R.P. Zigler

The Respondent sought an urgent motion for leave to list and sell two matrimonial properties.

The Applicant opposed the motion and sought various forms of relief.

The court found that the Respondent had failed to comply with several prior court orders, including a restraint on foreign divorce proceedings, a costs order, and financial disclosure.

Consequently, the Respondent's motion was dismissed.

The court, applying Rule 1(8) of the Family Law Rules, granted the Applicant sole authority to sell one of the properties, ordered the Respondent to pay for property repairs and a child's tuition from sale proceeds, released $100,000 to the Applicant, and awarded costs to the Applicant due to the Respondent's non-compliance and the Applicant's success.

The respondent father brought a motion to set aside two final court orders concerning parenting and child support, arguing technological issues prevented his participation and that the applicant mother had agreed to mediation.

He sought leave to file an Answer/Claim, shared parenting, and recalculation of child support.

The court dismissed the motion, finding the father had adequate notice and made an informed choice not to participate, and that his claims lacked sufficient merit.

The applicant, operator of a hookah lounge, brought an application to quash the Region of Durham's Smoking By-law No. 28-2019, which prohibited smoking and vaping in public places including hookah lounges.

The applicant argued the By-law was an ultra vires attempt to regulate business and that subsequent changes to the By-law's set fines schedule invalidated it.

The court found that while the application to quash under the Municipal Act was statute-barred, the request for declaratory relief was not.

On the merits, the court held the By-law was a valid exercise of the municipality's power to protect public health and safety, not an improper regulation of business.

The court also found that changes to the set fines schedule by the Regional Senior Justice did not invalidate the By-law.

The application was dismissed.

The applicants, having lost their initial application to quash a by-law prohibiting water pipe smoking, sought no costs.

The respondent, The Regional Municipality of Peel, sought costs on a substantial or partial indemnity basis.

The court rejected the applicants' submission for no costs, finding their application was not one of first impression and they knew the risks given prior similar cases.

While acknowledging some merit to the respondent's arguments for substantial indemnity due to re-arguing settled matters and one applicant opening a new lounge, the court found the applicants' conduct not egregious enough to warrant elevated costs.

Applying principles of reasonableness under Rule 57.01(1), the court awarded partial indemnity costs, but reduced the amount by $10,000 due to junior counsel's attendance at the hearing not being deemed necessary for the proper presentation of the respondent's case.

The applicants sought a declaration that a by-law banning waterpipes was invalid.

At the outset of submissions, the applicants moved for leave to file a supplementary affidavit after cross-examinations were completed.

The respondents opposed.

The court dismissed the motion, finding that the document attached to the affidavit was not a "public document" under common law or the Evidence Act, and the applicants failed to meet the high threshold under Rule 39.02(2) of the Rules of Civil Procedure.

The evidence was not responsive to matters raised on cross-examination, and no reasonable explanation for the late filing was provided.

The applicants, owners of several waterpipe lounges, sought to quash provisions of a Regional Municipality of Peel by-law prohibiting waterpipe smoking in enclosed public places.

They argued the by-law conflicted with provincial legislation, was enacted in bad faith, and was ultra vires as it effectively prohibited their businesses.

The Superior Court of Justice dismissed the application, finding that the Region had the statutory authority under the Municipal Act, 2001 to enact the by-law for the protection of public health and safety.

The court also found no conflict with the Occupational Health and Safety Act and no evidence of bad faith.

The appellants appealed an order refusing to set aside a default judgment.

They sought to introduce fresh evidence consisting of expert reports suggesting a key document in the litigation was forged.

The Court of Appeal admitted the fresh evidence, noting that while the appellants failed to exercise due diligence by not raising the issue before the motion judge, the interests of justice required a trial to resolve the real concerns about the bona fides of the respondent's claim.

The appeal was allowed and the default judgment set aside.

On a family law motion following the breakdown of a marriage and an international custody dispute involving Jordan and Ontario, the court determined whether it had jurisdiction to address custody of the youngest child.

Applying s. 22(1)(b) of the Children’s Law Reform Act, the court held that the child was physically present in Ontario, substantial best-interests evidence was available in Ontario, no pending custody proceeding existed in Jordan, the child had a real and substantial connection to Ontario, and the balance of convenience favoured Ontario.

In the alternative, the court found under s. 23 of the CLRA that the child would suffer serious harm if returned to Jordan, given evidence of corporal punishment, assaultive behaviour, risk of the mother’s arrest, and psychological harm from separation from her mother and siblings.

The court granted interim custody to the applicant, imposed travel restrictions, and structured access and decision-making on an interim basis.

The respondent father brought a motion to change a final order after the parties' two children moved to reside primarily with him.

The parties consented to the change in primary residence and the applicant mother's new obligation to pay child support.

The applicant brought a cross-motion seeking retroactive increases to child and spousal support for the period before the children moved, arguing the respondent's income had increased due to overtime and bonuses.

The court dismissed the cross-motion, finding that the respondent had paid child support in accordance with the existing order, and that the fluctuations in his income were contemplated by the parties when they agreed to the original spousal support terms, thus not constituting a material change in circumstances.