Scott Gallagher

The parties brought cross-motions for interim parenting, child support, and spousal support.

The parties agreed on an equal parenting schedule based on a Voice of the Child report.

The primary issue was whether to impute income to the applicant, who had been a stay-at-home parent for many years but had not sought employment since separation.

Applying the principles from Drygala v. Pauli, the court found the applicant was intentionally unemployed and imputed an annual income of $55,000 based on a vocational assessment report.

Homeowners brought an action against a builder alleging defects in the concrete foundation of their home.

The litigation stalled due to ongoing disputes over the terms under which the defendant’s engineers could inspect and test the foundation.

Despite a prior court order permitting inspection, the plaintiffs repeatedly imposed additional conditions and ultimately refused access, preventing the testing from occurring.

The court found that the plaintiffs had created impediments to the inspection and that the action could not proceed without the testing.

The court ordered that the plaintiffs’ own engineers extract the core samples and deliver them to the defendant’s experts for testing and required the plaintiffs to pay costs thrown away due to the failed inspection.

In a Building Code Act appeal from an unsafe building order concerning an allegedly structurally deficient residential foundation, the appellant builder sought interim relief compelling access to the homeowners' property for its engineers to take concrete samples.

The court held that, on a section 25 appeal, its remedial jurisdiction is confined to powers the inspector or chief building official could exercise under the statute.

Interpreting sections 15.9 and 18 of the Building Code Act, the court found those provisions authorize inspections and sampling by inspectors and their agents, not compelled access for private parties advancing their own interests.

The requested access order, adjournment, and stay were denied.

No costs were awarded given the novelty of the jurisdictional issue.

The plaintiff bank brought a motion seeking leave to amend three consolidated statements of claim to add allegations of fraud and fraudulent misrepresentation against a lawyer and a property appraiser involved in mortgage transactions, and to assert that the claims survived bankruptcy under s. 178 of the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act.

The defendants opposed the motion, arguing the amendments introduced a new cause of action after the expiry of the applicable limitation period.

The court held that the original pleadings alleged negligence only and did not contain the material facts necessary to support allegations of fraudulent misrepresentation, including knowledge of falsity or intention to deceive.

Because the proposed amendments introduced a fundamentally different cause of action, the limitation period created a presumption of non‑compensable prejudice.

The motion to amend was therefore dismissed.

The appellant appealed a trial judgment dismissing its claim for breach of contract.

The appellant argued that a preliminary contract was formed when it submitted a proposal, or alternatively, that an oral contract was formed during a phone call.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no palpable and overriding error in the trial judge's factual conclusions that a purchase order was required to form a contract and that the phone call did not constitute offer and acceptance.