OCA 2006

The appellant was convicted of careless driving and failing to report a snowmobile accident under the Motorized Snow Vehicles Act.

He appealed, arguing that the justice of the peace failed to consider his due diligence defence—specifically, his mistaken belief that he was uninjured and that the snowmobile damage was minor—and failed to provide sufficient reasons under the Sheppard standard.

The Court of Appeal agreed, finding that the lower courts ignored the appellant's evidence regarding his condition, the apparent damage, and the trail conditions.

The appeal was allowed, the convictions were set aside, and a new trial was ordered.

The appellant appealed a decision of a single judge of the Divisional Court directly to the Court of Appeal.

The respondents brought a motion to quash the appeal.

The Court of Appeal granted the motion and quashed the appeal, holding that the proper route for such an appeal is to the full panel of the Divisional Court under s. 21(5) of the Courts of Justice Act.

The appellant appealed his designation as a dangerous offender and sentence of indeterminate detention following guilty pleas to assault causing bodily harm and aggravated assault.

He argued the trial judge erred by rejecting the 'burnout theory'—that his age would reduce his risk of violence—and by dismissing his psychiatrist's opinion that he could be managed in the community as a long-term offender.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the trial judge reasonably concluded that the burnout theory was speculative and that the preconditions for community management were absent given the appellant's history of violence and lack of motivation to change.

The appellant appealed a jury verdict regarding a motor vehicle accident where the respondent made a left-hand turn into the path of the appellant's approaching vehicle.

The Court of Appeal found that the trial judge's instructions to the jury were inadequate and erroneous, particularly by suggesting 'competing onuses' rather than emphasizing the heavy onus on a left-turning driver under the Highway Traffic Act.

The trial judge also failed to adequately review the evidence and improperly expressed personal opinions on the appellant's possible negligence.

The appeal was allowed, and a new trial was ordered.

The appellants appealed an order reviewing their committal for trial on fraud-related charges.

The Court of Appeal agreed with the reviewing judge that there was some evidence from which an inference could be drawn that the appellants engaged in deceit.

This included attracting investors who could not afford the loans, directing them to obtain loans for the benefit of a corporation, and withholding knowledge that the corporation could not make the promised loan payments.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellants appealed a decision finding the respondents acted reasonably under a Dock License Agreement and were entitled to reimbursement for municipal taxes.

The Court of Appeal upheld the finding that the respondents acted reasonably.

However, the Court allowed the appeal in part, declaring that the respondents were not entitled to a lien under the Repair and Storage Liens Act because they never received possession of the vessel for storage, as the appellants continued to occupy it as their home.

The appellant challenged historical sexual offence convictions and custodial sentences arising from Youth Court and Superior Court proceedings, primarily alleging ineffective assistance of trial counsel.

The Court of Appeal applied the governing incompetence and miscarriage of justice framework and held that most factual predicates for the complaints were not established, while one impugned cross-examination in the Superior Court proceedings, though bordering on incompetence, did not undermine trial fairness or verdict reliability.

The court also rejected the challenge to the Youth Court judge’s credibility assessment, finding proper self-instruction under the governing credibility principles.

Leave to appeal sentence in the Youth Court matter was granted but dismissed, and the sentence appeal in the Superior Court matter was also dismissed.

The appellant appealed his conviction for pushing the complainant down the stairs, arguing the trial judge erred by determining credibility based solely on demeanour and failing to properly apply the W.(D.) framework.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, agreeing with the Summary Conviction Appeal Judge that the trial judge considered all the evidence, recognized inconsistencies, and properly concluded the defence evidence did not raise a reasonable doubt.

The appellant appealed his sentence of two years less a day of incarceration for an offence involving supplying alcohol to a 16-year-old CAS ward he was hired to protect and engaging in sexual intercourse with her despite her protests.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the sentence fit given the gravity of the offence and the appellant's moral blameworthiness, which outweighed the restorative objective of a conditional sentence despite his expressions of remorse.

The appellant appealed his sentence of two years less a day and probation for an offence involving a substantial amount of crack cocaine.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the sentence fit given the aggravating factor that the appellant committed the offence while serving an intermittent sentence for the same offence.

