OCA 2006

The appellant appealed a matter to the Court of Appeal for Ontario.

A publication ban was ordered prohibiting publication until the end of the trial.

No reasons for decision or outcomes are provided in the available text.

Following the plaintiff's successful appeal to certify an environmental claim as a class proceeding, the court determined the appropriate costs awards for the certification motion, the Divisional Court appeal, and the Court of Appeal.

The court held that the plaintiff was entitled to costs for all stages, imputing success at the certification motion stage despite the plaintiff having substantially narrowed the claim on appeal.

Recognizing the public interest nature of the environmental class action under s. 31(1) of the Class Proceedings Act, the court awarded the plaintiff $90,000 for the motion, $65,000 for the Divisional Court appeal, and $50,000 for the Court of Appeal.

The parties appealed the trial judge's costs award in a shareholder oppression and valuation proceeding.

The trial judge had awarded the dissenting shareholders substantial indemnity costs up to the date of a settlement offer, and awarded the corporation partial indemnity costs thereafter.

The Court of Appeal dismissed both costs appeals, finding no error in principle in the trial judge's exercise of discretion under s. 241(3) of the Canada Business Corporations Act.

The Court also ordered no costs for the main appeals due to divided success.

The appellant appealed his conviction, arguing that the trial judge erred in his Charter analysis under ss. 9, 10(a), 10(b), and 24(2).

The Court of Appeal upheld the trial judge's findings that the detention was appropriate until the scene was secured, and that despite breaches of ss. 10(a) and 10(b), the violations were not sufficiently serious to merit the exclusion of the drug evidence.

The appeal was dismissed.

The respondent brought a motion requesting the Court of Appeal reconsider its decision not to order a trial on whether a right of first refusal was extended by oral agreement.

The court dismissed the request for reconsideration, finding no evidence of an oral agreement specifically addressing the extension of the right of first refusal.

However, the court clarified its previous order to specify that paragraph 4 of the application judge's judgment was not set aside, as it had not been appealed.

The court also granted a temporary stay of its judgment pending the disposition of the respondent's leave application to the Supreme Court of Canada and granted leave to register a certificate of pending litigation against the property.

The trustee in bankruptcy appealed an order restricting it from providing the bankrupt estate's inspectors and creditors with access to the bankrupt's documents.

The restriction was initially imposed due to concerns that an inspector, representing a competitor creditor, would use the information for collateral purposes.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, holding that inspectors require access to documents to fulfill their statutory supervisory duties.

The court ruled that the proper remedy for concerns about misuse of information is to restrain the collateral use of the documents or remove the inspector, rather than denying access entirely.

The appellant appealed his conviction and sentence, arguing the trial judge failed to consider inconsistencies between the complainant's evidence and statements she allegedly made to former friends regarding her sexual activity.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding the trial judge adequately addressed the inconsistencies and accepted the complainant's explanations.

The sentence appeal was also dismissed as the sentence was deemed appropriate.

The appellant pleaded guilty to making and distributing child pornography after creating a sexually explicit collage of his 15-year-old former girlfriend and sharing it online.

He was sentenced to two years in a penitentiary.

On appeal, he sought to withdraw his guilty plea, arguing it was involuntary and that his trial counsel provided ineffective assistance.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding the plea was valid and no miscarriage of justice occurred.

However, the sentence appeal was allowed, with the court finding the two-year term excessive for a youthful first-time offender whose actions were an immature response to a breakup.

The sentence was reduced to time served of eight months.

The appellant, a director of a public holding company, appealed orders removing him from the board of directors and denying him indemnification for costs incurred in resisting his removal.

The application judge had previously found the appellant engaged in oppressive conduct regarding a related-party loan but temporarily allowed him to remain on the board at the pleasure of the independent directors.

When the corporation's circumstances changed, including the commencement of litigation against the majority shareholder, the application judge ordered the appellant's permanent removal.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that the application judge had jurisdiction under s. 241 of the Canada Business Corporations Act to order the conditional service and subsequent removal of the director.

The Court also upheld the denial of indemnification, finding the appellant did not act in the best interests of the corporation in resisting his removal.

The appellant appealed his conviction for refusing to provide a breath sample, arguing there was no unequivocal refusal.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the trial judge and summary conviction appeal judge's inference of an unequivocal refusal was available on the facts, and thus no error of law was demonstrated.

The appellant appealed his conviction, arguing that the verdict was unreasonable due to problems with eyewitness identification procedures and inconsistencies in the description of the getaway car.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the trial judge properly assessed the evidence and that the verdict was supported by a formidable circumstantial case, including the appellant's association with a car closely matching the getaway car.

The appellant appealed a summary judgment decision, arguing there were two genuine issues for trial: where the passenger was seated during the crash, and the damages she would have suffered had she worn a seat belt.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no evidence to support the appellant's position on the seating location and agreeing with the motion judge that expert evidence showed seat belt use would have made no difference.

The appeal was dismissed with costs.

The appellant appealed an order granting a divorce judgment, arguing that the respondent was improperly served.

The appellant had served the respondent's solicitor's clerk with the divorce petition, but the respondent did not file an acceptance or admission of service.

The Court of Appeal found that there was no proper service under Rule 6(3)(b) of the Family Law Rules, as service of the application initiated a new case and there was no lawyer 'in the case' yet.

The appeal was allowed, the divorce judgment was set aside, and costs were awarded to the appellant.

The appellants appealed an order requiring indemnification under an all risk insurance policy for losses of perishable food following a massive power failure in southern Ontario.

The court held that the blackout, not the lack of refrigeration, was the proximate cause of the direct physical loss.

It agreed that ambiguity in the exclusion clauses had to be construed in favour of the insured and distinguished prior authority based on materially different policy wording.

The appeal was dismissed, and appeal costs were awarded to the respondent.

The appellant appealed his sentence, arguing the trial judge misapprehended the allocation of pre-trial custody.

The Crown conceded the error.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal in part, reducing the sentence of imprisonment to time served.

The appeal was otherwise dismissed, with the court upholding the restitution and probation orders, finding the trial judge made no error in principle regarding the appellant's ability to pay.

The Crown appealed the sentence imposed by the trial judge.

The Court of Appeal refused leave to appeal, noting that the trial judge had acceded to a joint submission and that the respondent would have already served the sentence had the proper order been made.

The appellant appealed the sentence imposed by the trial judge.

The Court of Appeal found that the sentence was within the acceptable range and the trial judge made no error in principle.

The court noted that this was not a case of a joint submission, and the sentence imposed was not a significant departure from the Crown's suggested range.

Leave to appeal was granted, but the appeal was dismissed.

The appellant appealed the judgment of the motions judge.

The Court of Appeal agreed with the reasons of the motions judge and dismissed the appeal, fixing costs at $10,000 inclusive of G.S.T. and disbursements.

The young person appealed their convictions for sexual assault and carrying a concealed weapon, as well as the sentence imposed.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding no error in the trial judge's appreciation of the identification evidence or in refusing to direct a verdict of acquittal on the concealed weapon charge.

However, the Crown conceded that the trial judge erred in applying s. 39(1)(d) of the Youth Criminal Justice Act.

Given the time already spent in custody, house arrest, and community service, the Court allowed the sentence appeal, reducing the sentence to time served and striking out the probation order.

The appellants brought an application in Ontario for a declaration that assignments of mining licences relating to Mongolian properties were null and void.

The motion judge stayed the application, finding no real and substantial connection to Ontario.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that the connection to Ontario was weak and that any declaratory or injunctive order would likely be unenforceable in Mongolia under the rules of private international law regarding foreign land.