William F. Ehrcke

The Crown appealed a Court of Appeal decision that ordered a new sentencing hearing for an offender who had been declared a dangerous offender and sentenced to an indeterminate prison term.

The sentencing judge had not considered the new long-term offender provisions, which came into force after the predicate offence was committed.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal, holding that the sentencing judge was required to consider the possibility of a long-term offender designation prior to declaring the offender dangerous, even though the predicate offence was committed prior to the enactment of those provisions.

The accused was convicted of sexual assault and declared a dangerous offender, receiving an indeterminate sentence.

The predicate offence occurred before the enactment of the long-term offender provisions.

The Supreme Court of Canada, applying its concurrent decision in R. v. Johnson, held that the sentencing judge was required to consider the long-term offender provisions before declaring the accused a dangerous offender.

The Crown's appeal was dismissed and a new sentencing hearing was ordered.

The accused was declared a dangerous offender and sentenced to an indeterminate prison term for a predicate offence committed prior to the enactment of the long-term offender provisions.

The sentencing judge held that the long-term offender provisions were not available.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the Crown's appeal, applying its companion decision in R. v. Johnson, holding that the sentencing judge was required to consider the possibility of a long-term offender designation prior to declaring the accused a dangerous offender.

The Crown appealed a decision of the Court of Appeal that ordered a new sentencing hearing for the respondent.

The sentencing judge had declared the respondent a dangerous offender and imposed an indeterminate sentence without considering the newly enacted long-term offender provisions.

Applying the companion case of R. v. Johnson, the Supreme Court of Canada held that a sentencing judge must consider the possibility of a long-term offender designation prior to declaring an offender dangerous.

The appeal was dismissed and the order for a new sentencing hearing was confirmed.

The Crown appealed a decision ordering a new sentencing hearing for an offender who was declared a dangerous offender and sentenced to an indeterminate prison term.

The sentencing judge had not considered the newly enacted long-term offender provisions because the predicate offence occurred prior to their enactment.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal, holding that a sentencing judge must consider the long-term offender provisions prior to declaring an offender dangerous.

Furthermore, under s. 11(i) of the Charter, the offender is entitled to the benefit of the lesser punishment, requiring the judge to consider the long-term offender provisions even for offences committed prior to the amendments.

The appellant, a cult leader, was convicted of multiple sexual offences against teenage girls.

At trial, the judge admitted evidence of each count as similar fact evidence for the others, and restricted the defence from cross-examining one complainant on the absence of references to sexual abuse in her teenage diary.

The Supreme Court of Canada upheld the admission of the similar fact evidence, finding its probative value outweighed its prejudicial effect.

However, the Court held that the trial judge erred in restricting the cross-examination on the diary, as the complainant's privacy interest did not substantially outweigh the accused's right to make full answer and defence.

A new trial was ordered for the counts relating to that specific complainant, while the other convictions were upheld.

The appellant confessed to a murder to an undercover police officer.

The conversation was surreptitiously recorded pursuant to a judicial authorization.

At trial, the judge found the authorization invalid and excluded the tape and transcript under s. 24(2) of the Charter, but allowed the officer to testify about the conversation using the transcript to refresh his memory.

The officer's testimony was essentially a verbatim recitation of the transcript.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that while the officer's recitation of the transcript violated s. 8 of the Charter, the evidence should not be excluded under s. 24(2) because its admission would not bring the administration of justice into disrepute, as the confession was freely volunteered and the police acted in good faith.

The Crown appealed a decision of the British Columbia Court of Appeal that quashed a direct indictment against the accused.

The accused had already been committed for trial after a preliminary inquiry.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the appeal, holding that the Attorney General can prefer a direct indictment under s. 577 of the Criminal Code against an accused who could have been indicted through the ordinary process under s. 574(1)(a), which permitted his inclusion in a direct indictment with his co-accused.

The judgment of the Court of Appeal was set aside and the indictment reinstated.

The appellant was convicted of breaking, entering, and possession of stolen property.

At trial, a defence witness testified that he, not the appellant, committed the crime.

The Crown cross-examined the witness on his knowledge of the protection against self-incrimination under s. 13 of the Charter.

The trial judge disbelieved the witness and convicted the appellant.

The Court of Appeal upheld the conviction.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that cross-examining a witness on their knowledge of s. 13 should rarely be permitted, as its prejudicial effect generally outweighs its probative value.

However, the Court applied the curative proviso, finding that the trial judge's reliance on the impugned testimony was minimal and no substantial wrong or miscarriage of justice occurred.

The appeal was dismissed.

The accused and a co-perpetrator participated in a violent beating that left the victim dead.

The accused stomped on the victim's head.

At trial, the Crown's medical expert initially testified the accused caused the death, but later agreed with the defence expert that the co-perpetrator caused the fatal injuries.

The Crown maintained its theory but also argued co-perpetrator liability.

The accused was convicted of second degree murder.

The Court of Appeal substituted a manslaughter conviction, finding the murder verdict unreasonable.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the Crown's appeal, reaffirming the Yebes test that the reasonableness of a verdict is a question of law.

The Court held that a properly instructed jury could reasonably have found the accused had the requisite intent for murder as a party to the offence, and restored the second degree murder conviction.