Stella Gabbino

The appellant was charged with two counts of first degree murder and six counts of attempted murder.

During his testimony at trial, he repeatedly refused to answer questions concerning the identity of individuals who allegedly provided him with information about the crime.

The trial judge cited the appellant for contempt of court and immediately sentenced him to three years' imprisonment in the presence of the jury.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that while the judge was justified in citing the appellant for contempt, he erred in convicting and sentencing him instanter without urgent necessity.

However, the Court applied the curative proviso under s. 686(1)(b)(iii) of the Criminal Code, concluding that the error did not cause a substantial wrong or miscarriage of justice, and dismissed the appeal.

The appellant appealed a judgment of the Quebec Court of Appeal that upheld the trial judge's dismissal of his motion to challenge prospective jurors for cause based on racial prejudice.

At the Supreme Court of Canada, the Crown conceded the first grounds of appeal.

The Court allowed the appeal and ordered a new trial on the charges as laid against the accused.

The appellant was convicted of second degree murder after shooting the victim in the back of the head while he slept.

At trial, the appellant argued self-defence based on an overwhelming fear of the victim, supported by psychiatric evidence.

The appellant appealed his conviction, arguing the trial judge erred in his instructions to the jury on self-defence, the expert evidence, and character evidence, and erred by allowing the Crown to ask if he would submit to a blood test and a Crown psychiatric assessment.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal, holding that while errors were made, they caused minimal prejudice and the curative proviso under s. 686(1)(b)(iii) of the Criminal Code applied because the evidence was overwhelming and the verdict would inevitably have been the same.

The appellant was convicted of second degree murder based on circumstantial evidence.

He appealed his conviction, arguing that the trial judge's pre-Lifchus jury charge on reasonable doubt, which included references to 'moral certainty', was flawed.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal, holding that the trial judge's instructions were in substantial compliance with the principles set out in Lifchus and did not give rise to a reasonable likelihood that the jury misapprehended the correct standard of proof.

The accused was charged with sexual assaults on two young male children.

At trial, he sought to introduce expert psychiatric evidence, including penile plethysmograph test results, to show he lacked the distinctive personality traits of someone who would commit such offences.

The trial judge excluded the evidence, finding it did not meet the Mohan criteria for admissibility, and convicted the accused.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal and ordered a new trial.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the Crown's appeal and restored the conviction, holding that the trial judge properly exercised his gatekeeper function in excluding the novel scientific evidence due to its lack of reliability and failure to establish a standard profile for the distinctive group of offenders.

The appellant, a non-accused target of authorized electronic surveillance, sought access to the sealed wiretap packet and related recordings in order to pursue a civil claim for unlawful interception and Charter damages.

The Court held that a non-accused target may bring an application under s. 187(1)(a)(ii) of the Criminal Code before commencing a civil action, but is not automatically entitled to disclosure.

For non-accused applicants, the statutory discretion remains governed by confidentiality concerns and will normally require some evidence suggesting the authorization was obtained unlawfully, such as fraud or wilful non-disclosure.

The motion judge erred by rejecting the application outright on the basis that the applicant was not an accused.

The appeal was allowed and the matter remitted for reconsideration, while access to recordings was held to be premature at this stage.

The appellant appealed his conviction for first degree murder, arguing that the trial judge misdirected the jury on premeditation.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal from the bench, disagreeing with the dissenting judge in the Quebec Court of Appeal.