OCA 2006

The appellant appealed a motion judge's decision finding that the respondent's alleged breach of a confidentiality provision in minutes of settlement did not constitute a fundamental breach.

The appellant conceded there was no fundamental breach but sought a remedy analogous to Rule 49.09 of the Rules of Civil Procedure.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that Rule 49.09 did not apply because the settlement was reached via minutes of settlement, not an offer to settle, and the rule does not alter substantive contract law.

However, the Court noted the motion judge erred in finding there was no breach at all, preserving the appellant's right to sue for damages for breach of contract.

The appellant appealed his conviction for first degree murder.

He argued the trial judge erred by reversing a ruling that had excluded derivative evidence of the victim's severed head, and by improperly instructing the jury on post-offence conduct, reasonable doubt, and police investigation deficiencies.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the defence's own questioning necessitated the admission of the head evidence to restore trial fairness.

The court also upheld the trial judge's jury instructions and evidentiary rulings, concluding the Crown presented an overwhelming circumstantial case.

The appellant appealed his convictions for robbery and using a firearm, arguing the trial judge erred in relying on the uncorroborated and inconsistent testimony of three complainants who had opportunities to collude.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding the trial judge's reasons adequately addressed the inconsistencies and credibility issues.

The Crown appealed the sentence, arguing the concurrent sentence for the firearm offence was illegal under s. 85 of the Criminal Code.

The Court of Appeal allowed the sentence appeal, imposing consecutive sentences for the firearm offences, resulting in a total sentence of two years and ten months.

The Crown appealed a summary conviction appeal judge's decision to quash the respondents' convictions for assault and enter a stay of proceedings.

The respondents, two off-duty police officers, had been convicted at trial of assaulting a teenager during a wrongful arrest for car theft.

The summary conviction appeal judge found the trial judge erred by failing to explicitly advert to the dual purposes of character evidence.

The Court of Appeal allowed the Crown's appeal, finding the trial judge's treatment of the character evidence was adequate in the context of his credibility assessment.

The Court of Appeal restored the convictions and remitted the sentence appeals to a different summary conviction appeal judge.

The appellant was convicted of two counts of incest involving his two half-sisters, with the abuse occurring in the 1960s when the victims were children.

He appealed his conviction, arguing the trial judge erred in instructing the jury on the relevance of the complainants' 30-year delay in reporting the abuse.

He also appealed his four-year sentence, arguing the sentencing judge failed to give sufficient weight to his youth at the time of the offences and his subsequent exemplary life.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding no error in the jury instructions.

The sentence appeal was also dismissed, as the appellant's lack of remorse meant his subsequent good character did not warrant a reduced sentence.

The appellant appealed his conviction, arguing the trial judge erred by failing to fairly outline the position of the defence in the jury charge.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that while the charge was perfunctory, the failure to detail the evidence did not amount to reversible error.

The case turned entirely on credibility, as the evidence of the appellant and police officers were diametrically opposed, and the trial judge gave a proper W.D. instruction.

The appellant appealed his jury convictions for a convenience store robbery and possession of a stolen vehicle, arguing the verdicts were unreasonable.

The Crown's case relied on circumstantial evidence linking the appellant to the stolen getaway vehicle days prior to the robbery, and speculative theories regarding his knowledge of the store's panic button and a knife used in the robbery.

Exculpatory evidence included DNA from masks that did not match the appellant and an eyewitness description of the getaway driver's hair colour that did not match the appellant's red hair.

The Court of Appeal found the evidence too tenuous to support an inference of guilt and concluded the verdicts were unreasonable.

The appeal was allowed and acquittals were entered.

The appellant appealed the dismissal of her negligence claim against the respondent dairy after she tripped and fell in its parking lot.

The trial judge found the parking lot was in a state of disrepair and the respondent's inspection system was inadequate, but dismissed the action because the appellant could not identify the precise location of her fall.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, holding that the trial judge erred in her causation analysis by setting too high an onus.

Given the uncontradicted evidence of the parking lot's extensive disrepair and the absence of any alternative cause, the court found the respondent's negligence caused or materially contributed to the appellant's injuries.

The appellant appealed his conviction for sexual assault, arguing the trial judge erred in admitting evidence of a prior sexual assault conviction as similar fact evidence.

