P. Santora

The accused pleaded guilty to making child pornography available after uploading an image containing 30 thumbnails of child abuse to a public website.

A search of his residence revealed a moderate collection of child pornography.

The accused, a youthful first offender with a low risk of reoffending, sought a conditional sentence.

The court emphasized denunciation and general deterrence for offences involving the abuse of children, sentencing the accused to 10 months' incarceration followed by 18 months' probation and ancillary orders.

During a trial for first-degree murder, the investigating officer gave inadmissible hearsay and opinion evidence connecting the accused to the apartment where the alleged murder weapon was found.

The defence applied for a mistrial.

The trial judge dismissed the application, finding that the Crown's case on identity was overwhelming even without the knife evidence, and that a strong mid-trial instruction to the jury to disregard the inadmissible evidence was sufficient to ensure a fair trial.

The accused was subsequently convicted by the jury.

The court sentenced the offender for a sexual assault committed against a co-worker who had driven him home after a work shift.

The assault involved persistent sexual advances, forced kissing, and digital vaginal penetration in the complainant's car, and the court treated breach of trust, degradation of sexual integrity, and the need for denunciation and deterrence as significant sentencing factors.

Although the offender had later been convicted of other sexual offences connected to the same workplace, the court held under the Coke principle that those later convictions could not be used as aggravating factors for this offence.

Applying the totality principle in light of the offender's existing consecutive penitentiary sentences, the court imposed a further consecutive sentence of 15 months, three years' probation, a lifetime SOIRA order, and a DNA order.

In a judge-alone sexual assault trial involving two co-worker complainants, the Crown sought admission of extrinsic similar fact evidence from two other incidents and also sought count-to-count use of the complainants' evidence.

Applying the similar fact framework from *Handy*, the court excluded the extrinsic incidents because their probative value did not outweigh prejudice, but allowed count-to-count use of the two charged incidents based on their persuasive degree of connection.

On the merits, the court found the accused's evidence concerning one complainant incredible and accepted that complainant's account beyond a reasonable doubt, resulting in a conviction on one count.

The court was left with a reasonable doubt on the second count because of material credibility and reliability concerns affecting that complainant's evidence, and entered an acquittal on that count.

During a murder trial, the Crown sought to introduce two pieces of evidence: an internet search conducted by an associate of the accused shortly after the shooting, and a video found on the associate's phone depicting the accused brandishing a firearm 11 days prior to the murder.

The court ruled the internet search inadmissible, finding its limited probative value was outweighed by its prejudicial effect.

However, the court admitted the video as prior discreditable conduct, concluding it was highly probative on the central issue of identity and its prejudicial effect could be mitigated by jury instructions.

The applicant, a young person charged with second-degree murder and firearms offences, brought a Charter application alleging violations of his rights under sections 10(a) and 12 during his arrest.

The police executed a search warrant using a dynamic entry and a violent struggle ensued when the applicant resisted arrest, resulting in officers punching him multiple times to gain control and seize a loaded firearm.

The court dismissed the application, finding that the section 10(a) right to be informed of the reasons for arrest did not accrue until the applicant was safely detained, which was delayed by his own actions.

Furthermore, the court held that the force used by the police was reasonable and justified under the circumstances, resulting in no section 12 violation.

The accused, charged with second-degree murder, sought to exclude a photograph taken of him surreptitiously by a police officer while he was seated in a courtroom for an unrelated matter.

The accused argued the photograph violated his rights under sections 7 and 8 of the Charter.

The court found no Charter breaches, noting there is no reasonable expectation of privacy in a public courtroom and no state compulsion involved.

However, the court exercised its residual discretion to exclude the photograph because the officer violated section 136 of the Courts of Justice Act, which prohibits taking photographs in a courtroom without judicial authorization.

In a youth prosecution for second degree murder arising from a fatal shooting at Dundas Square, the Crown brought a Leaney application seeking leave to adduce recognition evidence from several non-expert witnesses based on surveillance footage and images recovered from seized mobile phones.

The court applied the threshold admissibility principles governing recognition evidence, focusing on the witnesses' prior acquaintance and whether they were in a better position than the trier of fact to identify the persons depicted.

The court permitted recognition evidence from one investigating officer as to the accused and another individual, and from another officer as to a third individual, but excluded the proposed recognition evidence of three other witnesses for insufficient familiarity.

The ruling distinguished threshold admissibility from ultimate reliability, leaving reliability to the trier of fact.

The young person, charged with second degree murder, brought a Charter application challenging the validity of a search warrant executed at his residence.

He argued the Information to Obtain (ITO) failed to establish he resided at the address, the warrant was overly broad, the search of seized cell phones occurred outside the warrant's time limit, and the affiant deliberately misled the issuing justice.

The court dismissed the application, finding sufficient surveillance evidence linked the young person to the residence, the seizure of multiple phones was necessary, the forensic examination of the phones did not need to occur within the warrant's entry window, and there was no evidence of deliberate deception by police.

The young person, charged with second-degree murder, brought a Charter motion alleging a breach of section 8 rights regarding the search of a co-accused's mobile phone.

The applicant sought to exclude photographic and video evidence found on the device.

The court held that the applicant lacked standing, as there was no subjective or objectively reasonable expectation of privacy in images taken by another person in a group setting.

Furthermore, the court found the search warrant was validly issued based on reasonable and probable grounds.

The application was dismissed.

The accused, charged with first degree murder, brought an application to exclude sworn jurors from the courtroom during the challenge for cause process using rotating triers.

The Crown argued that recent appellate jurisprudence eliminated the trial judge's inherent jurisdiction to exclude sworn jurors.

The court held that it retained the common law discretion to exclude sworn jurors, as the Criminal Code is silent on the matter.

The court exercised its discretion to exclude the sworn jurors to prevent them from sitting idly in court for up to a week while the remainder of the jury was selected, which would diminish respect for the process.

In a first-degree murder trial, the applicants (accused) brought an application to adduce evidence of an alternate suspect.

The Crown moved to dismiss the application summarily.

The court dismissed the application on two grounds: first, for severe non-compliance with the Criminal Proceedings Rules regarding the filing of materials and factums; and second, because the proposed evidence lacked an 'air of reality' and failed to establish any sufficient connection, motive, means, or propensity linking the proposed third party to the murder.

The applicants, charged with first degree murder, brought a motion to adduce evidence at trial of a known third party as an alternate suspect.

The Crown alleged the applicants conspired to kill the deceased for insurance proceeds.

The applicants sought to introduce evidence that the deceased's former common-law partner had motive and opportunity to commit the murder.

The court applied the test for third-party suspect evidence, requiring a sufficient connection between the third party and the crime.

The court found the proposed evidence lacked direct connection, relied on hearsay, and failed to establish motive, means, or propensity.

The motion to adduce the alternate suspect evidence was dismissed.