Michael Meredith

The moving party brought a motion to quash the responding party's appeal of a Small Claims Court decision that refused a trial adjournment.

The responding party argued the refusal amounted to a denial of natural justice and deprived it of counsel.

The Divisional Court dismissed the motion to quash, finding that the appeal was not manifestly devoid of merit, as the unusual circumstances surrounding the adjournment request warranted consideration on appeal.

The plaintiff brought a motion to amend the statement of claim to correct the pleaded date of discovery of an alleged fraud, which as originally pleaded placed the claim outside the two‑year limitation period under the Limitations Act, 2002.

The defendants opposed the amendment, arguing that allowing the change would deprive them of a limitation period defence and that a presumption of prejudice applied under Rule 26.01 and s. 5(2) of the Limitations Act.

The court held that the amendment did not add a new claim or introduce a claim outside the limitation period and therefore the presumption of prejudice applicable to amendments after expiry of a limitation period did not apply.

The court further found that the defendants failed to demonstrate non‑compensable prejudice and that the discoverability issue remained a matter for trial or summary judgment.

Leave to amend the statement of claim was granted and the defendants were permitted to amend their defence to plead discoverability.

The appellants appealed a motion judge's decision that failed to confirm a Master's Report in a construction lien dispute.

The Divisional Court found that the motion judge failed to apply the proper deferential standard of review to the Master's findings of fact regarding cost overruns, project management failures, and the nature of the contract.

The appeal was allowed, the motion judge's decision was set aside, and the Master's Report was confirmed with a minor arithmetical correction.

The respondents were successful in defeating the applicant's motion for leave to appeal a costs order.

The respondents sought costs of $5,950 for the leave motion, while the applicant argued for $2,250.

The court found the respondents' request too high and the applicant's offer too low, fixing costs at $3,500 inclusive of fees, disbursements, and taxes.

The moving parties (defendants) sought an extension of time to appeal a decision that reversed a Master's report in a construction lien dispute.

The appeal period under the Construction Lien Act had expired.

The court applied the test for extending time under Rule 3.02(1), finding that the moving parties had formed an intention to appeal within the prescribed period and provided a reasonable explanation for the delay, which was largely due to attempts to clarify the order and the retirement of the motions judge.

Finding no relevant prejudice to the respondent and that the appeal had some merit, the court granted the extension of time in the interests of justice.

The applicant contractor sought leave to appeal a costs order made by the Regional Senior Judge following a construction lien trial and subsequent motion.

The applicant claimed over $158,000 in costs on a $60,000 claim, which the Regional Senior Judge reduced to $45,000 on the basis of proportionality.

The Divisional Court dismissed the motion for leave to appeal, finding no error in principle and agreeing that the costs claimed were grossly excessive and disproportionate to the amounts in issue.

The defendants brought a motion seeking reconsideration or rehearing of reasons issued by a motions judge allowing an appeal from a Master's report in a construction lien dispute.

They relied on Rule 59.06 of the Rules of Civil Procedure and s. 123(4) of the Courts of Justice Act, arguing the reasons were incomplete and failed to address several issues before the court.

The court held that the earlier decision constituted a valid decision under the Courts of Justice Act and that s. 123 applies only where a judge is unable to render a decision, not where a party disputes the adequacy of the reasons.

Any alleged legal error was properly the subject of an appeal rather than reconsideration.

The motion was dismissed and the plaintiff was awarded costs of $45,000 inclusive of disbursements and HST.

The applicants appealed a decision dismissing their application to delete a right of first refusal from the Land Titles registry.

The right of first refusal was created in an agreement between three siblings regarding a family farm property.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that the agreement was not a personal contract and therefore bound the applicant's heirs.

The court also found that the applicant's husband was bound by his undertaking to respect the agreement, as the respondents' forbearance from enforcing their rights constituted valid consideration.

Finally, the court confirmed that a right of first refusal is properly registrable under section 71(1) of the Land Titles Act.

Following a successful summary judgment motion dismissing the plaintiff’s claim, the defendants sought substantial indemnity costs exceeding $58,000.

The plaintiff argued the defendants achieved only mixed success because one of their legal arguments failed and sought costs on that issue.

The court held that the defendants achieved complete success because the action was dismissed in its entirety and that unsuccessful arguments do not constitute divided success where they were reasonably advanced.

While the court declined to award substantial indemnity costs, it granted the defendants their full partial indemnity costs for the motion.

Costs of $39,910.36 were ordered payable within 30 days.

Following dismissal of the applicants’ motion concerning the legal validity of a long‑standing agreement registered on title to residential property, the court addressed the issue of costs.

The respondents, who were wholly successful on the motion, sought over $32,000 in costs on a partial indemnity basis.

The court determined that partial indemnity costs should be calculated at 60% of counsel’s hourly rate and accepted the reasonableness of time spent by a senior real estate lawyer assisting with the matter.

However, a $2,000 disbursement for legal research was disallowed for lack of supporting documentation under Rule 57.01(5) and Form 57A of the Rules of Civil Procedure.

The court ultimately fixed costs at $22,809.82 payable forthwith.

The applicants sought to strike an agreement from the land registry that had been registered on the title of their residential property for nearly 25 years.

The agreement, made between siblings, contained a right of first refusal and provided for equal distribution of net proceeds upon the sale of the property.

The court found that the agreement was intended to survive the death of the parties and bind their heirs.

The court also held that the addendum binding the applicant's spouse was supported by valid consideration in the form of forbearance.

Finally, the court confirmed the agreement was properly registered on title under both the Registry Act and the Land Titles Act.

The application was dismissed.

The applicant sought a review of a sanction imposed by the Investment Industry Regulatory Organization of Canada (IIROC).

After succeeding on the review, the applicant requested that the Ontario Securities Commission determine the appropriate sanction rather than remitting the matter.

The Commission declined, finding that an IIROC panel would have greater familiarity with its own guidelines, could hear the matter sooner, and that deference is owed to a sanctioning administrative body composed of the applicant's peers.

The matter was remitted to IIROC for a sanction hearing before a differently constituted panel.

The applicants sought a hearing and review of an IIROC sanctions decision, arguing that the reasons provided by the IIROC panel were inadequate.

The applicants had admitted to failing to properly perform gatekeeper responsibilities and failing to adequately supervise conduct.

The IIROC panel imposed sanctions that were significantly more severe than those sought by IIROC staff, including a life suspension and a $250,000 fine for the principal applicant.

The Commission found that the IIROC panel's reasons failed to address mitigating factors, appeared to sanction the applicants for unadmitted conduct such as fraud and illegal distributions, and misstated the agreed facts.

The Commission concluded that the reasons were so inadequate as to constitute an error in law, set aside the decision, and invited submissions on whether it should substitute its own decision or remit the matter for a re-hearing.

The moving party sought an adjournment of the sanctions hearing pending his application to the Divisional Court for judicial review of the decision on the merits.

He argued he was denied procedural fairness because the Commission failed to consider a settlement agreement he entered into with Staff.

The Commission denied the adjournment motion, finding it premature.

Granting the adjournment would place an incomplete record before the Divisional Court, as the sanctions applied to the moving party would be unknown.

The Commission also rejected the submission that the moving party was denied procedural fairness bringing him within the exception in Ontario (Liquor Control Board) v. Lifford Wine Agencies, noting little or no prejudice to him in proceeding with the sanctions hearing.