OCA 2003

The appellants appealed a trial decision which found that the respondent did not misuse confidential information to obtain a commercial contract.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no palpable or overriding error in the trial judge's conclusion that the confidential material was not used by or of assistance to the respondent, as the minimum price had been agreed upon before the information was supplied.

The appellants appealed a decision finding that a transaction involving cows was an option to purchase rather than a security interest.

The Court of Appeal upheld the applications judge's finding that the substance of the transaction was an option to purchase, which does not create a security interest under the Personal Property Security Act.

The court also declined to review the procedural issue of whether a trial of an issue should have been directed, as the parties had agreed to the procedure followed.

The appeal was dismissed with costs.

The appellant appealed his conviction for first-degree murder, arguing that the trial judge erred in summarizing the defence theory, admitting propensity evidence regarding handguns, instructing the jury on after-the-fact conduct, restricting cross-examination on polygraph tests, and charging the jury on first-degree murder.

The appellant also argued the verdict was unreasonable.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no errors in the trial judge's instructions or evidentiary rulings, and concluding that a properly instructed jury could reasonably have rendered a verdict of first-degree murder based on the evidence of planning and deliberation.

The appellant manufacturer sought coverage under its comprehensive general liability insurance policy for costs incurred to remedy a defective transformer incorporated into its product.

The motions judge held the loss was caused by an 'occurrence' (defined as an accident) but applied an exclusion clause to part of the claim.

On appeal and cross-appeal, the Court of Appeal held that defective manufacture does not constitute an 'accident' or 'occurrence' under the policy.

The cross-appeal was allowed, and a declaration was issued that the policy did not apply to the claim.

The moving party brought a motion to quash the responding parties' appeal, arguing that the appeal did not fall within sections 193(a) to (d) of the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act and therefore required leave.

The Court of Appeal disagreed, finding that the appeal fell within section 193(c) because the order appealed from would declare the moving party a creditor and allow it to prove a claim in excess of $3 million, meaning the property involved exceeded $10,000.

The motion to quash was dismissed with costs fixed at $5,000.

The appellant, acting in person, appealed his conviction for taking his child in contravention of a custody order, contrary to s. 282(1)(a) of the Criminal Code, and sought leave to appeal his sentence regarding probation terms.

The appellant had failed to return the child after an access visit and took her to another province.

On appeal, amicus curiae argued the trial judge erred by not leaving the defences of colour of right and imminent harm to the jury, by misdirecting the jury on 'taking' versus 'detaining', and by imposing probation conditions restricting civil litigation.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no air of reality to the proposed defences, applying the curative proviso for any jury instruction error, and upholding the probation conditions as reasonable given the appellant's history of vexatious litigation.

The Crown appealed an acquittal of the respondent on charges of sexual assault.

The trial judge had withdrawn the case from the jury and entered an acquittal because the Crown failed to explicitly ask the complainant where the incidents occurred, and the trial judge denied the Crown's application to re-open the case to establish territorial jurisdiction.

The Court of Appeal found there was sufficient circumstantial evidence that the offences occurred in Ontario.

Furthermore, the trial judge erred in refusing to allow the Crown to re-open its case under the non-controversial exception, as there was no prejudice to the unrepresented accused.

The appeal was allowed and a new trial ordered.

The appellant appealed a judgment of the Superior Court of Justice.

On consent of the parties, the Court of Appeal for Ontario dismissed the appeal without costs.

The appellant appealed a spousal support order, arguing the trial judge relied on an erroneous income figure from a Support Mate calculation entered on consent.

The Court of Appeal agreed, finding the error patent on the face of the record, as the appellant's actual employment income was $10,026 per year, not $16,500.

The court varied the spousal support to $400 a month to equalize the parties' net disposable income, declining to depart from the equalization approach due to an inadequate evidentiary basis.

The appellant appealed a summary judgment dismissing his action against the respondents.

The appellant alleged that the respondents breached a duty of care by failing to properly trace a harassing phone call, which led to his implication.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding it unnecessary to decide the duty of care issue because there was no evidence that further investigation by the respondents would have produced exculpatory evidence for the appellant.

