OCA 2006

The appellant pleaded guilty to dealing in passports and breach of trust after stealing 246 blank passports from her employer, the Scarborough Passport Office.

She was sentenced to 5.5 years imprisonment.

On appeal, the Crown conceded the trial judge erred in principle by treating an unproven profit motive as an aggravating factor.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding the offence was not the worst envisaged by the statute and emphasizing the appellant's youth and lack of prior record.

The global sentence was reduced to 4.5 years, resulting in a net sentence of 4 years after credit for pre-trial custody and bail conditions.

The appellant was convicted of second degree murder following a fatal stabbing during a bar altercation.

At trial, the appellant raised self-defence and sought to introduce the deceased's criminal record and a transcript of a guilty plea to demonstrate the deceased's propensity for violence.

The trial judge excluded this evidence.

Furthermore, in response to a jury question, the trial judge instructed that 'recklessness' for murder meant foreseeing a 'risk' of death rather than a 'likelihood'.

The Court of Appeal held that the trial judge erred in excluding the propensity evidence and in the jury charge on recklessness.

The curative proviso was not applied, the appeal was allowed, and a new trial was ordered.

The appellant appealed an order made by the motion judge.

The original motion sought an order based on non-disclosure, but the motion judge made the order based on non-payment of arrears, which was not sought.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, setting aside the order because it was made on a basis not requested, and noted the respondent could bring a fresh motion if a dispute about disclosure remained.

The appellant appealed an order of the motion judge.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding that the impact of the Stipulated Order on the Amended Plan of Reorganization is a matter to be determined at trial because it turns on questions of foreign law.

The order was varied accordingly, and the parties were ordered to bear their own costs of the appeal.

The appellant appealed the motion judge's refusal to set aside a Notice of Discontinuance.

The Court of Appeal held that the decision was discretionary and found no basis for appellate intervention.

The court noted that even if the motion judge erred in assessing prejudice, the test for special circumstances was not met.

The appeal was dismissed with costs.

The appellant appealed her conviction, arguing the trial judge erred in admitting evidence that contradicted her explanation for using cash to purchase airline tickets to Jamaica.

The appellant claimed she used cash because she lacked a credit card due to unpaid student loans.

The Crown introduced evidence proving this explanation false, which the Court of Appeal held was not collateral as it provided circumstantial evidence of guilty knowledge.

The court also found no error in the trial judge raising an irregularity in the appellant's diploma.

The appeal from conviction was dismissed, and the sentence appeal was abandoned.

The appellant appealed her convictions for confinement and failing to provide the necessaries of life, arguing that the trial judge erred in his credibility assessments and findings of fact.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that the trial judge adequately explained his reasons for accepting the Crown witnesses over the defence witnesses and that his factual findings were supported by the evidence.

The Court noted it is not its role to retry the case.

The appellant insurer appealed a trial judgment finding that the respondent insured's 5R production facility was a separate location under the policy and that only one accident occurred.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the trial judge's conclusion that the facility was added as a separate location by endorsement.

The Court also agreed that the accidental breakdown continued until the compressor was successfully repaired on the second attempt, meaning there was only one accident.

The appellant appealed her conviction, arguing the trial judge failed to provide adequate reasons.

The Court of Appeal agreed, finding the one-page judgment insufficient for a serious charge resulting in a 15-month sentence.

The trial judge failed to adequately explain why he disbelieved the appellant, contrary to the requirements in R. v. Sheppard, and failed to address relevant evidence.

The appeal was allowed and the conviction quashed.

Given the frail Crown case and that the sentence had been fully served, the Court stayed the charge rather than ordering a new trial.

The appellant appealed his convictions for sexual assault, assault, and sexual touching of a ten-year-old boy.

The appellant argued that the trial judge erred in his treatment of a dissatisfied juror, in his instructions on assessing the credibility of a child witness, and that the verdict was unreasonable.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the trial judge's handling of the juror or his jury charge regarding the child complainant's credibility, and concluding that the evidence reasonably supported the verdict.

