M. Venturi

The applicant brought a pre-trial change of venue application before the Regional Senior Judge.

A temporary publication ban was imposed, and the court invited submissions on whether section 648(1) of the Criminal Code automatically bans publication of information regarding pre-trial applications heard before a jury is chosen.

The court held that section 648(1) does not apply to applications heard before a jury is empanelled, nor to change of venue applications, nor to applications heard by a judge other than the trial judge.

Instead, publication bans for such pre-trial applications must be determined using the common law Dagenais/Mentuck test.

The applicant, charged with second-degree murder in a 1998 cold case, applied to change the venue of his trial from Sudbury to Toronto, arguing that extensive pre-trial publicity and public support for the victim made it impossible to empanel an impartial jury in the Northeast Region.

The court reviewed the extent and content of the media coverage, social media commentary, and a public opinion survey.

The court found that the applicant failed to establish a fair and reasonable likelihood of widespread partiality or prejudice that could not be overcome by the safeguards of the jury system.

The application was dismissed, though the court noted the trial might still be moved within the region due to COVID-19 constraints, and imposed a publication ban on specific portions of the reasons.

The applicant brought a motion for a stay of proceedings, arguing that the delay to trial exceeded the 30-month ceiling under s. 11(b) of the Charter.

The central issue was whether the delay clock started when the information was sworn or seven months later when the applicant was arrested.

The court held that the clock begins upon arrest if the accused is unaware of the charges.

After deducting defence-caused delays, the net delay was under 30 months.

The application was dismissed.

The Crown brought an application to remove the accused's defence counsel due to an alleged conflict of interest.

One of the defence counsel had previously represented a former suspect who was initially charged with the same murder in 1998 before being cleared by DNA and fingerprint evidence.

The Crown argued counsel would be unable to effectively challenge the forensic evidence or advance a third-party suspect defence without implicating the former client.

The court dismissed the application, finding that a third-party suspect defence pointing to the former client was not realistically available and that counsel could effectively challenge the forensic evidence without implicating him.

The accused's right to counsel of choice was upheld.

The Crown brought an application to admit the hearsay statements of a deceased victim in a second-degree murder trial under the principled exception to the hearsay rule.

The victim had made statements to police, medical staff, and family members before dying from his injuries.

The court applied the test for threshold reliability, noting concerns about the victim's perception due to intoxication, medical condition, and language barriers.

Furthermore, the victim's statements identifying the attacker as a woman contradicted the Crown's theory that the male accused was the attacker.

The court found the statements lacked sufficient threshold reliability and dismissed the application.

The accused, charged with second degree murder, brought applications under s. 8 of the Charter to exclude evidence derived from the warrantless seizure of his pants, shoes, and sweater.

The court found that the accused had a reasonable expectation of privacy in the clothing and that the warrantless seizures violated his s. 8 rights, as there were no exigent circumstances.

Applying the Grant framework under s. 24(2) of the Charter, the court excluded the evidence derived from the pants due to a lack of evidence regarding their seizure, but admitted the evidence derived from the shoes and sweater, finding that their admission would not bring the administration of justice into disrepute.

The Crown brought a pre-trial application seeking an order that the defence provide a list of its witnesses to be read to prospective jurors during jury selection to identify potential conflicts.

The defence opposed the application, arguing it violated the accused's right against self-incrimination and the principle that the defence need not reveal its case until the close of the Crown's case.

The court dismissed the Crown's application, finding that compelling the defence to reveal its witness list at the outset would amount to conscripting the accused against himself.

The court adopted a procedure proposed by the defence where a combined, anonymized list of Crown and defence witnesses would be provided to the trial judge and prospective jurors silently.