DATE: 20030822
COURT OF APPEAL FOR ONTARIO
LASKIN, CRONK and ARMSTRONG JJ.A.
B E T W E E N :
MICHAEL HILTON
R. Steven Baldwin for the appellant
Plaintiff (Respondent)
- and -
NORAMPAC INC.
Bram A. Lecker for the respondent
Defendant (Appellant)
Heard: March 31, 2003
On appeal from a judgment of Justice Richard G. Byers of the Superior Court of Justice dated May 22, 2002.
LASKIN J.A.:
A. Introduction
1Michael Hilton worked for Norampac Inc., a paper mill operator in Trenton, for fifteen years. He was an excellent worker. The company promoted him from a unionized employee to a stock prep foreman and then to a tour foreman. His work schedule included two weekends per month. In May 2000, Norampac required its tour foremen to be on‑call every sixth weekend and to do so without any additional pay. Hilton refused, citing child care commitments. When he would not reconsider his refusal, Norampac fired him.
2Hilton sued for wrongful dismissal. The parties agreed on most of the relevant facts and on damages of $74,000. The trial judge, Byers J., found that the on‑call requirement amounted to a material change in Hilton’s contract of employment, and that, therefore, he had been wrongfully dismissed. Norampac raises four grounds of appeal:
In finding that the on‑call requirement was a material change to the employment contract, the trial judge went beyond the terms of the parties’ agreed statement of facts.
Alternatively, the trial judge erred in finding that the on‑call requirement constituted a material change to the contract.
The trial judge’s conduct raised a reasonable apprehension of bias.
Hilton breached his duty to mitigate his damages by refusing the on‑call requirement during the notice period or until he found another job.
B. Discussion
First Ground of Appeal: Did the trial judge go beyond the parties’ agreed statement of facts?
Second Ground of Appeal: Did the trial judge err in finding that the on‑call requirement was a material change to Hilton’s contract of employment?
3These first two grounds of appeal are best considered together. Norampac contends that the parties agreed to limit the trial judge’s fact‑finding and that in finding a material change to the employment contract, the trial judge exceeded the limits of the parties’ agreement. Alternatively, Norampac contends that, on the agreed facts, the on‑call requirement did not constitute a material change to Hilton’s employment contract.
4To put these contentions in context I will briefly review the agreed facts and then what the parties asked the trial judge to do. The following is a summary of the agreed facts, and a few additional relevant facts that were not contested.
5Hilton began working for Norampac in 1985. He was promoted to stock prep foreman in 1990, and to tour foreman in 1994. As tour foreman he supervised twelve production employees. He worked twelve‑hour shifts, and at the end of each shift he had to arrange a smooth transition to the next shift, which typically took a half an hour to an hour and a half. Up until April 2000, Hilton’s terms of employment had not required that he be on‑call.
6However, beginning in May 2000, Norampac required all four of its tour foremen and two superintendents to be on‑call on average every sixth weekend from 5:00 p.m. Friday to 6:00 a.m. Monday. The company gave two reasons for the on‑call requirement: relief for its two superintendents, who until then had been on‑call every weekend; and “cross‑over training” for the tour foremen.
7The posted schedule did not stipulate any additional compensation for being on‑call. Later, Norampac offered an additional day off, usually the Friday after an on‑call weekend, but no additional pay.
8The other three tour foremen accepted the on‑call requirement, but Hilton refused to do so. He had four young children, his wife had just started a part‑time job that required her to work weekends, and he did not trust outside caregivers. He therefore told the company that family commitments prevented him from taking on this added job responsibility.
9Hilton told Norampac of his refusal to be on‑call verbally on May 2, 2000, in writing on May 10 and at a meeting with management on May 24. On May 25, he received a letter from the company giving him one week at home with pay to reconsider his refusal. On May 31, he wrote the president of Norampac to explain his situation. Hilton noted in his letter that he had declined a promotion to paper machine superintendent the previous year because of his family obligations.
