Matthew Barteaux

The plaintiffs brought a summary judgment motion for specific performance of an agreement of purchase and sale for a new home.

The vendor had attempted to terminate the agreement due to increased construction costs, but did so after the contractual cancellation date.

The court found the vendor in breach and ordered specific performance, requiring the transfer of the land with an abatement of the purchase price equal to the estimated cost of construction.

The court also dismissed the vendor's third-party claim against the municipality, finding that building officials do not owe a duty of care to protect a developer's profit margins from delays in processing building permits.

The moving parties brought a motion for leave to appeal an order of Van Melle J. dated April 19, 2023.

The Divisional Court dismissed the motion for leave to appeal without costs.

The plaintiffs sought an interlocutory injunction to prevent the defendants from enforcing two vendor take-back mortgages on a commercial property and the plaintiffs' residential property.

The plaintiffs alleged they were induced to purchase the property based on inaccurate sales figures and that the transaction was fraudulent.

The court dismissed the motion, finding that the plaintiffs failed to establish irreparable harm that could not be quantified monetarily and that the balance of convenience favoured the defendants.

The decision reinforced the principle that mortgagees should be allowed to enforce contractual rights unless fraud related to the mortgage itself is proven, and noted the plaintiffs' apparent inability to honour their undertaking as to damages.

The applicant was injured in a motor vehicle accident in 2004 and sought statutory accident benefits.

The insurer denied claims for attendant care and housekeeping benefits in 2005, issuing an Explanation of Benefits (OCF-9) indicating a refusal to pay.

The applicant did not appeal this denial until 2017, after being deemed catastrophically impaired.

The insurer raised a preliminary issue that the appeal was statute-barred under s. 51 of the Schedule.

The Tribunal found that the 2005 denial was clear and unequivocal, triggering the two-year limitation period.

Consequently, the applicant's appeal was dismissed as statute-barred.

The applicant sought reconsideration of an interlocutory decision that denied an adjournment of a preliminary issue hearing.

The applicant had requested the adjournment pending the outcome of an application for leave to appeal to the Court of Appeal in a similar case regarding limitation periods.

The Tribunal dismissed the reconsideration request, finding no error of law or breach of procedural fairness in the original decision.

The Tribunal emphasized the need for fair, efficient, and timely conduct of proceedings, noting that delaying hearings to await potential outcomes in unrelated civil actions is impractical and unfair.

The Defendant brought a motion seeking a further examination for discovery and production of documents from Plaintiff Mark Birikorang.

Although the substantive issues were settled by consent, the parties disagreed on costs.

The court found the motion necessary due to the Plaintiff's initial refusal to attend a third examination.

The Defendant was awarded costs, but the claimed amount was reduced from $7,572.70 to $4,000 for fees, plus $560.50 for disbursements, totaling $4,560.50, payable by the Plaintiff Mark Birikorang.

The applicant was injured in a motor vehicle accident and sought income replacement benefits.

The insurer paid benefits for a period before sending a notice of refusal on March 5, 2015.

The applicant filed an application with the Tribunal on March 6, 2017.

The insurer brought a preliminary motion arguing the application was statute-barred for missing the two-year limitation period by one day.

The Tribunal dismissed the motion, finding that the limitation period does not begin to run until the applicant receives the notice of refusal.

Under the Statutory Accident Benefits Schedule, notice sent by regular mail is deemed received on the fifth business day after it is sent, meaning the limitation period had not expired when the application was filed.

The appellant, a police officer, appealed his conviction for assault causing bodily harm.

The trial judge found that the appellant unlawfully detained the complainant and lacked reasonable grounds to arrest him for causing a disturbance, as the complainant's loud and rude protestations were instigated by the appellant's improper actions.

The summary conviction appeal judge upheld the conviction.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the lower courts' conclusions that there was no criminal disturbance and no reasonable grounds for arrest.