McMurtry

The appellant appealed both conviction and sentence arising from an armed jewellery store robbery in which he was alleged to have been the getaway driver.

The court held that handgun evidence found during a warrantless search of his residence should have been excluded because the breach of s. 8 of the Charter was deliberate, flagrant, and not justified by urgency, but applied the proviso because the accomplice evidence made the conviction inevitable.

The court also held that the trial judge erred in treating the rejected alibi as concocted absent sufficient extrinsic evidence of fabrication, though that error likewise caused no substantial wrong or miscarriage of justice.

The conviction appeal was dismissed, but the sentence appeal was allowed because the trial judge failed to adequately account for parity, differing criminal records, and the appellant’s lesser role in the violence.

The appellant appealed a conviction for second degree murder arising from a fatal shooting after a house party.

The central issue was whether the trial judge's jury re-instruction on reasonable doubt improperly required jurors to articulate a logical reason for their doubt and further referred to the notion of a timid juror.

The court held that this wording was contrary to established appellate authority and inconsistent with the proper reasonable doubt framework.

In the context of a closely contested case, the error was reversible and necessitated a new trial.

This addendum to a criminal appeal judgment clarified that the court did not intend to preclude the respondent from applying for a discharge.

Relying on prior authority indicating that even a conviction would not necessarily bar a discharge, the court nonetheless amended its earlier reasons for absolute clarity.

The acquittal was set aside and replaced with a finding of guilt for common assault, thereby preserving the respondent's ability to seek a discharge.

The appellants appealed only the assessment of damages following a negligence finding against criminal defence counsel arising from the handling of an abduction prosecution and plea discussions.

The Court of Appeal held that the respondent could not recover amounts paid toward his mother's legal fees or amounts paid by Legal Aid, as those losses were not legally attributable to the appellants.

The majority further held that while the trial judge erred in linking the respondent's family estrangement to counsel's negligence, the expert psychiatric evidence supported a reduced award for depression caused by the negligent conduct of the defence.

The damages award was reduced to $15,000, with prejudgment interest and trial costs preserved on the basis fixed below.

The appellant sought leave to appeal a one-year sentence imposed for serious offences committed against his ex-spouse while on probation for prior violence toward the same victim.

The court noted the appellant's lengthy criminal record dating back to 1972, including numerous violent offences, and his untreated long-standing alcohol problem.

Although the panel observed that more extensive reasons from the sentencing judge would have been preferable, it was not persuaded that the sentence was unfit.

Leave to appeal sentence was granted, but the appeal was dismissed.

Appeal and cross-appeal in a solicitor's negligence action arising from corporate and estate transactions involving an executor who became president and shareholder of a corporation in which the estate held shares.

The court held that the law firm's retainer in relation to the initial transaction was limited and did not impose a duty to warn of the risk of beneficiary claims, particularly given the sophistication and role of the client.

However, the firm did owe a duty to warn in relation to a later acquisition transaction in which it was involved in all aspects and knew the estate was excluded.

The court upheld the trial judge's lost chance analysis, apportionment of fault, and nominal damages award.

The appellant appealed his murder conviction and sentence, relying on fresh recantation evidence from a key civilian witness and an inmate informant, as well as new DNA testing undermining aspects of the Crown's theory.

The court rejected the civilian witness recantation as incredible, but admitted the inmate recantation and the DNA evidence under the Palmer framework.

Although the fresh evidence significantly weakened the Crown case and impaired important inculpatory evidence, the court held it was not so conclusive as to justify an acquittal and the verdict was not shown to be unreasonable under the governing standard.

The conviction was set aside and a new trial ordered on second degree murder.

Leave to appeal the counselling sentence was granted and that sentence was reduced to time served.