10Hilton met with management on June 5, 2000. He maintained his refusal to be on‑call on weekends. He proposed being on‑call during the week, which the company refused. He then asked to be demoted to a union position, which the company also refused. The two sides exchanged letters the same day. In his letter, Hilton reiterated: “I cannot commit to my scheduled weekends off due to the fact that I have small children and responding on short notice would be impossible.” Management responded by saying that he had until noon on June 7 to reconsider his refusal. Hilton had to take his daughter to the hospital during the evening of June 6. He did not respond to the company’s ultimatum. On June 7, Norampac fired Hilton on the ground that he had “refused to accept the duties and responsibilities of tour foreman.” It gave him no severance pay.
11In their agreed statement of facts, the parties asked the trial judge to decide two questions. They asked him to decide whether Hilton knew that Norampac had offered an extra day off in compensation for the on‑call requirement. The trial judge answered that Hilton did not know. The parties also asked the trial judge to decide how long a tour foreman would typically spend at the paper mill during an on‑call weekend. He answered by stating that on average an on‑call tour foreman would receive two to three calls and would be at the mill for three hours.
12In their agreed statement, the parties stipulated that the trial judge was “to limit any further finding of fact” to these two questions. Norampac relies on this stipulation in submitting that the trial judge went outside the parties’ agreement in finding a material change to the employment contract. In effect, Norampac submits that in making this finding the trial judge exceeded his jurisdiction. It says that but for this stipulation it would have called further evidence.
13I do not accept this submission. The parties agreed that the on‑call requirement had not been a term of Hilton’s employment contract. In the light of that agreed fact, the trial judge was entitled to decide whether the introduction of the on‑call requirement amounted to a material change in the employment contract. In so deciding he did not exceed his jurisdiction. He simply applied the law on constructive dismissal to the facts before him. To accede to Norampac’s submission would have required the trial judge to abdicate his duty and his authority to resolve Hilton’s claim, which was a claim for wrongful dismissal based on a material change to his employment contract.
14Alternatively, Norampac submits that the trial judge erred in holding that the on‑call requirement constituted a material change to the contract. Norampac argues that it was entitled to change Hilton’s work schedule, and that when he refused to comply with the change, it could dismiss him for cause. I do not agree with this submission.
15The question the trial judge had to answer was whether, viewed from the perspective of a reasonable person in Hilton’s situation, Norampac’s unilateral imposition of the on‑call requirement substantially altered the essential terms of Hilton’s employment contract. See Farber v. Royal Trust Co., 1997 387 (SCC), [1997] 1 S.C.R. 846 at 858. Or, in the trial judge’s language, was the on‑call requirement “under all the circumstances, a material change” to Hilton’s contract? In answering this question affirmatively, the trial judge emphasized that the on‑call requirement meant that some months Hilton would have had to work three weekends. The trial judge also held that, although he accepted Hilton’s explanation for refusing the on‑call requirement, his reasons were irrelevant. He was entitled to refuse for no reason at all. Thus, Norampac could dismiss Hilton only by giving him reasonable notice.
16The question of whether the on‑call requirement constituted a material change to the contract is a question of mixed fact and law. Norampac does not argue that the trial judge applied the law incorrectly. His finding of a material change turns on his assessment of the facts, and, in my view, has little precedential value. Therefore, on appeal his finding is entitled to deference. See Housen v. Nikolaisen, 2002 SCC 33, [2002] 2 S.C.R. 235 at 256ff.
17It seems to me that a trier of fact could reasonably find that the unilateral imposition of additional hours of weekend work without pay materially changed the terms of Hilton’s employment. See Randall Scott Echlin & Jennifer M. Fantini, Quitting for Good Reason (Aurora: Canada Law Book, 2001) at 406ff. As this finding was available to the trial judge on the evidentiary record before him, I see no basis to interfere with it. Accordingly, I would not give effect to this ground of appeal.
Third Ground of Appeal: Did the trial judge’s conduct raise a reasonable apprehension of bias?
18After Hilton gave his evidence in chief, but before he was cross-examined, and before Norampac led its own evidence, the trial judge “as is my practice” gave the parties “some comments” on what he had heard so far. He said:
THE COURT: Sit down. As is my practice, I propose to make some comments on what I’ve heard so far. And depending on how the facts unfold, they may or may not be helpful to counsel. I’m not inviting an argument. I’m just giving you some comments and some thoughts.
Assuming for the moment that I accept the plaintiff’s evidence as he has described it, and it looks to be generally supported by the written material, then I don’t think he was entitled to be fired.