The Court of Appeal applied the framework from R. v. Handy and R. v. Blake, finding that the similarities between the prior incident and the current allegations were merely generic and lacked distinctive unifying features.

The court concluded the probative value of the evidence failed to outweigh its prejudicial effect.

The appeal was allowed, the conviction set aside, and a new trial ordered.

The appellants appealed a decision of the commercial list judge, who concluded that the relief sought related to the internal governance of a Utah corporation.

The Court of Appeal agreed, holding that principles of comity dictate that Ontario courts will not issue orders regulating the internal affairs of a foreign corporation.

The appeal was dismissed, and the motion judge's costs award was upheld.

The appellant appealed his conviction for sexual assault, arguing the trial judge made several errors in the jury charge.

Specifically, the appellant contended the trial judge gave flawed instructions regarding the use of his extensive criminal record, misstated the W.(D.) instruction by telling the jury to consider only credible evidence, and erred in the reasonable doubt instruction.

The Court of Appeal agreed that the cumulative effect of these errors left it unclear whether the jury properly understood its task.

The appeal was allowed, the conviction quashed, and a new trial ordered.

The appellants sought leave to appeal costs awards.

The Court of Appeal granted leave to appeal the costs awards.

The court allowed the cross-appeal in respect of the motion to re-open the argued costs award, reducing it from $7,500 to $1,500.

The cross-appeal was otherwise dismissed, with costs of the cross-appeal fixed at $3,500 awarded to the respondents.

The appellant, who was found not guilty by reason of insanity on a charge of murder in 1976, appealed an Ontario Review Board disposition ordering his detention in a minimum secure unit with a provision allowing him to live in the community in 24-hour supervised accommodation approved by the person in charge.

The appellant argued the order was defective because the person in charge required a facility with awake staff 24 hours a day, which did not exist.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the Board's conclusion that the appellant remained a significant risk was reasonable and the order was not defective.

However, the Court urged the Board to address the impasse between the treatment team and the person in charge at the upcoming annual review.

The appellant appealed an order converting an application into a trial.

The Court of Appeal raised the issue of whether the order was interlocutory, which would deprive the court of jurisdiction.

The appellant argued the order was final because it was against a non-party and ended a summary procedure.

The Court of Appeal rejected these arguments, finding the order was only against the appellant and simply converted the application into a trial within the same court.

The appeal was quashed as the order was interlocutory.

The appellant appealed an order refusing to extend the time for service of the statement of claim.

The Court of Appeal found that the motion judge erred by allowing his frustration with plaintiff's counsel to displace the assessment of prejudice to the defendant, and by improperly concluding the plaintiff had no case.

Finding little to no prejudice to the defendant, the Court allowed the appeal and extended the time for service, but awarded no costs due to the conduct of plaintiff's counsel.

The Court of Appeal issued an addendum to its oral judgment released on January 20, 2006.

The court clarified that the new trial ordered for the appellant applied not only to the sexual assault conviction but also to the related counts of failing to comply with a recognizance and failing to comply with probation.

The appellant appealed a sentence of two years less a day, arguing the trial judge closed his mind to a conditional sentence by revoking bail during an adjournment.

The Court of Appeal found the trial judge had not closed his mind and that the sentence was within the appropriate range.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant appealed his dangerous offender designation, arguing the trial judge failed to consider whether he could be safely controlled in the community through supervision rather than treatment.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the trial judge properly considered both treatability and supervision, and reasonably concluded there was no realistic prospect of managing the risk in the community.

The appellant mother appealed a Crown wardship order, arguing that the Children's Aid Society's prior contravention of s. 140(2) of the Child and Family Services Act rendered the order a nullity.

She also argued the trial judge relied on stereotypes about alcoholism and improperly compared her to the prospective adoptive parents.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the Society's procedural breach did not affect jurisdiction, the trial judge's assessment of alcoholism was based on evidence rather than stereotypes, and the wardship decision correctly focused on the mother's inability to provide care and the child's best interests.

The appellant appealed an order finding that the cause of a fire was directly related to the use of a motor vehicle and therefore fell within the exclusion clause of the insurance policy.

The Court of Appeal agreed with the motions judge, rejecting the appellant's argument that there was an independent non-automobile related cause.

The appeal was dismissed with costs fixed at $10,000.