Theona Hamilton

Reyan Chaudhry pleaded guilty to 17 charges across four GTA jurisdictions, including residential break and enters, multiple motor vehicle thefts, flight from police, and impaired driving, all driven by a severe opioid addiction.

The Crown and defence presented a joint submission for a global sentence of 5.5 years.

The primary contested issue was the quantification of mitigation for harsh presentence custody conditions (Marshall or Duncan mitigation).

The court accepted the joint submission for the global sentence and, after considering the severe lockdown and triple-bunking conditions, awarded an additional six months of mitigation for presentence custody.

The court also imposed a seven-year driving prohibition.

The defendant, Tariq Hansraj, was charged with 80 plus operation.

The trial addressed several Charter issues, including unlawful detention (ss. 8, 9, 10(b)), delayed breath demand, and denial of right to counsel, as well as the factual issue of care or control.

The court found an 11-minute delay in reading rights to counsel but determined it was not a serious Charter violation warranting exclusion of evidence.

The court also found that the defendant was in care or control of the vehicle, despite his arguments.

Hansraj was convicted.

Three defendants, Levi Alexander, Vejay Alexander, and Lamar Cyrus, pleaded guilty to manslaughter after a planned robbery of a modified starter's pistol resulted in the unintentional shooting death of Alex Perlmutter.

Lamar Cyrus also pleaded guilty to unauthorized possession of a prohibited firearm.

The court accepted joint sentencing recommendations, emphasizing the egregious nature of the offence, the defendants' disregard for court orders (firearms prohibitions, probation conditions), and their serious criminal records.

Mitigating factors included the guilty pleas (though late) and the harshness of pre-sentencing custody during the COVID-19 pandemic.

The victim's family provided impact statements detailing their profound loss.

The applicant, Andre Tully, facing serious drug and gun charges with a significant criminal record, applied for bail after 18 months in custody, citing potential trial delays due to the COVID-19 pandemic.

The court addressed jurisdictional issues regarding the bail application, ultimately proceeding as either a s. 520 bail review or exercising ex officio powers under s. 515 of the Criminal Code.

The court found that the proposed strict house arrest bail plan with three sureties and electronic monitoring adequately addressed secondary ground concerns regarding public safety.

Furthermore, the court considered the COVID-19 pandemic as a significant factor under the tertiary ground, weighing the elevated risk of infection in custody, potential trial delays, and the public interest in reducing the remand population against the gravity of the offences.

Bail was granted with strict conditions.

The Crown appealed the acquittal of a speeding charge.

The trial judge dismissed the charge on two grounds: insufficient evidence regarding radar device calibration and insufficient evidence regarding visibility due to foggy conditions.

The appellate court found that the trial judge erred in law by imposing an incorrect burden on the prosecution regarding radar device testing.

The court held that it is sufficient to prove the officer tested the radar unit before and after the investigation and was a qualified operator.

The court also found the trial judge's visibility finding was a palpable and overriding error, as the evidence clearly showed the officer could see 400 metres in each direction and identified the vehicle directly.

The conviction was restored.

The Crown appealed two sentences imposed by a Justice of the Peace for driving without insurance and driving under suspension.

In both cases, the trial judge imposed fines below the mandatory minimums, citing the victim fine surcharge as a mitigating factor.

The appellate court found this reasoning constituted an error of principle.

The court allowed both appeals but imposed different outcomes: for Paul East, who was impecunious and receiving public assistance, the court imposed a reduced fine of $7,500 (below the $10,000 minimum) based on exceptional circumstances of destitution; for Kainnon Jennrich, who earned a substantial income and had demonstrated ability to pay large fines, the court imposed the mandatory minimums of $2,000 and $5,000 respectively.

The Crown appealed an acquittal on a charge of operating a motor vehicle without insurance under the Compulsory Automobile Insurance Act.

The respondent was also charged with driving with a suspended licence and driving without a valid licence plate.

The trial judge acquitted on the insurance charge, finding that the Crown had not proven the complete absence of insurance.

The appellate court allowed the appeal, holding that the insurance charge is a strict liability offence where proof that the owner-operator could not produce proof of valid insurance upon demand establishes the prima facie offence.

The respondent was convicted and fined $5,000.