Now that’s all very nice. The more difficult problem is, the consequences. This fellow was apparently a real good worker, and went out and got another job. And got some unemployment insurance. So they got to be taken off things.
So my sense is that we might be looking at the range of 15 months, less deductions. So we can’t be looking at that much money. We cannot be looking at that much money. And we’re looking at another two to three days of trial and the costs of that.
19Norampac submits that the trial judge’s comments show that he had prejudged both Hilton’s credibility and the merits of the case. Although acknowledging that the threshold for a finding of bias is high, Norampac contends that the trial judge’s comments crossed the line. See Marchand (Litigation Guardian of) v. Public General Hospital Society of Chatham (2000), 2000 16946 (ON CA), 51 O.R. (3d) 97 (C.A.) at para. 131; R. v. S. (R.D.), 1997 324 (SCC), [1997] 3 S.C.R. 484.
20The trial judge’s comments would have been far better left unsaid, but they do not show that he had prejudged the case. His words show that his views were tentative. Thus, he prefaced his comments by saying “depending on how the facts unfold”. And he said nothing further during the course of the trial that suggested he had closed his mind to Norampac’s position. Moreover, at the trial Norampac’s counsel made no objection to the trial judge’s comments.
21This case differs from Osterbauer v. Ash Temple Ltd. (2003), 2003 6614 (ON CA), 63 O.R. (3d) 697, where this court found that a trial judge’s interventions gave the impression that he had prejudged the case and thus met the test for reasonable apprehension of bias. In that case, the trial judge intervened numerous times, expressed firm views about the merits of the case and prevented the losing party from fully advancing its position. Here, the trial judge intervened only once, the views he expressed were not firmly held, and he did not prevent Norampac from fully presenting its case. I would not give effect to this ground of appeal.
22That said, it seems to me that the trial judge’s “practice” is unwise. In a case like this one, where his decision replicates his preliminary comments, the losing party may justifiably feel aggrieved. In other circumstances, with little more, a finding of bias might be made out. In my view, the trial judge would better serve the interests of justice by discontinuing this “practice”.
Fourth Ground of Appeal: Did Hilton breach his duty to mitigate by refusing the on‑call requirement?
23Norampac submits that to fulfil his duty to mitigate his damages, Hilton was obliged to accept the on‑call requirement during the period of reasonable notice or until he found another job. It relies on this court’s judgment in Mifsud v. MacMillan Bathurst Inc. (1989), 1989 260 (ON CA), 70 O.R. (2d) 701 at 709-10, where McKinlay J.A. discussed the employee’s obligation to mitigate by accepting a different position within the company – in Mifsud, a demotion albeit with no loss of pay:
Is the situation substantially different when an employer does not wish to dismiss an employee but, being unsatisfied with his performance, or for some other valid reason, wishes to place him in a different position at the same salary? Why should it not be considered reasonable for the employee to mitigate his damages by working at the other position for the period of reasonable notice, or at least until he has found alternative employment which he accepts in mitigation?
The fact that the transfer to a new position may constitute in law a constructive dismissal does not eliminate the obligation of the employee to look at the new position offered and evaluate it as a means of mitigating damages. In all cases, comparison should be made to the contractual entitlement of the employer to give reasonable notice and leave the employee in his current position while a search is made for alternative employment.
24Hilton did not have a similar obligation to accept the on‑call requirement. As McKinlay J.A. pointed out at 710: “[T]here are many situations where the facts would substantiate a constructive dismissal but where it would be patently unreasonable to expect an employee to accept continuing employment with the same employer in mitigation of his damages.” This is one of those situations. The trial judge implicitly found that it would not have been reasonable to expect Hilton to comply with the on‑call requirement. I therefore would not give effect to Norampac’s argument on mitigation.
C. Conclusion
25I would not interfere with the trial judge’s finding that the on‑call requirement was a unilateral and material change to the employment contract, which Hilton was entitled to refuse to accept. Accordingly, I would dismiss the appeal. Hilton is entitled to his costs of the appeal on a partial indemnity basis. I would fix those costs at $7,500, inclusive of disbursements and Goods and Services Tax.
RELEASED: August 22, 2003
“JL”
“John Laskin J.A.”
“I agree E. A. Cronk J.A.”
“I agree Robert P. Armstrong J.A.”