The appellant appealed an order regarding the meaning of a publication in a defamation action.

The Court of Appeal agreed with the motion judge that the respondent's publication did not say or imply the appellant was guilty of impropriety, only that he was suspected of it.

The Court also agreed that meanings from other publications could not be imputed to the respondent.

The appeal was dismissed with costs.

The appellant appealed a judgment granting declaratory relief regarding his status as a director, shareholder, and administrator of a corporation.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the appellant had validly resigned as a director and could not unilaterally withdraw his resignation.

The court also held that the sole remaining non-resident director did not lose his status under the Business Corporations Act and had standing to call a shareholders meeting.

Furthermore, the issuance of shares to the appellant from the corporate treasury violated an existing cease-trading order under the Securities Act and was therefore invalid.

The appellants appealed a decision refusing to set aside a noting in default and enforcing a U.S. District Court judgment.

They argued there was a failure of natural justice because the self-represented appellant was not permitted to read her prepared submissions.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the motion judge merely assisted in focusing submissions and committed no error in principle in refusing to set aside the default.

The court ordered a stay of execution pending the final resolution of the appellants' appeals in the United States.

The appellant appealed a trial judgment finding he breached his duty of confidentiality to his former employer by exploiting information related to a government contract.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding that the information regarding the contract's renewal and the client's needs was not confidential, as it was widely known and solicited by the government.

Furthermore, the appellant's knowledge of his own skills and qualifications, which he provided to a competing bidder, was his own information and not the property of the respondent.

The action was dismissed.

The appellant appealed his conviction for possession of crack cocaine for the purpose of trafficking and his sentence of two and a half years.

He argued his rights under sections 8 and 9 of the Charter were violated during his arrest.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, agreeing with the trial judge that the officers had a legitimate reason to investigate the appellant.

The sentence appeal was also dismissed, as the sentence was within the appropriate range and no error in principle was made.

The appellant appealed the trial judge's findings of fact and credibility.

The Court of Appeal found no palpable and overriding error, concluding the trial judge was amply justified on the record to find the respondent had a reasonable basis for its allegations.

The appeal was dismissed with costs fixed at $24,000.

The youth appellant, aged 14 at the time of the offence, was convicted of being an accessory after the fact to murder after assisting an adult in dismembering and disposing of the bodies of two victims.

The trial judge imposed a custodial sentence of six months' secure custody and two years' probation, finding it was an exceptional case under s. 39(1)(d) of the Youth Criminal Justice Act.

The youth appealed the sentence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that the horrifying circumstances of the offence and the youth's substantial role made it an exceptional case where a non-custodial sentence would be inconsistent with the purpose and principles of sentencing.

The appellant appealed a trial judgment awarding the respondent $25,000 in damages for breach of contract and denying the appellant pre-judgment interest.

The Court of Appeal upheld the damage award as reasonable but found no basis for the respondent to retain three consignment watches without compensating the appellant.

The Court also held that the appellant was presumptively entitled to pre-judgment interest under the Courts of Justice Act.

The appeal was allowed in part.

The appellants appealed an order excising references to a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) from their statement of claim.

The parties had entered into the MOU for a wind energy project, which the respondent later purported to terminate while under CCAA protection.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding that the motion judge erred in determining the validity of the termination notice on a Rule 21 motion and in concluding that the appellants were precluded from pleading a good faith obligation arising from the MOU.

The appellants appealed a trial judgment awarding damages for a brain injury sustained in a motor vehicle accident.

They argued the trial judge erred in relying on the opinion of a psychiatrist over other specialists who found no brain injury.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that the expert was qualified to give the opinion and the trial judge made no palpable and overriding error in preferring it.

The court also upheld the trial judge's findings on lost income and the application of a tax gross-up on future care costs.