M. B. Carnegie

A 13-year-old young person pled guilty to unauthorized possession of a prohibited firearm and failing to comply with an undertaking.

The Crown and defence jointly submitted a sentence of time served (130 days) plus probation.

The court rejected the joint submission, finding that a custodial sentence was not legally available under s. 39 of the Youth Criminal Justice Act because the mere possession of the firearm did not constitute a 'violent offence' and the circumstances did not amount to an 'exceptional case'.

The young person was sentenced to 18 months of probation with ancillary orders.

The accused, a police officer, pleaded guilty to breach of trust after using his position to access confidential vehicle registration information for his son.

The son subsequently used this information to commit a home invasion that resulted in a homicide.

The court weighed the paramount sentencing principles of deterrence and denunciation against the accused's guilty plea, lack of prior record, and the fact that he did not foresee the homicide.

The court imposed a 12-month conditional sentence order.

The applicants, charged with various drug trafficking and weapons offences, brought an application for a stay of proceedings under s. 24(1) of the Charter, alleging an infringement of their right to be tried within a reasonable time under s. 11(b).

The total delay from the laying of charges to the anticipated end of trial was 915 days.

After deducting defence-caused delay and deliberation time, the net delay was 773 days, exceeding the 18-month presumptive ceiling for provincial court matters.

The Crown argued that the COVID-19 pandemic constituted an exceptional circumstance justifying the delay.

The court rejected this argument, finding that the primary cause of the delay was the Crown's failure to provide timely disclosure, not the pandemic.

As the Crown failed to mitigate the delay or establish exceptional circumstances, the court found a breach of s. 11(b) and stayed the proceedings.

The accused, charged with sexual assault and common assault, brought an application under section 278.94 of the Criminal Code seeking leave to cross-examine the complainant about an alleged consensual sexual encounter that occurred months after the alleged offences.

The accused argued the evidence was relevant to the complainant's credibility and supported his defence that the assault never occurred.

The court dismissed the application, finding that admitting the evidence would violate the myth-based reasoning prohibition in section 276(1) and that the evidence lacked significant probative value to outweigh its prejudicial effect.

The accused was charged with impaired operation of a conveyance after being involved in two motor vehicle collisions and exhibiting erratic driving.

The accused conceded the actus reus of being impaired by a drug but argued he lacked the mens rea, claiming his intoxication was involuntary due to a combination of his prescribed medications and an over-the-counter cold medication.

The court found the accused's evidence lacked credibility and reliability, noting significant inconsistencies and a failure to establish a nexus between the cold medication and his impairment.

The accused failed to rebut the presumption of voluntary intoxication, resulting in a finding of guilt.

The applicant, charged with child pornography and luring offences, applied for a stay of proceedings under s. 11(b) of the Charter, citing a 24.6-month delay to trial.

The Crown argued the delay was justified by the COVID-19 pandemic as an exceptional circumstance.

The court found that the vast majority of the delay was caused by the Crown's lack of diligence in providing critical disclosure, not the pandemic.

As the net delay exceeded the presumptive ceiling and no exceptional circumstances mitigated the Crown's disclosure failures, the court found the delay unreasonable and stayed the charges.