Matthew W. Griener

The Crown appealed an Alberta Court of Appeal order setting aside a first degree murder conviction and ordering a new trial.

The accused had been questioned at a police station in connection with a homicide investigation without being cautioned of his right to remain silent or informed of his right to counsel.

The trial judge admitted the statements as voluntary.

The majority held that the absence of a caution constitutes prima facie evidence of involuntariness where the accused is a suspect, but that the Crown may discharge its burden by proving beyond a reasonable doubt that the absence of caution was without consequence and that the statements were voluntary in all the circumstances.

The majority further held the accused was not psychologically detained and his Charter rights were not triggered.

Appeal allowed and conviction restored, with Brown and Martin JJ. dissenting on the basis that a warning should be required at the outset of all police-initiated investigative interviews.

A young person charged with second degree murder elected trial before a superior court judge and sought judicial interim release before a Queen's Bench justice, who declined jurisdiction on the basis that the provincially designated youth court held exclusive authority.

The Supreme Court allowed the appeal, finding that a superior court justice deemed a youth justice court judge under ss. 13(2) or 13(3) of the YCJA has jurisdiction over pre-trial applications including judicial interim release, because 'the proceeding' in those sections encompasses all steps taken after election, not merely the trial.

The Court further held that s. 33(8) of the YCJA, which grants release authority to 'a youth justice court judge', does not qualify that term to exclude s. 13(1) provincially designated youth court judges.

Accordingly, jurisdiction over judicial interim release is concurrent between the superior court and the designated youth justice court, a result Parliament intended to provide flexibility and accessibility, particularly for Indigenous youth in rural areas.

The accused sought to introduce evidence of a prior ongoing sexual relationship with the complainant — a 'friends with benefits' arrangement — in a sexual assault trial under s. 276 of the Criminal Code.

The majority held that the evidence failed to satisfy s. 276(2) because the accused did not identify any specific, legitimate purpose for the evidence beyond a bare invocation of 'context', meaning its only operative relevance was to support the prohibited twin-myth inferences.

The improper admission of the evidence, and the subsequent broadening of sexual activity evidence at trial, might reasonably have had a material bearing on the acquittal.

Brown J. dissented, finding the trial judge applied the correct legal principles, that the relationship evidence did not solely derive its relevance from twin-myth reasoning, and that a new trial was procedurally unfair given that the Crown itself relied on the sexual nature of the relationship to advance its theory of the case.