M. Snowden

The applicants brought a motion for leave to amend their Amended Notice of Application to add Sentry Insurance Company, Teva Canada Limited, and National Union Fire Insurance Company of Pittsburgh, PA as respondents.

The proposed respondents consented to the relief sought.

The court granted the motion on consent, with the application against the newly added parties to be adjourned to a later date.

The applicants brought a motion to compel the representative of Liberty Mutual Insurance Company to answer questions refused during cross-examination and to reattend.

Prior to the hearing, the parties settled the motion on consent.

The court granted the relief sought in accordance with the draft order.

The defendants, Economical Mutual Insurance Company and Firstbrook, Cassie & Anderson Limited, brought motions for leave to amend their statements of defence under Rule 26.01.

The plaintiff opposed several proposed amendments, arguing they improperly pleaded res judicata, issue estoppel, withdrew admissions, and pleaded evidence rather than facts.

The Master granted leave to both defendants to amend their pleadings, finding no non-compensable prejudice to the plaintiff and concluding that the proposed amendments were legally tenable and properly pleaded the necessary elements of the defences.

The applicant, who operated a wood shavings business, was sued for negligence after a tree he was cutting down fell and injured the plaintiff.

The applicant sought a declaration that his homeowner's insurer (Northbridge) and his commercial general liability insurer (Economical) had a duty to defend the action.

The court held that Northbridge had no duty to defend because the tree cutting was an occasional pursuit undertaken for financial gain, falling squarely within the policy's business exclusion.

However, the court found that Economical had a duty to defend because the policy covered the applicant as a sole owner of a business, and it was possible the tree cutting arrangement did not constitute a joint venture or partnership that would fall outside coverage.

The applicant's request to appoint independent counsel was dismissed as premature.

Following a summary judgment decision where the plaintiffs successfully obtained a declaration that the primary insurer was required to advance defence costs under a D&O policy, the court determined costs and pre-judgment interest.

The plaintiffs were awarded full indemnity costs against the primary insurer due to the breach of the duty to defend.

The court declined to issue a Bullock or Sanderson Order, finding it was the plaintiffs' decision to continue their claim against the excess insurers, who were awarded partial indemnity costs payable by the plaintiffs.