The appellant appealed his conviction for sexual assault, arguing the verdict was unreasonable.

A preliminary issue arose regarding the summary conviction appeal judge's reference to unadmitted fresh DNA evidence.

The Court of Appeal agreed the judge erred in considering the fresh evidence, but proceeded to assess the merits without it.

The Court found the trial judge properly cautioned himself regarding the intoxicated complainant's evidence and correctly relied on DNA evidence as corroboration.

The trial judge's rejection of the appellant's evidence in accordance with the W.(D.) framework was upheld.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant appealed a trial judgment finding him liable for defamation.

The trial judge preferred the evidence of a witness who recorded the appellant's comments, concluding the words left the clear inference that the respondent was guilty of corrupt and criminal behaviour.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, applying the high standard of deference owed to a trial judge's findings of fact.

The appellant appealed the motion judge's construction of the Minutes of Settlement.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the motion judge properly construed the Minutes of Settlement and that the appellant's explanation was not in the material before the motion judge and could not be considered.

The appellant appealed a summary conviction for impaired driving, arguing that the trial judge erred in finding he had the requisite mens rea.

The appellant had consumed a significantly increased dosage of prescription medication before driving, despite experiencing recent memory loss and knowing the drug could cause drowsiness.

The summary conviction appeal judge upheld the conviction, applying the test from R. v. King to find the appellant could reasonably have foreseen the impairment or was reckless.

The Court of Appeal found no basis to interfere with the appeal judge's decision and dismissed the appeal.

The employee, a tour foreman, was fired after refusing a new, unpaid weekend on-call requirement due to child care commitments.

He sued for wrongful dismissal.

The trial judge found the on-call requirement was a material change to the employment contract, constituting constructive dismissal.

The employer appealed, arguing the trial judge exceeded the agreed statement of facts, erred in finding a material change, exhibited bias through preliminary comments, and that the employee failed to mitigate by not accepting the on-call shifts.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, upholding the trial judge's findings and concluding the employee was not obliged to accept the on-call requirement to mitigate damages.

The accused appealed his assault conviction to the summary conviction appeal court, which dismissed the appeal with brief, conclusory reasons.

The accused appealed to the Court of Appeal, arguing the appeal judge's reasons were inadequate.

The Court of Appeal held that the failure to give adequate reasons constituted an error of law that deprived the accused of meaningful appellate review.

Upon reviewing the trial record, the Court found the trial judge misapprehended evidence and subjected the accused's testimony to stricter scrutiny than the complainant's.

The appeal was allowed and a new trial ordered.

The appellant appealed a summary judgment granted in favour of the respondent regarding liability for payment of bills.

The Court of Appeal upheld the summary judgment, finding no error in the motions judge's conclusion that the parties intended for the respondent to look to the appellant for payment, rather than the Titan group.

The court also found no basis to interfere with the costs award.

The appeal was dismissed with costs fixed at $3,000.

The respondent was insured under an accidental death and dismemberment policy and submitted a claim for the loss of use of her leg.

The appellant insurer rejected the claim.

The respondent commenced an action slightly more than a year after submitting her proof of claim, but less than a year after the rejection.

The appellant moved for summary judgment, arguing the action was barred by the one-year limitation period in s. 206(1) of the Insurance Act.

The motion judge dismissed the motion, holding the period began upon unequivocal rejection.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, holding that the limitation period begins to run when the insurer receives sufficient evidence to assess the claim, not upon rejection, and that the discoverability principle does not apply to this statutory provision.

The appellants appealed a decision regarding whether their trial should be heard by a judge rather than a justice of the peace.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that while the statute recognizes complex cases may be heard by a judge, it does not require it, making the decision a matter of discretion.

The court found no reviewable error in the lower courts' decisions.

The appellant appealed an order finding it in contempt of an arbitration award.

The appellant argued the agreement between the parties was ambiguous.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the parties had agreed to a specific calculation method and the appellant's deviation from it constituted a clear violation of a clear order.