OCA 2006

The appellant appealed a trial judgment awarding damages for lost profits arising from a breach of contract.

The appellant argued the trial judge erred in accepting the plaintiff's expert's historical approach to calculating lost profits and failed to consider whether lost advertisements were transferred to other accounts.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the trial judge was entitled to accept the plaintiff's expert evidence and that the argument regarding transferred advertisements was not sufficiently developed in the evidence.

The youth appellant was convicted of robbery, trafficking, and other offences, and sentenced to 33 months in custody in addition to six months of pre-sentence custody.

The appellant appealed, arguing the effective 39-month sentence exceeded the three-year maximum under s. 42(15) of the Youth Criminal Justice Act.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, holding that pre-sentence custody must be included when calculating the maximum sentence.

The sentence was reduced to 30 months, and a concurrent probation order was struck down for lack of jurisdiction.

The appellant was convicted of sexual assault causing bodily harm, kidnapping, and carrying a firearm for the purpose of forcible confinement.

At trial, the Crown relied on DNA and fingerprint evidence, while the appellant relied on a denial and an alibi defence.

On appeal, the appellant argued the trial judge made three reversible errors: giving a deliberate fabrication instruction without independent evidence, improperly instructing the jury on the late disclosure of his alibi, and making a prejudicial Corbett ruling that allowed the Crown to elicit that he had other unspecified convictions.

The Court of Appeal agreed that these three errors cumulatively rendered the trial unfair and deprived the appellant of a fair opportunity to have the jury consider his defence.

The appeal was allowed and a new trial ordered.

The appellant was convicted of multiple offences including forcible confinement, assault, and criminal harassment against a former girlfriend, and was sentenced to 21 months' imprisonment.

He appealed the sentence on the basis that the trial judge failed to give him credit for 18 months spent on bail under strict house arrest conditions.

The Court of Appeal held that time spent under stringent bail conditions is a relevant mitigating factor that must be considered, and the failure to do so is an error in principle.

The appeal was allowed and the sentence was reduced to 16 months' imprisonment.

The appellant appealed a five-year sentence imposed for sexual offences against two young children.

The Court of Appeal found the sentencing judge erred by classifying the offences as hate crimes and by ignoring the principle of rehabilitation without evidence that the appellant was incapable of it.

While rejecting the proposed sentence of two years less a day as unfit, the Court allowed the appeal and reduced the sentence to four years.

The appellant appealed his conviction for sexual assault on a young male, arguing that the cumulative effect of several trial errors rendered the trial unfair.

The issues raised included the trial judge's handling of e-mails sent to the appellant by an excluded defence witness regarding his choice to affirm rather than swear an oath, the jury instructions on delayed disclosure and prior complaints, and the absence of a Vetrovec warning.

The Court of Appeal found no errors in the trial judge's rulings or jury instructions, concluding that the trial was fair.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant sued his insurer for a fire loss but was subsequently convicted of arson.

Despite having a legal opinion that his criminal appeal had merit, he agreed to settle the civil action by a consent dismissal without costs.

His criminal convictions were later quashed on appeal and the charges withdrawn.

He moved to set aside the civil settlement and consent order, arguing common mistake and fresh evidence.

The motion judge dismissed the motion.

The Court of Appeal upheld the dismissal, emphasizing the principle of finality in litigation and noting that the appellant knew his appeal had merit when he chose to settle.

The appellant appealed an order dismissing her application for spousal support and declaring her a vexatious litigant under s. 140(1) of the Courts of Justice Act.

The respondent moved to quash the appeal on the basis that the appellant failed to obtain leave to appeal.

The Court of Appeal held that leave is not required to appeal a vexatious litigant order itself.

On the merits, the Court set aside the vexatious litigant order because the appellant was not given a fair hearing on the issue.

However, the Court upheld the summary dismissal of the spousal support claim, finding no genuine issue for trial given the lack of evidence of economic disadvantage or need arising from the marriage.

The appellants appealed a decision finding that the parties had entered into a binding settlement agreement.

The appellants argued that no agreement was reached, that the respondent accepted their repudiation of the agreement, and that conflicting affidavit evidence required the trial of an issue.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no palpable and overriding error in the application judge's conclusion that a binding settlement was reached and that the respondent had not accepted the repudiation.

