Mary A. Fraser

Following the withdrawal of a status review application by the child protection society, the respondent foster parents, maternal grandmother, and First Nation band sought costs against the society.

The court reviewed the principles for awarding costs against a child protection agency, noting that costs are only appropriate if the society acted in a patently unfair or indefensible manner.

The court found that the society's actions in bringing the application to address access issues and a breakdown in the foster placement were reasonable based on the information available at the time.

The requests for costs were dismissed.

The respondent grandmother brought a motion to strike the applicant step-grandfather's application for contact with their grandson.

The respondent argued the issue was res judicata due to a prior child protection order granting her custody.

The court dismissed the motion to strike, finding the applicant was not a party to the child protection proceeding and the Children's Law Reform Act explicitly allows for contact applications following such orders.

The court ordered the biological parents to be added as respondents but declined to order the applicant to pay child support.

The applicant father brought an urgent motion seeking the return of the children to Pembroke, Ontario, enrollment in in-person schooling, and primary parenting time.

The respondent mother conceded to returning to Pembroke and enrolling the children in in-person schooling.

The court dismissed the applicant's request for primary parenting time, finding insufficient evidence to justify altering the long-standing status quo of week-about shared parenting on an interim basis.

The Applicant father brought an urgent motion for a temporary shared parenting schedule for the child, Olive Grace Murray.

The Respondent mother opposed, seeking limited supervised access and communication through an app, and also requested child support (which the court declined to consider).

The court reviewed the parties' history, including a prior shared parenting arrangement that the mother unilaterally stopped, and the mother's concerns about the father's conduct and mental health.

Applying the "best interests of the child" principle and the desirability of maximizing contact, the court found no compelling reasons to alter the status quo of shared parenting.

The motion was granted, restoring the shared parenting schedule with third-party exchanges and communication via a designated app.

This trial concerned a custody and access dispute between the applicant father and respondent mother regarding their child, D. The father sought joint custody and a week-about parenting schedule, while the mother sought sole custody and primary residence.

The court considered the child's views, which favored a week-about arrangement, and the parents' ability to communicate and cooperate.

The court granted joint custody and a week-about parenting schedule, finding it to be in the child's best interests.

The mother was granted final decision-making authority for education and medical/health issues in case of disagreement.

The father's request to add his surname to the child's name was denied.

No child support was ordered given the parties' respective incomes.

Mobility was restricted to Ottawa, and travel outside Canada required mutual consent.

The applicant mother brought a motion for temporary sole custody of the parties' child.

The respondent father had unilaterally relocated with the child and repeatedly denied the mother access, failing to comply with a previous court order for access.

The father raised uncorroborated allegations of substance abuse and physical abuse against the mother.

The court found the father was actively attempting to sever the child's relationship with the mother.

To preserve the relationship and in the child's best interests, the court granted temporary sole custody to the mother, with scheduled access for the father.

On a family law motion, the applicant sought immediate sale of the jointly owned matrimonial home pending trial, while the respondent opposed sale and proposed retaining the home through an equalization set-off.

Applying the pre-trial sale framework under the Partition Act in light of unresolved Family Law Act issues, the court held that immediate sale should be refused where substantial rights, including equalization, pension treatment, and a potential spousal support claim, could still be affected at trial.

The court also considered the modest anticipated delay to trial, the respondent's undertaking to assume mortgage payments, and the limited practical advantage of listing during winter and COVID-19 restrictions.

The request for immediate sale was denied, the respondent was ordered to pay the mortgage pending trial, and use of the Family Wizard application was ordered on consent.

The applicant brought a motion seeking orders to file Trial Scheduling Endorsement Forms (TSEF), secure life insurance benefits, and for leave to bring a motion for interim spousal support despite a settlement conference having already occurred.

The court granted the consent orders regarding the TSEF and life insurance.

However, the court denied leave for the interim spousal support motion, finding that the applicant failed to adequately explain the significant delay in bringing the claim and noting that the matter should proceed directly to trial.

The applicant moved for the partition and sale of the jointly owned matrimonial home.

The respondent opposed the sale, seeking exclusive possession to assess the home's value and potentially purchase the applicant's interest.

The court granted the motion for partition and sale, finding no malicious or oppressive conduct by the applicant and noting the respondent failed to establish a realistic claim for exclusive possession under section 24 of the Family Law Act.

The court ordered the property to be listed for sale and directed the parties to exchange updated financial statements to account for personal property sold post-separation.

The parties resolved ongoing child support on consent but disputed retroactive child support for 2018.

The applicant argued his 2018 income should not include a mandatory pension payout, while the respondent's income should be averaged due to her sick leave.

The court excluded the portion of the pension payout reinvested into an RRSP but included the remainder, finding the applicant failed to establish unfairness.

The court used the respondent's actual 2018 income and ordered the applicant to pay retroactive child support based on a set-off of the parties' incomes.

The Respondent brought an urgent motion to vary a prior order and obtain shared custody of the four children.

The Applicant opposed, seeking continuation of the prior order and supervised access for the Respondent, citing concerns about the Respondent's disposition, anger management, and past aggressive behaviour towards her, a step-child, and a family pet.