The defendant pleaded guilty to impaired driving causing death following a motor vehicle collision on Highway 404 on October 25, 2018, in which the victim, a hospice nurse, was killed.

The defendant was travelling at approximately 169 kilometres per hour with a blood alcohol concentration of 160 milligrams per 100 millilitres of blood (double the legal limit) when she collided with the victim's vehicle.

The court imposed a sentence of 5 years and 6 months imprisonment in a federal penitentiary, a 10-year driving prohibition, and a DNA order.

The sentence reflects the principles of general deterrence and denunciation, with the court emphasizing the prevalence of impaired driving in York Region and the need for substantial sentences to deter such conduct.

The defendant was charged with driving with excess alcohol (over 80 milligrams) following a traffic stop for speeding and failure to stop at a red light.

The Crown sought to establish that the defendant had reasonable suspicion to demand an approved screening device test and that no Charter breaches occurred.

The defendant challenged the admissibility of the breath test results on multiple grounds: the officer's credibility regarding the smell of alcohol, denial of right to counsel of choice, and arbitrary detention.

The court found the officer's evidence credible, determined no Charter breaches occurred, and convicted the defendant of operating a motor vehicle with 130 milligrams of alcohol in 100 millilitres of blood.

The defendant was charged with impaired driving, driving with excess alcohol, dangerous driving, speeding, and stunt driving following a high-speed pursuit at 113 km/h in a 50 km/h zone at 01:01 hours.

The Crown established reasonable and probable grounds for arrest based on excessive speed, observed unsteadiness, blurry eyes, and odour of alcohol.

The court found no Charter breach regarding the delay between arrest and rights advisement, and found that while there was a technical breach of the right to counsel of choice, the breach was largely technical and the evidence was admissible.

Breath test results showed 177 mg/100 ml at 02:21 and 168 mg/100 ml at 02:44, with toxicologist opinion placing blood alcohol at minimum 160 mg/100 ml at time of driving.

The defendant was found guilty of driving with excess alcohol, impaired driving, dangerous driving, and stunt driving.

The defendant was charged with driving with excess alcohol.

The primary issue was whether the defendant's Charter rights under section 10(b) were breached when police conducted the investigation and breath demand in English without providing a Vietnamese interpreter.

The defendant argued that his limited English proficiency prevented him from fully understanding and exercising his rights to counsel.

The court examined the defendant's actual comprehension of his rights through video evidence and testimony, considering factors including his ability to communicate in English, his responsiveness to police directions, his ability to ask questions, and his demonstrated understanding of his rights to counsel.

The court found no breach of section 10(b) rights and convicted the defendant of operating a motor vehicle with a blood alcohol level exceeding the legal limit.

The Crown sought permission to proceed with trial using a non-accredited interpreter in Shona for the defendant, who is a native of Zimbabwe.

The defendant was charged with driving with excess alcohol.

The court applied the legal framework requiring the Crown to rebut the presumption of incompetence for non-accredited interpreters on a balance of probabilities.

The proposed interpreter had significant experience including accreditation with the Immigration and Refugee Board, criminal trial experience, and fluency in multiple languages.

The court found the Crown had discharged its burden and permitted the non-accredited interpreter to provide services.

The defendant was charged with care or control of a vehicle while impaired by alcohol and while having a blood alcohol concentration exceeding the legal limit, contrary to sections 253(1)(a) and (b) of the Criminal Code.

The defendant's vehicle crashed into a ditch.

A civilian found him exiting the driver's side and called police.

The defendant demonstrated signs of alcohol consumption and language difficulties.

The court found two violations of the defendant's section 10(b) Charter right to counsel: the officer failed to translate the right to counsel despite clear language barriers, and failed to properly implement the right by steering the defendant to duty counsel without inquiry.

The breath samples were excluded as a remedy.

However, the court found the defendant guilty of impaired care or control based on circumstantial evidence including the unexplained accident, strong odour of alcohol, physical presentation, and vomiting.

The Crown appealed the acquittal of the respondent for refusing to provide a breath sample into an approved screening device.

The trial judge acquitted the respondent because the police officer made an unlawful demand for a sample into an "approved instrument" without reasonable and probable grounds, instead of the correct "approved screening device" demand based on reasonable suspicion.