The court also held that the application judge did not err in failing to order the trial of an issue, as neither party had requested one.

The appellant appealed the judgment of Justice Gerald F. Day.

The Court of Appeal substantially agreed with the reasons of the lower court judge and dismissed the appeal with costs fixed at $2,500.

The appellant appealed a trial judge's order for indefinite supervised access to the children of the marriage, arguing it made obtaining future unsupervised access practically and legally impossible.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the trial judge's exceptional order was supported by evidence of the appellant's attempts to manipulate the children and subject them to repeated professional assessments.

The Court noted the order does not preclude the appellant from seeking to vary the terms of access in the future upon proof of a material change in circumstances.

The appellants were convicted of first-degree murder, conspiracy to murder, and possession of explosives in relation to a contract killing.

The Crown's case relied heavily on the testimony of an unsavoury witness who had pleaded guilty to manslaughter in exchange for his testimony.

The appellants appealed their convictions on multiple grounds, primarily focusing on errors in the trial judge's charge to the jury.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal and ordered a new trial, finding that the trial judge failed to give an adequate Vetrovec warning regarding the unsavoury Crown witnesses, improperly gave a Vetrovec-like warning regarding a defence witness, and failed to instruct the jury properly on a hearsay statement.

The self-represented appellant appealed the dismissal of his various causes of action at trial, alleging errors by the trial judge, reasonable apprehension of bias due to judicial interventions, and denial of natural justice.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal on the merits, finding no errors in the dismissal of the claims and no reasonable apprehension of bias.

However, the Court allowed the appeal in part regarding costs, setting aside the trial judge's full indemnity costs award and substituting it with an award of $200,000.

The appellants appealed an order of the Superior Court of Justice that allowed an appeal from an arbitrator's award regarding the interpretation of a condominium cost-sharing agreement.

The dispute centered on the allocation of bulk hydro bill costs for the parking and service garage.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the application judge correctly interpreted the agreement harmoniously to allocate the costs to the appellant, consistent with the building's single bulk hydro meter design.

The appellant appealed his sentence following a conviction for a vicious beating.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error in principle and concluding that the sentence was not outside the appropriate range given the severity of the offence.

The appellant appealed his conviction, arguing there was insufficient evidence to find him guilty as a party to the offence.

The Court of Appeal agreed, finding no admissible evidence of the appellant's prior knowledge of the principal's intention.

The court held that mere presence was insufficient to sustain a conviction as a party.

The conviction was set aside and an acquittal ordered.

The appellant appealed his conviction and sentence, including a twenty-year period of parole ineligibility, for an unprovoked shooting.

He argued the trial judge erred in a Corbett application and failed to instruct the jury on the use of previous consistent statements.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no reviewable error in the Corbett ruling and applying the curative proviso regarding the jury instructions due to the overwhelming case against the appellant.

The twenty-year parole ineligibility period was upheld given the appellant's serious criminal record and the fact he was on parole for manslaughter at the time of the offence.

The appellant sued for wrongful dismissal after his employment was terminated.

The trial judge concluded that the appellant was employed under a fixed-term contract and was terminated in accordance with its terms.

On appeal, the appellant argued the employment relationship was of indefinite duration.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the written contracts were clear and unequivocal, and the appellant understood his employment was speculative and could be terminated on a moment's notice.

The appellant was convicted of assault and his summary conviction appeal to the Superior Court was dismissed.

He appealed to the Court of Appeal, arguing that the trial judge erred in assessing the complainant's credibility, failed to properly apply the W.D. framework, and should have drawn an adverse inference from the lack of corroborating evidence.

The Court of Appeal found no error in the summary conviction appeal judge's conclusion that the trial judge's findings were reasonable and fully supported by the evidence.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant was convicted of offences arising from a home invasion robbery based solely on a fingerprint found on a pizza box used as a ruse to gain entry.

The victims could not identify the appellant and provided descriptions inconsistent with his appearance.

The Court of Appeal found the verdicts unreasonable under s. 686(1)(a)(i) of the Criminal Code, as the fingerprint evidence alone, without any evidence as to when it was placed on the box, could not support a conviction in light of the exculpatory eyewitness testimony.

The appeal was allowed, convictions quashed, and acquittals entered.