claiming they were protected under s. 672.21 of the Criminal Code.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, applying R. v. Jones to hold that such statements are admissible at the sentencing stage to accurately evaluate the danger posed by the offender.

The Court also found the appellant had consented to the admission of the psychiatric evidence.

The appellant hospital appealed a decision of the Ontario Review Board granting an absolute discharge to an individual found not criminally responsible for first degree murder.

The Board had previously adjourned the hearing to obtain an independent psychiatric assessment regarding the individual's past criminal involvement.

Despite the assessment failing to resolve these concerns, the Board's majority granted the absolute discharge.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding the Board's decision unreasonable due to an unexplained gap in its reasoning regarding the relevance of the past criminal conduct and its failure to address inadequacies in the proposed treatment plan for monitoring medication compliance.

The appellant school board appealed a trial judgment finding it breached its obligation to treat bidders equally and fairly during a tendering process.

The respondent, an unsuccessful bidder, alleged the successful bid was non-compliant because the bidder provided a letter of credit instead of the required performance bonds.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding that the tender documents only required performance bonds upon acceptance of the bid.

The successful bid was compliant when submitted, forming Contract A. The appellant's acceptance formed Contract B, discharging obligations to the respondent.

The subsequent modification to accept a letter of credit did not breach the respondent's contractual rights.

The appellants appealed the trial judge's decision dismissing their claim for negligent misrepresentation.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no merit to the claim.

The court noted that the trial judge correctly addressed the pleaded theory of liability and found no liability or damages.

The court also held that even if a breach of contract theory had been advanced, the claimed damages were not attributable in law to such a breach.

The appellant pleaded guilty to second degree murder and was sentenced to life imprisonment with 18 years of parole ineligibility.

He subsequently sought to withdraw his guilty plea, which the trial judge dismissed.

On appeal, the appellant sought to introduce fresh evidence from his co-accused, appealed the dismissal of his motion to withdraw the plea, and appealed his sentence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the application to admit fresh evidence, finding it lacked credibility as the co-accused refused to answer critical questions.

The Court upheld the trial judge's finding that the guilty plea was voluntary, unequivocal, and informed.

The sentence appeal was also dismissed, as the trial judge did not err in extending the period of parole ineligibility based on the appellant's high culpability and poor pre-sentence report.

The appellant pleaded guilty to infanticide in 1998 based on the pathology opinion of a paediatric forensic pathologist.

Following a Coroner's Review and a public inquiry, new expert evidence revealed there was no reliable pathological evidence to support the conclusion that the cause of death was asphyxia.

The Court of Appeal admitted the fresh evidence, set aside the guilty plea, quashed the conviction, and ordered a new trial, finding a miscarriage of justice had occurred.

The appellant pleaded guilty to manslaughter in 1994 for the death of her newborn child, based heavily on the flawed forensic pathology evidence of Dr. Charles Smith.

Following the Goudge Inquiry, which revealed serious errors in Dr. Smith's conclusions, the appellant sought to introduce fresh expert evidence demonstrating that the cause of death could not be ascertained and that there was no evidence of asphyxia.

The Crown consented to the appeal.

The Court of Appeal admitted the fresh evidence, set aside the guilty plea, and ordered a new trial, finding that the appellant would not have pleaded guilty but for the flawed expert opinion.

The appellant appealed his convictions for dangerous driving, possession of stolen property, and resisting arrest, arguing that his right to be tried within a reasonable time under s. 11(b) of the Charter was violated.

The total delay between the laying of charges and the retrial following a mistrial was 30 months.

The Court of Appeal found that the trial judge erred in allocating delay from a disclosure request to the defence and in placing too much weight on the absence of specific prejudice.

The Court held that the Crown failed in its duty to schedule the retrial without further delay.

The appeal was allowed, the convictions were quashed, and a stay of proceedings was entered.

The applicant sought bail pending appeal of his convictions.

The Crown conceded the appeal was not frivolous and the applicant was not a flight risk, but opposed bail on public interest grounds.

The applicant's appeal grounds relate to the trial judge's refusal to order disclosure of police investigations into two key police witnesses, one of whom was subsequently charged with perjury.

The Court of Appeal granted bail, finding sufficient merit in the appeal grounds to temporarily suspend enforcement of the sentence, and ordered the appeal to be case managed for expeditious resolution.

The appellant appealed his murder conviction, arguing the trial judge erred by provisionally ruling that if the defence led 'other suspect' evidence regarding strychnine in the deceased's home, the Crown could lead evidence of the accused's wife's death by strychnine poisoning the previous year.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the trial judge correctly held that without evidence of the accused's special access to strychnine, the other suspect evidence would leave the jury with a distorted picture.

The ruling was a fair balancing of the evidence.

Following a successful appeal by the appellant, the respondent brought a motion to re-open the appeal based on fresh evidence.

The court declined to re-open the appeal.

The appellant sought costs of $7,500 for preparing responding materials and costs submissions.

The court awarded the appellant costs fixed at $2,500 inclusive of disbursements and taxes.

The appellant abandoned his conviction appeal and appealed his sentence after having already served the custodial portion.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the sentence appeal, finding that the sentence imposed by the trial judge was fit.

The appellant appealed his conviction for sexual assault.

He argued the trial judge erred in rejecting his explanation for DNA evidence, applied unequal scrutiny to the evidence of intoxicated witnesses, and misused evidence of vaginal bleeding.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the trial judge's credibility assessments were entitled to deference and that she did not err in her treatment of the evidence.

The appellants appealed their convictions and 15-year sentences for attempted murder.

They argued the verdicts were unreasonable due to unreliable eyewitness identification and that the trial judge's reasons were inadequate.

The appellant Nguyen also argued the trial judge erred in applying party liability.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeals, finding the identification evidence was supported by other evidence and the trial judge's reasons were sufficient.

The Court also dismissed the sentence appeals, holding that the 15-year sentences were within the appropriate range given the horrific nature of the shooting that rendered the victim quadriplegic, and that the trial judge did not err in denying enhanced pre-trial custody credit to an offender who committed the offence while serving a conditional sentence.

The appellant appealed his conviction for sexual assault, arguing the trial judge erred by failing to consider the defence of honest but mistaken belief, misapprehending expert evidence, and applying uneven scrutiny to the testimony.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no air of reality to the defence of mistaken belief.

The court also held that the trial judge properly used expert evidence to confirm the complainant's testimony regarding lack of consent and anal intercourse, and found no indication of uneven scrutiny.

The Information and Privacy Commissioner appealed a Divisional Court decision which held that confidential mediation and settlement records involving the Liquor Control Board of Ontario were exempt from disclosure under the Freedom of Information and Protection of Privacy Act (FIPPA).

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the term 'litigation' in the second branch of s. 19 of FIPPA includes both mandatory and consensual mediation.

The court held that the exemption is not limited to documents falling within common law litigation privilege, and therefore the disputed records were protected from disclosure.