S. Baker

The two offenders were convicted of sexually assaulting a 19-year-old unconscious victim.

The assault involved digital penetration by one offender while the other encouraged and facilitated the act.

The court rejected the argument that the absence of penile penetration lessened the gravity of the offence.

Emphasizing denunciation and deterrence, the court sentenced both first-time offenders to 16 months in custody followed by two years of probation, along with a 20-year SOIRA order and a weapons prohibition.

Sentencing decision following convictions for sexual assault, assault causing bodily harm, and assault arising from a long-term pattern of exploitation and abuse that began when the complainant was a teenage athlete and the offender was her coach.

The court treated denunciation and deterrence as predominant, relying on the modern sentencing approach for sexual offences against children and recognizing the aggravating features of breach of trust, exploitation, domestic violence, humiliation, and lasting psychological harm.

The court also considered mitigating factors including the offender's youth at the time of the sexual assault, lengthy law-abiding period, harsh extrajudicial consequences, and extended bail period.

A global custodial sentence of 45 months was imposed, together with mandatory and ancillary orders.

The two accused were jointly charged with sexual assault.

The complainant, who had consumed an unknown substance and alcohol, lost consciousness but later experienced a flashback of being sexually assaulted by one accused while the other accused watched and provided encouragement.

The court found the complainant's flashback memory to be reliable, as it was consistent and corroborated by physical bruising.

The court held that the complainant did not consent to the sexual activity.

Both accused were found guilty, with the observing accused convicted as a party to the offence for aiding and abetting by facilitating the assault and encouraging the principal offender.

The applicants, jointly charged with historical sexual offences, brought applications for a stay of proceedings alleging unreasonable delay under s. 11(b) of the Charter.

The total delay was approximately 35 months.

The court deducted periods of defence-caused delay, reasonable judicial reserve time, and exceptional circumstances arising from one applicant's Legal Aid application process.

After deductions, the net delay for both applicants fell well below the 30-month Jordan ceiling.

As the applicants failed to demonstrate a sustained effort to expedite the proceedings, the applications were dismissed.

The accused was charged with impaired care or control and over 80.

She brought a Charter application alleging violations of ss. 8, 9, and 10(b), arguing the arresting officer lacked reasonable and probable grounds and that her right to counsel was infringed due to a staticky phone line when speaking to duty counsel.

The court dismissed the Charter application, finding the officer had ample objective and subjective grounds based on the accused's driving, physical indicia of impairment, and admissions.

The court also found no s. 10(b) violation, as the accused failed to be duly diligent in exercising her rights and indicated to police that she was satisfied with the legal advice received.

The accused was found guilty of the over 80 charge.

The young person, charged with sexual offences against two different complainants, brought an application to sever the counts relating to one complainant from those relating to the other.

The court considered the factors for severance, noting the young person's intention to testify regarding one complainant but not the other, the lack of factual nexus between the incidents, and the potential for prejudice.

The court concluded that the interests of justice required severance and granted the application.

The applicants sought relief under ss. 8 and 24(2) of the Charter, arguing that a search warrant authorizing the search of their motel room lacked reasonable grounds and that the resulting drug evidence should be excluded.

The reviewing judge found that the information to obtain contained omissions and inaccuracies and that reasonable grounds to search the motel room did not exist, rendering the search unreasonable under s. 8.

However, applying the framework from Grant and Harrison, the court concluded the police acted in overall good faith and that the misleading aspects of the warrant materials were at the lower end of seriousness.

Given the reliability and importance of the seized drug evidence and society’s interest in adjudicating serious trafficking charges on their merits, exclusion under s. 24(2) was not warranted.