Mclntyre

The appellants appealed a Superior Court judge's decision not to review his initial approval of an authorization to enter and seize under section 231(4) of the Income Tax Act.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal, following its concurrent decision in Goodman v. Rompkey, which held that there is no right of appeal to the Court of Appeal from such an approval or a revised approval.

The appellant was charged with conspiring in Canada to cause persons to enter the United States unlawfully.

At the preliminary inquiry, the judge quashed the information on the basis that it did not allege an offence known to Canadian law.

The Superior Court issued a writ of mandamus directing the judge to proceed, which was affirmed by the Court of Appeal.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal, holding that conspiracy to effect unlawful entry is an offence in both Canada and the United States, and under s. 423(3) of the Criminal Code, the conspirators are deemed to have conspired to commit the offence in Canada.

The Court also held that the information was valid and that mandamus was the appropriate remedy for a fundamental error of law amounting to a refusal to exercise jurisdiction.

The appellant, a chartered accountant, appealed a decision of the Court of Appeal for Quebec which held that no appeal lies from a Superior Court judge's approval of a search and seizure authorization issued by the Minister of National Revenue under the Income Tax Act.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal, concluding that the judge's approval does not constitute a final judgment under the Code of Civil Procedure, as it merely permits the search and does not determine the rights of the parties or terminate a proceeding.

The Court also found that the Superior Court judge did not exceed his jurisdiction in granting the approval.

The Crown charged the appellant with conspiracy to violate the Export and Import Permits Act, but the indictment omitted reference to the alleged violation of United States law.

The trial judge refused the Crown's motion to amend the indictment and subsequently dismissed the case for want of evidence.

The Court of Appeal set aside the acquittal and directed the trial to continue.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the appeal and restored the acquittal, holding that the Court of Appeal lacked the authority to amend the indictment by substituting a different offence.

Furthermore, the Court held that an order for a new trial under s. 613(4) requires a full new trial, and it would be unjust to force the accused to proceed on an amended indictment, especially since the co-conspirator had been deported.

The CRTC appealed a Federal Court of Appeal decision that set aside its renewal of CTV's broadcasting licence.

The CRTC had imposed a condition requiring CTV to broadcast a specified number of hours of original new Canadian drama.

The Federal Court of Appeal held that the CRTC had jurisdiction to impose the condition but breached natural justice by not giving adequate notice of the specific condition.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the CRTC's appeal, holding that the CRTC had the jurisdiction to impose the condition under s. 17(1) of the Broadcasting Act and that there was no breach of natural justice, as CTV had sufficient notice that Canadian drama offerings would be discussed.

The Court also dismissed CTV's cross-appeal regarding the composition of the hearing panel.

A motion for leave to appeal to the Supreme Court of Canada from a decision of the Saskatchewan courts was dismissed.

The appellants challenged the validity of a 1908 surrender of Indian reserve lands by the Enoch Band.

At the surrender meeting, a majority of the eligible male members were present, and a majority of those present voted in favour of the surrender, but the assenting members did not constitute an absolute majority of all eligible male members of the band.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that under section 49(1) of the Indian Act, a valid surrender requires only that a majority of eligible members attend the meeting, and that a majority of those present assent to the surrender.

The appeal was dismissed.

Following a natural gas explosion that caused severe injuries and deaths, the trial judge and Court of Appeal found the appellant gas company 25% liable and the respondent municipalities 75% liable.

The appellant appealed to the Supreme Court of Canada, claiming full indemnity from the respondents.

The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, holding that a party cannot be indemnified for its own negligence in the absence of a clear contractual right, and the appellant's own negligence barred recovery beyond the 75% allowed by The Negligence Act.

The appellant, who was awarded custody of her children, sought an order compelling Revenue Canada to disclose the address of her former husband, who had abducted the children.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal, holding that the statutory confidentiality provisions in section 241 of the Income Tax Act preclude disclosure in civil proceedings.

The Court found no power to qualify these provisions and noted that the exceptions in section 241(4)(c) did not apply.

The appellant, who had been awarded custody of her children, sought to locate them after they were abducted by her husband.

She obtained an order directing the respondent telecommunications company to provide telephone records to the court under s. 26 of the Family Law Reform Act, 1978.

The Court of Appeal set aside the order.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal, holding that the order went beyond the scope of the statutory authority and the inherent powers of the court, taking on an inquisitional nature beyond the traditional role of courts in inter partes proceedings.

The appellant appealed a conviction for trafficking in heroin, arguing that the trial judge erred by failing to advert to the danger of acting on uncorroborated accomplice evidence.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal, finding that the trial judge's reasons were adequate to support the conviction, especially given that the accomplice's evidence was accepted and there was, in fact, corroboration.