The Superior Court upheld the acquittal, affirming that a lawful demand is an essential element of the refusal offence, and disobedience with unlawful compulsion is not criminal.

The defendant was charged with operating a motor vehicle while having an excess blood alcohol concentration contrary to section 253(1)(b) of the Criminal Code.

The defendant challenged the approved screening device demand on the basis that it was not made "forthwith" as required by law, arguing violations of sections 8, 9, and 10(b) of the Charter.

The court found that while there was a five-minute delay between the formation of reasonable suspicion and the provision of the demand, the delay was reasonably necessary given the defendant's exceptional chattiness and the operational context of a roadside stop.

The court found the demand was made forthwith and no Charter violation occurred.

The defendant was found guilty.

The defendant was charged with operating a motor vehicle while having an excess blood alcohol concentration contrary to section 253(1)(b) of the Criminal Code.

The defence challenged the validity of the approved screening demand, arguing it was not made "forthwith" as required by law, and sought exclusion of the breath readings on Charter grounds.

The court found that while there was a five-minute delay between the formation of reasonable suspicion and the provision of the demand, the delay was reasonably necessary given the defendant's exceptional chattiness and the practical circumstances of the roadside stop.

The court concluded the demand was made forthwith and there was no Charter violation.

The defendant was found guilty.

The defendant was charged with voyeurism, mischief, and breach of a common law peace bond following an incident at a Dollarama store in Richmond Hill on February 24, 2017.

The complainant believed the defendant had placed his cell phone between her legs and taken a picture up her skirt.

The Crown sought to prove the offence as an attempt to commit voyeurism under section 162(1)(c) of the Criminal Code.

The court found that while the physical positioning of the parties suggested the defendant may have been contemplating such an activity, the totality of the evidence did not establish the essential elements of an attempt beyond a reasonable doubt.

No photograph was found on the defendant's phone, and the Crown could not prove the defendant had the necessary mens rea to commit the offence.

The defendant was acquitted of all charges.

The defendant was charged with driving with excess alcohol.

A police officer encountered the defendant twice on the morning of May 20, 2016: first at 02:57 with no signs of impairment, and again at 04:35 when a roadside breath test was administered and failed.

The defendant was arrested and breath tests conducted at 07:02 and 07:24 showed readings of 170 and 150 milligrams of alcohol per 100 millilitres of blood respectively.

The Crown relied on a toxicologist's report to establish the defendant's blood alcohol level at the time of driving, which was based on the presumption of no bolus drinking within 15 minutes prior to the incident.

The defence argued that the presence of an alcoholic beverage in the vehicle's centre console, combined with the rising odour of alcohol and the time gap between driving and testing, raised a reasonable doubt regarding bolus drinking.

The court found the defendant's testimony credible and accepted that she did not engage in bolus drinking, thereby accepting the toxicologist's report and finding the defendant guilty.

The applicant was charged with care or control of a motor vehicle while impaired by alcohol and exceeding the legal blood alcohol limit.

He applied to stay the charges alleging a violation of his section 11(b) Charter right to trial within a reasonable time.

The total delay from laying of charges to anticipated trial completion was 18 months and 27 days.

The court applied the new Jordan framework for determining unreasonable delay, finding that after deducting 39 days of defence delay, the net delay fell below the presumptive 18-month ceiling for provincial court cases.

The court found the defence had not established meaningful and sustained steps to expedite proceedings, as counsel had repeatedly pursued a non-existent witness statement after the Crown and court were ready to set trial dates.

The application was dismissed and trial dates were upheld.

The appellant appealed his conviction for driving a motor vehicle without a license and without a valid validation sticker on the license plate.

The appellant raised arguments based on religious freedom, freedom of movement and association, and various constitutional and international human rights instruments.

The trial Justice of the Peace found the appellant lacked sincere religious belief and convicted him.

On appeal, the court found the Justice of the Peace erred in law by applying an incorrect three-part test for assessing sincerity of religious belief and by failing to provide meaningful reasons addressing the appellant's Charter arguments.

However, the court upheld the conviction, finding that even if the appellant had sincere religious beliefs, regulation of highway driving is a justifiable limit on Charter rights under section 1 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.

The appeal was dismissed.