Peter Campbell

The offender was convicted by a jury of possession of methamphetamine for the purpose of trafficking and possession of proceeds of crime.

The police seized 554 grams of methamphetamine and $2,000 from a hotel suite rented by the offender.

The court weighed the aggravating factor of commercial mid-level trafficking against the mitigating factor of the offender's 15-year drug addiction.

The offender was sentenced to 30 months' imprisonment, reduced to 80 days after credit for pre-trial custody, followed by two years of probation.

The applicant, a passenger in a motor vehicle, was committed for trial on charges of possession of cocaine for the purpose of trafficking and simple possession after police found 6.2 grams of crack cocaine on the vehicle's centre console.

The applicant sought certiorari to quash the committal, arguing there was no evidence he had control over the drugs.

The Superior Court of Justice agreed, finding that mere proximity and opportunity to control the drugs did not amount to actual or constructive possession.

The court concluded that no reasonable jury could infer control from the evidence, and quashed the committal for trial.

The accused was charged with possession of cocaine for the purpose of trafficking.

During his arrest, police officers mistook him for a fugitive and used excessive force, including punching, kneeing, and tasering him while he was handcuffed and compliant.

The court found the officers' testimony to be contrived and untruthful, and accepted the accused's version of events.

Concluding that the police conduct was extra-judicial punishment that offended society's sense of fair play and decency, the court found a breach of section 7 of the Charter and ordered a stay of proceedings under section 24(1).

The accused was charged with possession of cocaine for the purpose of trafficking and possession of codeine following a traffic stop.

The accused brought an application to exclude the drug evidence under s. 24(2) of the Charter, arguing the stop was arbitrary and based on racial profiling, and the subsequent arrest and search were unlawful.

The court found the arresting officer's testimony regarding the reason for the stop and his observations of the drugs to be untruthful.

Concluding that the accused's ss. 8 and 9 Charter rights were seriously breached, the court excluded the drug evidence.

The applicant sought review of a detention order on serious opium possession, importation, and conspiracy charges, arguing both error in principle and a material change based on a revised release plan including sureties and electronic monitoring.

The court accepted that electronic monitoring constituted a material change sufficient to permit a de novo review, but held detention remained necessary on the primary ground.

The court emphasized the strength of the Crown's case, the applicant's prior foreign conviction for heroin importation, minimal roots in Canada, strong family and economic ties to Iran, and the absence of an effective mechanism to prevent absconding.

Electronic monitoring was found to assist only in notification after flight, not prevention.

The review application was dismissed.

The accused applied for a subpoena requiring police to produce a confidential informant file following the dismissal of a Charter application seeking exclusion of evidence seized under a search warrant.

The accused argued that, under Step 6 of the Garofoli procedure, the trial judge should review the informant file to ensure police compliance with informant handling procedures and the reliability of information provided to obtain the warrant.

The court held that disclosure or judicial review of such material requires a threshold showing that the material could reasonably assist the defence, and mere speculation or a desire to verify police conduct is insufficient.

The judge rejected the argument that Step 6 transforms the court into an inquisitorial investigator and emphasized the continued primacy of the adversarial system and the strength of informer privilege.

The application for a subpoena and judicial review of the informant file was dismissed.

The accused brought a Charter application seeking exclusion of drugs and cash seized from his home pursuant to a Controlled Drugs and Substances Act search warrant, alleging the Information to Obtain failed to disclose reasonable and probable grounds and contained misleading information.

The court applied Step 6 of the Garofoli process to review redacted informant material and determine whether the excised information could support the warrant.

After reviewing the unredacted ITO and a judicial summary, the court found the informant’s tip compelling, credible, and sufficiently corroborated by police investigation.

Although certain statements in the ITO were misleading, they did not undermine the overall basis for the warrant once excised.

The court concluded there was no breach of s. 8 of the Charter and that, in any event, the evidence would not be excluded under s. 24(2).

Following a jury conviction for trafficking in crack cocaine and possession of property obtained by crime, the accused brought an application for a stay of proceedings alleging police entrapment.

The accused argued that the undercover officer lacked reasonable suspicion prior to initiating a telephone call that led to the drug transaction.

The court held that police were entitled to make the investigative call without prior reasonable suspicion and that reasonable suspicion arose during the conversation before the accused was provided an opportunity to commit the offence.

The court found the police conduct did not constitute random virtue testing and did not create an undue risk of inducing innocent individuals to commit crimes.

The entrapment application was dismissed.

The accused brought a motion seeking a stay of charges for possession for the purpose of trafficking cocaine and possession of proceeds of crime, alleging unreasonable delay contrary to s. 11(b) of the Charter.

The total delay from charge to trial approached 24 months, exceeding the guidelines established in earlier Supreme Court of Canada jurisprudence.

The court examined the length of delay, waiver, explanations for delay, and alleged prejudice to the accused.

Most delay was attributed to institutional factors and inherent requirements of the case, with a small portion attributable to the defence and none to the Crown.

Balancing these factors, the court held that the delay was not sufficiently unreasonable to outweigh society’s interest in a trial on serious indictable charges.