The court found an "air of reality" to the Applicant's allegations, including verified physical discipline and emotional harm by Family and Children's Services (FCS) Renfrew County, and outstanding criminal charges against the Respondent.

Given the conflicting evidence and early stage of proceedings, the court dismissed the Respondent's motion for shared custody and ordered temporary supervised access for the Respondent, to be facilitated by an agreed-upon family member or acquaintance, and later at a supervised access centre.

The court also ordered FCS Renfrew County to provide a report and prohibited negative discussions about the other parent or the proceedings with the children.

The respondent brought two motions: one for contempt against the applicant for alleged breaches of an access order and non-payment, and an urgent motion for resumption of in-person access to the children, which the applicant had suspended due to COVID-19 concerns.

The court dismissed the contempt motion, finding insufficient particularization of access breaches and noting that the payment issue was a "payment order" excluded from contempt provisions.

The urgent motion for access was granted, with the court emphasizing the presumption that existing orders should continue and that the applicant failed to provide specific evidence of the respondent's non-compliance with COVID-19 protocols to justify suspending access.

The applicant mother brought an urgent motion during the COVID-19 court suspension to dispense with the respondent father's consent for their child's counselling and to suspend the father's shared parenting time due to alleged failures to physically distance.

The father brought a cross-motion to enforce the existing week-about parenting order.

The court found the matters urgent but dismissed the mother's request to suspend access, finding no evidence the father was ignoring public health directives.

The court ordered the resumption of the shared parenting schedule and authorized the child's counselling, requiring both parents to participate in the intake process.

The Respondent mother brought an urgent motion seeking compliance with a prior custody/access order, after the Applicant father withheld their child due to concerns about the mother's adherence to COVID-19 public health directives.

The court found the matter urgent, emphasizing the presumption that existing parenting arrangements should continue unless modifications are necessary for COVID-19 precautions.

While acknowledging some of the mother's past "ill-conceived" behaviour regarding physical distancing, the court accepted her assurances of future compliance.

The court ordered a temporary 10-day period for the child to remain with the father, followed by the resumption of the week-about access schedule, with a "zero tolerance" warning for any future non-compliance by the mother.

The applicant father sought a temporary order requiring the respondent mother to return the children's residence to Innisfil, Ontario, or, alternatively, to transfer primary care of the children to him in Richmond Hill, Ontario.

This motion was brought following the mother's unilateral relocation with the children to Petawawa, Ontario, which the father argued constituted a material change in circumstances.

The court dismissed the father's motion, finding that while the mother's move was a material change, it was not in the children's best interests to disrupt their new settled environment.

The court considered the factors from Gordon v. Goertz and Plumley v. Plumley, noting the mother's new family unit, improved financial stability, and the delay in the father's application.

The court concluded there was a strong probability the mother's position would prevail at trial.

The applicant was successful on a motion regarding the interim parenting schedule for the parties' two children.

The court considered the factors under Rule 24 of the Family Law Rules, noting that while the applicant's email offer did not meet the formal requirements of Rule 18, it was similar to the final result.

The court awarded the applicant costs fixed at $1,800 inclusive of disbursements and HST.

The children's aid society brought a motion for summary judgment seeking a final order placing the child in the custody of the father and stepmother.

The mother opposed the motion, seeking the return of the child to her care.

The court found that the mother continued to struggle with undiagnosed health issues that impeded her ability to care for the child, and that the child's health and behavior had significantly improved in the care of the father and stepmother.

Applying the framework for summary judgment in child protection proceedings, the court concluded there was no genuine issue requiring a trial and granted the society's motion, ordering custody to the father and stepmother with supervised access for the mother.

The applicant father sought an interim order prohibiting the respondent mother from relocating their two children to Nova Scotia.

The mother sought an interim order permitting the relocation and for child support.

The parties separated following an altercation, and the mother moved to Nova Scotia where she had secured employment.

Applying the Gordon v. Goertz and Plumley factors, the court found that the mother was the primary caregiver, the move was in good faith, and the children wished to relocate.

The court permitted the interim relocation, finding a strong probability the mother would prevail at trial, and ordered the father to pay $639 per month in child support.

The applicant children's aid society brought a motion for temporary care and custody of an infant child.

The respondent mother opposed the motion, seeking the child's return under a supervision order.

The court reviewed the mother's extensive history with the society, which included five older children being made Crown wards due to her unaddressed mental health and personality issues.

Finding that the mother had not yet made sufficient progress in specialized therapy to mitigate the risk of harm, the court granted the society's motion and placed the child in temporary society care with supervised access.

The applicant father sought an interim order prohibiting the respondent mother from relocating the parties' four-year-old child to Deep River, Ontario, and requesting primary care.

The mother had been the primary caregiver since birth and moved to reside with her new partner.

Applying the Gordon v. Goertz and Plumley factors, the court found that the mother was likely to succeed at trial regarding primary care and that the move was made in good faith.

The court dismissed the father's motion, permitting the interim relocation pending trial.