The Attorney General of Quebec appealed a decision refusing a writ of prohibition against a Youth Court judge who proceeded with a robbery charge against a juvenile under the federal Juvenile Delinquents Act and Criminal Code.

The appellant argued that the provincial Youth Protection Act precluded such proceedings unless brought in accordance with its provisions.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal, holding that section 455 of the Criminal Code is valid federal legislation and that the relevant sections of the provincial Youth Protection Act are rendered inoperative in this context due to paramountcy, as they conflict with the valid federal criminal process.

The appellants were acquitted at trial of unlawfully importing heroin.

The trial judge found a reasonable doubt regarding the nature of the substance because the analyst had compared the suspect substance's graph to a standard graph of unknown preparation.

The Court of Appeal allowed the Crown's appeal and ordered a new trial, assuming the standard graph was prepared in Ottawa.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the appellants' appeal and restored the acquittals.

The Court held that the trial judge's factual determination regarding the analyst's procedure could not be overturned on a Crown appeal limited to questions of law.

Furthermore, the analyst's reliance on an unverified standard graph constituted 'evidence to the contrary' under s. 9 of the Narcotic Control Act, which was capable of rebutting the presumption created by the certificate of analysis.

The Royal Commission of Inquiry into the Confidentiality of Health Records in Ontario sought to compel RCMP officers to disclose the identities of physicians and hospital employees who had provided patients' medical information to the police without authorization.

The officers claimed police-informer privilege.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that the police-informer privilege is a rule of law that applies generally, including in civil proceedings and public inquiries, to protect the identity of those who furnish information to the police in the course of their duties.

The privilege belongs to the Crown and is not defeated by the fact that the informants may have breached a duty of confidentiality in providing the information.

The appeal was allowed and the officers were not required to disclose the identities.

The plaintiff, a highly educated woman of East Indian origin, repeatedly applied for teaching positions at the defendant college but was never interviewed or hired.

She brought a civil action claiming damages for discrimination based on race and national origin, arguing both a common law tort of discrimination and a breach of The Ontario Human Rights Code.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that no common law tort of discrimination exists.

The Court found that the comprehensive administrative and adjudicative scheme established by the Code forecloses any civil action based directly on a breach of the Code or on an invocation of the public policy expressed within it.

The appellant was convicted of breaking and entering a dwelling.

At trial, his counsel waived the holding of a voir dire regarding the voluntariness of a statement made to police.

The appellant appealed, arguing that the trial judge erred in failing to conduct a voir dire despite the waiver, and in failing to conduct one to determine if the statement was actually made or after the appellant testified about alleged threats and inducements.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal, holding that an accused or their counsel may expressly waive a voir dire, and that the trial judge did not err in his exercise of discretion.

The appellant vendor and respondent purchaser were negotiating a real estate transaction.

The purchaser made a counter offer and requested the vendor to initial the changes and return the agreement 'as soon as possible'.

The vendor initialled the changes within the time limit but the mailed acceptance was received after the deadline.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that the closing words of the purchaser's letter indicated that prompt return of the initialled document would satisfy any formal provision for acceptance.

The appeal was allowed and the trial judgment finding a valid contract was restored.

The appellant appealed from a judgment of the Court of Appeal for Ontario which allowed the Crown's appeal from his acquittal on charges of attempted robbery and firearms offences.

The trial judge had left the defence of non-insane automatism to the jury.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal, agreeing with the Court of Appeal that there was no evidence of non-insane automatism to be left with the jury and upholding the order for a new trial.

The appellants were convicted of conspiring to affect the public market price of shares.

At trial, the Crown relied on accomplice testimony.

The trial judge warned the jury about the danger of uncorroborated accomplice testimony but left them free to find corroboration in other parts of the evidence.

Crucially, the trial judge failed to instruct the jury that certain evidence suggested by the Crown as corroborative could not, as a matter of law, provide corroboration.

The Supreme Court of Canada held this was a fatal error and declined to apply the curative proviso under s. 613(1)(b)(iii) of the Criminal Code, as the Crown did not demonstrate the verdict would necessarily have been the same.

The appeal was allowed and a new trial ordered.

The appellant was acquitted of a drunk driving charge after the trial judge held that the Crown could not rely on the statutory presumption of blood alcohol level without proceeding by certificate evidence or proving the suitability of the breathalyzer solution.

The Court of Appeal set aside the acquittal.

On further appeal, the Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal, holding that the Crown may rely on the statutory presumption whether it proceeds by viva voce evidence or certificate, and that proof of the suitability of the breathalyzer solution is not required as part of the Crown's case.