OCA 2009

The appellants appealed a trial judgment finding them liable for the respondent's investment.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that the trial judge's findings of fact and credibility were supported by the record and revealed no error.

The Crown appealed a Superior Court decision that dismissed a certiorari application and upheld a preliminary inquiry judge's order discharging the respondent.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding that the preliminary inquiry judge committed a jurisdictional error by weighing competing inferences rather than determining if the inferences sought by the Crown were available on the evidence.

The matter was remitted to the preliminary inquiry judge with a direction to commit the respondent to stand trial on all charges.

The appellant appealed a motion judge's decision dismissing its breach of contract and warranty claim against an American respondent for lack of jurisdiction.

The motion judge found no real and substantial connection between the respondent and Ontario.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding that the motion judge failed to properly weigh the factors from Muscutt v. Courelles and conflated a choice of law clause with a choice of jurisdiction clause.

The matter was remitted for re-hearing before a different judge.

The applicant, charged with conspiracy to commit murder, sought a review of a detention order under s. 680(1) of the Criminal Code.

He argued that the application judge erred in dismissing his second bail application, which was based on an alleged material change in circumstances, including new evidence from the preliminary inquiry and a new release plan.

The reviewing judge found no error in the application judge's assessment that the Crown's case remained strong and the new release plan was inadequate.

The court also held that while Gladue principles apply to bail, the applicant failed to adduce evidence to support such an analysis.

The application for review was dismissed.

The wife appealed a trial judge's decision staying her Ontario application for equalization of net family property and spousal support on the basis that Greece was the more appropriate forum.

On appeal, the wife sought to introduce fresh evidence consisting of an application the husband filed in Greece after the Ontario trial, which contradicted his previous evidence regarding the parties' assets.

The Court of Appeal admitted the fresh evidence under the Palmer test, finding it radically changed the parameters of the property issues.

The court allowed the appeal, set aside the stay, and ordered the proceedings to continue in Ontario.

The appellant appealed his conviction and sentence.

He argued the trial judge erred in interpreting the phrase 'known to the police' and in delaying the ruling on his stay application until the end of the trial.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding the trial judge's interpretation reasonable and the timing of the stay ruling a proper exercise of discretion that caused no prejudice.

The sentence appeal was also dismissed as the sentence was deemed fit.

On a ministerial reference concerning a 1972 murder conviction, the court considered whether previously undisclosed police information about a potentially exculpatory alibi and witness statements, and new expert reports about false confessions, were admissible as fresh evidence.

The majority held that the alibi-related material and related witness information were admissible under the Palmer framework because they could reasonably have affected the verdict, although the Crown's non-disclosure did not render the 1972 trial unfair under the disclosure standards then prevailing.

The majority rejected the recent expert reports as not truly fresh, finding that their substance had already been before the jury through trial experts.

Treating the matter as an appeal, the majority quashed the conviction and ordered a new trial; one judge dissented on the first question and would have refused admission of the fresh evidence.

The appellants appealed a trial judgment that awarded them damages against two respondents for a serious assault but dismissed the action against several other respondents.

The appellants challenged the trial judge's findings of fact regarding the involvement of certain respondents, the assessment of damages, the refusal to award punitive damages, and the refusal to make a Bullock or Sanderson order for costs.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no palpable and overriding error in the trial judge's findings of fact and holding that the damages and costs awards were within the trial judge's discretion.

The appellants appealed the dismissal of their action on a motion for summary judgment.

The infant appellant suffered from a serious medical condition, which the appellants alleged was caused by a motor vehicle accident involving the mother while she was pregnant.

The Court of Appeal upheld the motion judge's finding that there was no genuine issue for trial regarding causation, as the appellants failed to provide expert medical opinion establishing that the accident probably caused or contributed to the condition.

The appeal was dismissed.

The respondent's first action was dismissed for delay.

The motion judge permitted the respondent to proceed with a second identical action, subject to paying the costs of the first action, relying on Rule 24.05(2).

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, holding that the rule does not provide a right to commence a second identical action and that doing so constitutes an abuse of process.

