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The Children's Aid Society of Toronto brought a status review application seeking extended society care for two children (aged 7 and 5) due to a prolonged history of family violence perpetrated by the father against the mother, the mother's inability to protect the children from this exposure, and the parents' consistent dishonesty and lack of insight regarding the impact of the violence.

The parents sought custody or supervision.

The court found a continuing necessity for a protection order, concluding that the risks of physical and emotional harm to the children remained unacceptably high.

The court granted the society's request for extended society care, emphasizing the children's need for permanency and stability.

Access for the mother and father was ordered to be strictly supervised and limited, with the children designated as access holders.

The maternal grandfather was granted more generous access as an access holder.

The applicant, a non-profit environmental education centre, sought a declaration that its property was exempt from municipal taxation under section 3(1)5 of the Assessment Act as an 'educational seminary of learning'.

The respondent assessment corporation opposed the application, arguing the centre lacked a structured curriculum, regular students, and formal instructors.

The Superior Court of Justice granted the application, finding that the primary purpose of the centre, determined objectively, was educational.

The court held that a flexible approach to the definition of a 'seminary of learning' was appropriate, and the centre's workshops, symposiums, and experiential learning programs sufficiently constituted a focused educational agenda.

The applicants sought an ex parte order to dispense with service and discharge a registered notice of security interest held by the respondent, Viva Financial Corporation (VFC), on their residential property.

The security interest related to a carbon filter and water softener system installed by VFC, which the applicants claimed was faulty and for which VFC became unresponsive.

The court declined to grant the order, finding that proceeding ex parte was inappropriate as VFC could be served by mail to its last registered address, and a potentially affected non-party, Simply Smart Home (SSH), also needed to be served.

Furthermore, the court held that the statutory provisions relied upon by the applicants (sections 1 and 12(3) of the Mortgages Act and subsection 102(1) of the Land Titles Act) did not apply because the applicants did not intend to pay off the secured obligation, which is a precondition for relief under those sections.

The application was adjourned sine die to allow the applicants to properly serve VFC and SSH and reframe their application.

The applicant, a charitable non-profit corporation, sought a declaration that a portion of its property leased to a day school was exempt from municipal taxation under paragraph 5 of s. 3(1) of the Assessment Act.

The applicant argued that if it occupied the space itself, it would use it for the relief of the poor, thereby qualifying for the exemption under paragraph 12(iii).

The court dismissed the application, finding that the statutory language requires an objective assessment of the owner's actual nature and operations, not hypothetical future uses, and that the applicant failed to demonstrate it was currently organized and engaged primarily in the relief of the poor or supported by public funds.

The plaintiff contractor brought a construction lien action for the unpaid balance of a metal roof installation contract, plus an alleged oral contract for extra work.

The defendant homeowner counterclaimed for damages, alleging extensive negligence and breach of contract in the roof's installation.

The court found the contractor substantially completed the work and dismissed the claim for the oral extra.

The court found minor functional and cosmetic deficiencies, awarding the homeowner $4,000 in damages to be set off against the $10,000 contract balance, resulting in a net payment of $6,000 to the contractor.

The Children's Aid Society brought a motion for summary judgment seeking a finding that the child was in need of protection and an order for extended society care with no access.

The mother had a history of substance abuse and criminal activity, and failed to comply with previous court orders or address the protection concerns.

The court found no genuine issue for trial, determined the child was in need of protection, and ordered extended society care.

The court also terminated the mother's access, finding it was not beneficial and meaningful to the child.

The plaintiffs sought court approval for the settlement of a tort action and an attendant care action on behalf of a minor injured in a motor vehicle accident, as well as approval of the associated contingency fee agreements.

The court approved the settlements and found the contingency fee agreement to be fair.

The court approved the requested fee for the tort action, finding it reasonable given the complexity and risk involved.

However, the court found the requested one-third fee for the attendant care action to be unreasonable due to the lack of complexity and risk, and reduced it to twenty percent of the recovery.

The plaintiff was injured in a single-vehicle accident involving his own vehicle and sought to amend his statement of claim to assert a claim against his own automobile insurer under the OPCF 44R family protection endorsement.

He alleged that an unlicenced acquaintance was driving the vehicle at the time.

The motion judge dismissed the motion on the basis that the claim was not tenable in law.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding that while the motion judge erred in her interpretation of the endorsement, the proposed claim was ultimately untenable in any of the possible factual scenarios.

The plaintiff brought a motion for judgment against his uncle, the defendant, for damages arising from sexual abuse that occurred in 1975 when the plaintiff was 12 years old.

The defendant initially defended the action but later withdrew his statement of defence and was noted in default.

The court found the defendant liable for sexual abuse, assault, battery, and negligence, and concluded that the abuse caused the plaintiff's severe psychological trauma and loss of earning capacity.

The court awarded the plaintiff $95,000 in general and aggravated damages, $85,000 for loss of earning capacity, $10,250 for future care costs, and $30,000 in punitive damages, along with substantial indemnity costs.