P. Renwick

On a summary conviction appeal from convictions and acquittals arising from domestic allegations, the appellant challenged the assault conviction on grounds including improper use of prior consistent statements, misapprehension of evidence, and reliance on prior case reasoning.

The appeal court held the trial reasons, read as a whole, did not show impermissible credibility bolstering and disclosed no material misapprehension affecting the verdict.

The court found it was open to the trial judge to reject the appellant’s explanation for the injury evidence and to accept corroborative value in contemporaneous photographs.

The court further held the circumstantial-evidence argument was inapplicable because the case included direct testimony and proper reasonable-doubt analysis.

The summary conviction appeal was dismissed and the assault conviction was upheld.

The Crown applied for certiorari and mandamus to quash a preliminary inquiry judge's decision discharging the accused on a charge of first degree murder and committing him only for second degree murder.

The accused was alleged to have committed a drive-by shooting.

The reviewing judge found that the preliminary inquiry judge committed a jurisdictional error by failing to consider the whole of the circumstantial evidence, which was reasonably capable of supporting an inference of planning and deliberation.

The application was granted, and the matter was remitted with a direction to commit the accused to stand trial for first degree murder.

The appellant appealed his summary convictions for impaired care or control of a motor vehicle.

At trial, the judge found that the police had violated the appellant's Charter rights by arbitrarily detaining him for 32 hours, but declined to order a stay of proceedings, instead imposing a lenient sentence.

On appeal, the appellant argued the trial judge erred in dismissing the stay request.

The Superior Court of Justice dismissed the appeal, finding the trial judge applied the proper test and fashioned an adequate Charter remedy.

The appellant appealed his summary convictions for sexual assault and sexual interference against a seven-year-old complainant.

The appellant argued the trial judge erred in finding the offences occurred within the six-month limitation period, alleging a failure to resolve reliability concerns with the child's evidence.

The Superior Court of Justice dismissed the appeal, finding the trial judge's credibility and reliability analysis was sufficient and revealed no palpable and overriding error.

The appellant appealed his summary conviction for refusing to comply with a roadside breath demand.

He argued the trial judge erred in finding the demand was made 'forthwith' and with reasonable suspicion.

The summary conviction appeal court dismissed the appeal, holding the 8-9 minute delay was reasonably necessary for the officer to run a query, wait for the screening device, and explain the consequences of refusal.

The court also found the objective component of reasonable suspicion was satisfied by the appellant's speed, failure to signal, departure from a licensed establishment, and odour of alcohol.

The appellant appealed a conviction for impaired operation under s.253(1)(a) of the Criminal Code involving the operation of a Davinci Scout e‑bike, and also appealed the sentence of six months’ imprisonment, probation, and a lengthy driving prohibition.

The appeal challenged the trial judge’s credibility findings under the W.(D.) framework and argued that an e‑bike was not a “motor vehicle” within the meaning of s.2 of the Criminal Code.

The court held that a device capable of propulsion by non‑muscular power qualifies as a motor vehicle for purposes of the offence, regardless of whether it could also be propelled by muscular power.

The court found no error in the trial judge’s application of the W.(D.) analysis or factual findings and determined the sentence was fit given the offender’s extensive impaired‑driving record.

Both the conviction and sentence appeals were dismissed.

The appellant appealed a summary conviction for impaired driving following a trial where he had been acquitted of failing to provide a breath sample but convicted of impaired operation.

The appellant argued the trial judge made unreasonable and inconsistent findings, including misapprehending evidence regarding his dexterity, drawing inferences from unsuccessful breath attempts, and misstating that he had testified he was “high.” The appeal court held that the trial judge’s factual findings were entitled to deference absent palpable and overriding error.

The court found that any misstatement in the reasons was not material and did not affect the reasoning process leading to the conviction.

The conviction for impaired driving was supported by strong evidence and the appeal was dismissed.

The accused was charged with impaired driving and refusing to provide a blood sample following a motor vehicle collision.

At the hospital, the accused asserted his right to counsel of choice.

The police left a message for the lawyer but demanded a blood sample only three minutes later, which the accused refused.

The accused brought a Charter application alleging a breach of his s. 10(b) right to counsel.

The court found that the police violated the accused's right to counsel by acting with unnecessary haste and failing to provide a reasonable opportunity to contact his lawyer.

However, applying binding appellate authority, the court held that the refusal constituted the actus reus of the offence and could not be excluded under s. 24(2) of the Charter.

The application to exclude the evidence was dismissed, though the court noted a sentence reduction could be considered if the accused is found guilty.

The accused was charged with dangerous driving, assault with a weapon, wilful damage to property, and uttering a death threat arising from a road rage incident involving a dump truck and a pickup truck on a highway.

Evidence from an independent witness established that both drivers engaged in aggressive driving, including cutting each other off, braking to obstruct the other, and throwing objects.

The court rejected the accused’s testimony and found that his operation of the dump truck constituted a marked departure from the standard of care expected of a reasonable driver under s. 249(1)(a) of the Criminal Code.

However, the Crown failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt the elements of assault with a weapon, mischief causing damage, or uttering threats.

The accused was convicted of dangerous driving and acquitted on the remaining counts.