The appellant corporation appealed an order requiring it to indemnify a former director for costs and fines incurred in Ontario Securities Commission proceedings.

The director had admitted to the OSC that he failed to disclose a material change regarding a disputed contract, but maintained he honestly and reasonably believed the contract was not in jeopardy.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that under s. 124(3) of the Canada Business Corporations Act, the corporation bears the onus of proving the director did not act honestly and in good faith, or lacked reasonable grounds to believe his conduct was lawful.

The application judge made no error in finding the corporation failed to meet this burden.

The appellant appealed his conviction for unlawfully entering Canada after being the subject of a removal order.

At trial, the judge allowed the Crown to rely on issue estoppel to prevent the appellant from attempting to prove he was a Canadian citizen.

Applying the recent Supreme Court of Canada decision in R. v. Mahalingam, the Court of Appeal held that the Crown cannot rely on issue estoppel against an accused.

The appeal was allowed, the conviction quashed, and a new trial ordered.

The appellant, an executor of the Lorraine Penna estate, appealed the dismissal of a motion for a declaration that claims against the estate were statute-barred.

The respondents sought to hold the estate liable for the fraudulent actions of a co-trustee in the administration of the Paul Penna estate.

The Court of Appeal held that the two-year limitation period in s. 38(3) of the Trustee Act applied and was preserved by s. 19 of the Limitations Act, 2002.

The court found that the fraud exception in s. 43(2) of the former Limitations Act did not apply because the deceased trustee was not a party or privy to the fraud.

The court also declined to apply the special circumstances doctrine to add the estate as a defendant.

The appeal was allowed in part, declaring the summary judgment motion barred by the limitation period.

The appellants pleaded guilty to manslaughter following a home invasion robbery and were sentenced to 15 years' imprisonment.

On appeal, they argued the trial judge failed to give adequate weight to their guilty pleas and remorse, and imposed an unfit sentence outside the usual 8 to 12 year range for brutal manslaughter.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the trial judge properly considered the mitigating factors and was justified in departing from the range due to serious aggravating factors, including the appellants' lengthy records for violent crimes, the fact they were on parole, and the gratuitous violence inflicted on a vulnerable victim.

The appellant appealed an order requiring him to pay a $185,000 fine for failing to produce financial documents in a family law proceeding.

The respondent brought a motion to quash the appeal, arguing the order was interlocutory and therefore required leave to appeal to the Divisional Court.

The Court of Appeal agreed, finding that the order did not finally dispose of any issue in the proceeding and was not a contempt order.

The appeal was quashed.

The appellant appealed the dismissal of his application for habeas corpus regarding a prison transfer.

He argued that the Warden's reasons for ordering the transfer were inadequate.

The Court of Appeal agreed with the reviewing judge that, although the reasons could have been better, the appellant knew he was being transferred due to security concerns triggered by an altercation with his cell mate.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant appealed his conviction, arguing the trial judge failed to properly apply the W.(D.) framework for assessing credibility.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that although the reasons could have been fuller, the trial judge directed his mind to the application of W.(D.).

The court noted that the foundation for the conviction was evident from the record and the defence position was utterly implausible.

The respondent insurer brought a motion for security for costs of the appellant's appeal.

The underlying action involved a motor vehicle accident claim that was dismissed after the insurer successfully moved to enforce a settlement agreement.

The Court of Appeal granted the motion for security for costs, finding good reason to believe the appeal was frivolous and vexatious, and that the appellant had insufficient assets in Ontario to pay the costs of the appeal.

The appellant was ordered to post $5,000 in security.

Following the appellant's partial success on appeal regarding the calculation of the equalization payment, the court addressed costs.

Because the appeal increased the property award beyond the respondent's offer to settle, the court set aside the trial judge's costs award of $82,822 in favour of the respondent, ordering each party to bear their own costs at trial due to divided success and relative means.

The appellant was awarded $5,000 in costs for the appeal.

Following an appeal, the parties provided joint submissions regarding the costs of the trial.

The Court of Appeal ordered that the trial judgment be amended on consent to award the plaintiff fixed costs in the amount of $39,196.08.