Lorne Levine

Following trial reasons in a construction contract dispute, the court determined costs and interest issues on written submissions.

Although the plaintiff recovered part of its claim and defeated most of the counterclaim, the court held success was divided and exercised its discretion to make no order as to costs.

The court rejected arguments that the proceeding should have been transferred to Small Claims Court, largely because of the size of the counterclaim and the complexity of the matter.

The court also confirmed the presumptive prejudgment interest rate of 3.3% under the Courts of Justice Act and declined to average quarterly rates downward.

Following a trial in a construction contract dispute where the plaintiff recovered approximately 33% of its claim, the parties made written submissions on costs and pre-judgment interest.

The plaintiff sought partial indemnity costs, while the defendant argued for no costs, asserting the matter should have been brought in Small Claims Court.

The Master confirmed the preliminary ruling of no order as to costs due to divided success, finding that the plaintiff could not have transferred the action to Small Claims Court because of the defendant's $50,000 counterclaim.

The Master also confirmed the pre-judgment interest rate at the presumptive statutory rate of 3.3%.

The appellants appealed an order requiring them to pay $5,500 for the removal of illegally placed barrels and $4,000 in costs, arguing the applications judge breached natural justice by denying an adjournment.

The Divisional Court found no error in principle or failure to act judicially in the denial of the adjournment, noting no evidence of prejudice to the appellants.

The appeal was dismissed with costs fixed at $3,500.

The appellants sought to enforce a Florida default judgment for damages arising from a real estate transaction against the respondents in Ontario.

The trial judge dismissed the action, finding the Florida judgment was obtained by fraud and its enforcement would contravene public policy.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal against most respondents, holding that the fraud defence requires newly discovered facts that could not have been discovered with reasonable diligence, which the respondents failed to demonstrate.

The public policy defence was also rejected.

However, the appeal was dismissed against one respondent whose absolute discharge from bankruptcy released her from the judgment debt.

The accused was acquitted at trial of sexual assault.

The Crown appealed, arguing the trial judge made several errors in his charge to the jury, including mischaracterizing evidence, failing to properly instruct on prior inconsistent statements, and improperly leaving the defence of honest but mistaken belief in consent to the jury.

The Court of Appeal upheld the acquittal.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the Crown's appeal and ordered a new trial, finding that the cumulative effect of the trial judge's errors was significant and that there was no evidentiary foundation to lend an air of reality to the defence of honest but mistaken belief in consent.