The appellants failed to appear for their appeal.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal with costs fixed at $4,000, without prejudice to the respondent's right to seek a writ of possession before the lower court judge.

The appellant was injured while riding as a passenger with an intoxicated driver after both were over-served at the respondent tavern.

The jury found the appellant 35.5% contributorily negligent for failing to wear a seatbelt and accepting a ride with an impaired driver.

In these supplementary reasons, the Court of Appeal apportioned that 35.5% contributory negligence, assigning 60% to the appellant and 40% to the tavern for its breach of duty in over-serving him.

The Court upheld the trial judge's costs rulings regarding a Rule 49 offer and the Victims' Bill of Rights, but set aside the denial of 14 months of postjudgment interest, finding it was an unwarranted penalty for a delay in delivering a bill of costs.

The appellant appealed his committal for extradition to Germany and applied for judicial review of the Minister of Justice's decision to surrender him.

Germany sought the appellant's extradition on charges of tax evasion, fraud, forgery, and bribery related to secret commissions earned from international arms and aircraft sales.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding sufficient evidence to justify committal and holding that the double criminality rule was satisfied for the tax offences.

The Court also dismissed the application for judicial review, concluding that the Minister did not err in interpreting the extradition treaty, assessing the evidence, or finding that surrender would not be unjust or oppressive.

The appellant appealed his conviction and sentence for conspiracy to traffic in marijuana.

He argued the evidence only showed multiple sales to the same buyer, not an ongoing conspiracy.

The Court of Appeal found ample evidence of a conspiracy, including frequent contact, the pattern of transactions, the quantity of marijuana, and the buyer acting as a broker.

The court also upheld the sentence, noting that while the trial judge may have erred in treating the lack of remorse as an aggravating factor rather than just a factor against a conditional sentence, the sentence was appropriate given the quantities involved.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant insurer appealed a decision finding it had a duty to defend the respondent insured.

The key issue was whether the escape of pollutants occurred at a premises owned or occupied by the insured, which would trigger the Absolute Pollutions Exclusion clause.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that the insured's mere presence for a limited purpose on property occupied and controlled by others did not exclude coverage.

The appellant pleaded guilty to possession of stolen property, firearms offences, and animal neglect.

He appealed his sentence, arguing the trial judge erred in principle by considering unproven prior offences.

The Court of Appeal agreed, finding the trial judge improperly based the sentence in part on unadmitted prior offences without applying s. 725 of the Criminal Code.

The Court reduced the possession sentences to 15 months concurrent, struck out the probation term as overly punitive, and modified the animal prohibition order under s. 446(5).

The appellants appealed a trial judgment finding them liable on a mortgage and rectifying the principal amount.

The Court of Appeal upheld the trial judge's findings that a promissory note evidenced a debt secured by the mortgage assumed by the appellant, and that the appellant had actual or imputed knowledge of the correct amount owing, justifying rectification.

The respondent's cross-appeal on trial costs was dismissed.

The appeal was dismissed with costs awarded to the respondent.

The appellant appealed an order finding he failed to disclose material evidence in his application for an order to continue under Rule 11.02.

The Court of Appeal found no error, noting the undisclosed security agreement provided that there was no transfer of assets until the transferor was paid and the benefits of the action remained with the transferor.

The appeal was dismissed, with the court noting the motion judge left it open for the appellant to reapply with proper material.

The appellant appealed a trial judgment finding it breached its contractual obligations to develop a product and use best efforts to meet time goals.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding ample evidence to support the trial judge's conclusions that the respondent received no value and the breaches were not condoned.

The court found no palpable and overriding error.

The appellant sued the Attorney General of Canada for improperly rejecting his proposal submitted in response to a Request for Proposal for Informatics Professional Services.

The proposal was rejected because the appellant's proposed personnel lacked the required security clearance.

The motions judge granted partial summary judgment to the respondent, finding no triable issue as the mandatory security requirements were not met.

The Court of Appeal upheld the decision, finding no ambiguity in the RFP documents and no basis to interfere.