Nader R. Hasan

The applicant was convicted of multiple sexual offences against his daughter and sentenced to eight years' imprisonment.

He applied for bail pending his conviction appeal, arguing the trial judge erred in admitting prior consistent statements and in her treatment of a Browne v. Dunn issue, and alleging ineffective assistance of counsel.

The motion judge dismissed the application, finding that while the grounds of appeal were not frivolous, they were weak and did not clearly surpass the minimal standard required to outweigh the strong public interest in enforcing the sentence for serious sexual offences against a child.

The applicants, who were unsuccessful in their constitutional challenge regarding Ontario's response to climate change, and the respondent, who successfully defended the application, both sought costs.

The respondent sought $45,000 on a partial indemnity basis, while the applicants sought $96,999.79 or, alternatively, no costs.

The court applied the factors for public interest litigation and declined to award costs to the successful respondent, noting the applicants had no pecuniary interest, the issues were of existential public importance, and the respondent had superior capacity to bear costs.

The court also declined to award costs to the unsuccessful applicants, finding this was not one of the rare cases justifying such an award.

The court ordered that each party bear their own costs.

The applicants, seven young Ontarians, brought an application challenging Ontario's greenhouse gas reduction target (the "Target") set under the Cap and Trade Cancellation Act, 2018.

They argued that the Target, which aims to reduce emissions by 30% below 2005 levels by 2030, is unconstitutional and violates their rights under sections 7 and 15 of the Charter.

The court found that the issues were justiciable, as they involved a challenge to specific state action and legislation.

However, the court dismissed the application, concluding that while climate change poses a severe threat and disproportionately impacts youth, the Target itself does not violate the Charter.

The court held that section 7 does not impose positive obligations on the state to enact more stringent environmental policies, and the Target is not arbitrary or grossly disproportionate.

Furthermore, the court found no section 15 violation, as the disproportionate impacts are caused by climate change itself, not the impugned legislation, and the Charter does not impose a positive obligation to remedy social inequalities.

Following the dismissal of the moving party's motion to strike, the successful responding parties sought partial indemnity costs of $36,269.19.

The moving party argued for a maximum of $15,000.

The court considered the factors under Rule 57.01, noting the public interest nature of the litigation, the complexity of the constitutional issues, and the reasonable delegation of work among counsel.

The court found the requested amount fair and reasonable and awarded costs of $36,269.19 to the responding parties.

The applicants, seven youths residing in Ontario, brought an application challenging Ontario's cancellation of the Climate Change Act and its newly-enacted greenhouse gas reduction target under the Cap and Trade Cancellation Act, 2018.

They alleged that the target violates their rights under sections 7 and 15 of the Charter.

Ontario brought a motion to strike the application under Rule 21, arguing it disclosed no reasonable cause of action, was not justiciable, was based on unprovable speculations, depended on positive obligations, and that the applicants lacked standing for future generations.

The court dismissed the motion to strike, finding that the target and plan are reviewable by the courts, the claims are capable of scientific proof, the matter is justiciable as it challenges specific government conduct, the issue of positive obligations should be decided on a full evidentiary record, and the applicants meet the test for public interest standing at this preliminary stage.

The accused attacked military personnel at a Canadian Forces Recruiting Centre with a knife.

He was charged with nine counts of committing indictable offences for the benefit of, at the direction of, or in association with a terrorist group under s. 83.2 of the Criminal Code.

The Crown argued that the accused, acting as a 'lone wolf', constituted a terrorist group himself.

The court rejected this interpretation, holding that s. 83.2 requires the terrorist group to have an identity separate from the person committing the offence.

The accused was therefore acquitted of the terrorism charges.

On the included offences of attempted murder, assault causing bodily harm, and weapons offences, the court accepted joint psychiatric evidence that the accused was suffering from schizophrenia and was incapable of knowing his actions were morally wrong.

The accused was found not criminally responsible on account of mental disorder.

The offender, a 56-year-old first-time offender, was found guilty of sexually assaulting his then-girlfriend's 13-year-old daughter in 2005.

The Crown sought a penitentiary term of 3 to 4 years, while the defence sought a conditional sentence.

The court considered the principles of denunciation and deterrence, but noted the offence was a single, transitory incident of touching by a person in a quasi-position of trust.

Applying the law as it existed at the time of the offence, the court found a conditional sentence was available and appropriate.

The offender was sentenced to a 9-month conditional sentence to be served under house arrest, along with a 20-year SOIRA order and a DNA order.

The applicant brought an application under the Municipal Conflict of Interest Act (MCIA) seeking to declare the respondent's seat on Toronto City Council vacant.

The respondent, the Mayor of Toronto, had previously been found to have violated the Code of Conduct and was ordered to reimburse $3,150 to donors.

At a subsequent Council meeting, the respondent spoke and voted on a motion to rescind that repayment obligation.

The court found that the respondent had a pecuniary interest in the matter and breached s. 5(1) of the MCIA.

The court rejected arguments that the MCIA did not apply to Code of Conduct violations, that the repayment order was ultra vires, or that the interest was too insignificant to influence him.

The court also found the breach was not committed through inadvertence or an error in judgment.

The application was granted and the respondent's seat was declared vacant.