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Motion for stay of disciplinary proceedings dismissed; inordinate delay found but no significant prejudice established.
The moving parties, professional engineers and engineering firms involved in the design and construction of the Nipigon River Bridge, brought a motion to stay disciplinary proceedings against them on the basis of delay.
The Discipline Committee found that the Association of Professional Engineers of Ontario (PEO) was responsible for approximately 36 months of inordinate delay in its investigation.
However, the Committee dismissed the motion, concluding that the moving parties failed to establish significant prejudice that would compromise hearing fairness or amount to an abuse of process.
The Committee further held that the public interest in holding a hearing on the merits regarding the failure of major public infrastructure outweighed any disrepute caused by the delay.
Discipline Committee's refusal to award costs after staying deficient professional misconduct proceedings was unreasonable.
The appellants, a professional engineer and his company, appealed a decision of the Discipline Committee of the Association of Professional Engineers of Ontario refusing to award them costs after staying a disciplinary proceeding against them.
The Discipline Committee had stayed the proceeding indefinitely because the referral lacked sufficient detail to identify the complaint.
However, the Committee later refused to award costs, finding the proceeding was not unwarranted.
The Divisional Court held that the decision to deny costs was unreasonable, as the Committee had already concluded the allegations were so deficient that a finding of professional misconduct could not succeed.
The Court awarded the appellants $26,000 in costs for the hearing and the appeal.
Law Society has the authority to compel a licensee to attend an oral investigatory interview.
The appellant lawyer appealed a decision of the Law Society Appeal Panel finding him guilty of professional misconduct for refusing to attend an interview with a Society investigator.
The appellant argued that the Law Society Act only authorized the Society to require the provision of information, not attendance at an oral interview.
The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, holding that the standard of review was reasonableness and that the Society's broad duty to protect the public interest required effective investigation powers, including the authority to compel oral interviews.
