Maia Stevenson

The Court of Appeal for Ontario dismissed the appeal from the denial of certification of a class action alleging systemic negligence in the use of seclusion and restraint at a forensic psychiatric hospital.

The court found that the motion judge did not err in concluding that the claims lacked commonality, as the alleged wrongdoing could only be determined on an individual basis.

The court also upheld the dismissal of claims against individual hospital administrators and affirmed the costs award, finding no reversible error in the motion judge’s analysis.

The Empowerment Council sought leave to intervene as a friend of the court in an appeal from the refusal to certify a proposed class action concerning psychiatric inpatients at Waypoint Centre for Mental Health Care.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the motion, finding that the proposed intervener’s submissions were largely duplicative of the appellants’ and would not usefully contribute to the resolution of the appeal without prejudicing the parties.

Following the dismissal of the plaintiffs' motion for certification in a systemic negligence class action against a psychiatric hospital and the Province of Ontario, the successful defendants sought costs.

Waypoint claimed approximately $1.3 million and Ontario claimed approximately $815,000.

The court found the claimed amounts to be fair and reasonable given the complexity of the case and the resources expended by the plaintiffs.

Applying section 31 of the Class Proceedings Act, the court applied an approximate 10% discount due to the public interest nature of the litigation, awarding Waypoint $1,170,000 and Ontario $735,000 in partial indemnity costs.

The plaintiffs brought a motion to certify a class action against Ontario, Waypoint Centre for Mental Health Care, and individual hospital administrators, alleging systemic negligence, breach of fiduciary duty, and Charter violations related to the use of seclusion and restraints at a maximum-security psychiatric hospital.

The court dismissed the certification motion, finding that while some patients may have individual claims for culpable seclusion, there was no basis in fact for systemic wrongdoing.

The court concluded that the claims lacked commonality, as the use of restraints required highly individualized clinical assessments, and that a joinder action, rather than a class proceeding, was the preferable procedure.

The appellants (Crown) appealed a Divisional Court order that declared the Math Proficiency Test (MPT) unconstitutional for infringing s. 15(1) of the Charter due to disproportionate adverse impact on racialized teacher candidates, and found it not justified under s. 1.

The Court of Appeal found that the Divisional Court erred by relying on incomplete and preliminary data (July 2021 Data) to conclude a disproportionate adverse impact.

The Court of Appeal, reviewing more complete data (December 2021 Data), determined that the MPT did not have a disproportionate adverse impact on racialized candidates' entry to the teaching profession, nor did it reinforce existing disadvantages.

The appeal was allowed, and the Divisional Court's order, including the declaration that s. 18(1)(c) of the OCTA was unconstitutional, was set aside.

On a motion to strike a constitutional application challenging Ontario's funding of Roman Catholic and public schools to the exclusion of Jewish day schools and other independent faith-based schools, the court held it was not plain and obvious that the applicants could not satisfy the Bedford and Carter threshold for revisiting binding precedent.

The court found a reasonable prospect that changes in constitutional interpretation, state neutrality, international law, minority-rights jurisprudence, and the amendment adding s. 93A could fundamentally shift the parameters of the debate as against Ontario.

The claim against Canada was struck because education funding is a provincial matter, Canada had taken no impugned legislative action, and unincorporated treaty obligations were not directly enforceable against it in this proceeding.

The motion therefore succeeded only in part.

The appellants, two churches and their members, challenged the constitutionality of Ontario's COVID-19 regulations that imposed capacity restrictions on indoor and outdoor religious gatherings.

The motion judge found that the regulations infringed the appellants' freedom of religion under s. 2(a) of the Charter but were justified under s. 1.

On appeal, the appellants argued the motion judge erred in her treatment of expert evidence, her refusal to use hindsight evidence, her decision not to conduct separate analyses for other s. 2 Charter rights, and her s. 1 justification analysis.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the motion judge's deferential approach to the government's response to an unprecedented public health emergency, her application of the precautionary principle, or her conclusion that the measures were minimally impairing and proportionate.

The appellants sought to appeal the dismissal of their application challenging outdoor gathering restrictions imposed as public health measures during the COVID-19 pandemic, which was initially dismissed for lack of public interest standing.

The Court of Appeal determined that the underlying application was moot because the challenged regulations were no longer in force.

The court declined to exercise its discretion to hear the appeal regarding Mr. Baber's private interest standing, finding that this issue was also moot and that a decision would not resolve any live controversy or bind future hypothetical challenges.

The moving parties, consisting of two churches and their members, brought motions to set aside judicial orders directing compliance with COVID-19 religious gathering limits.

They argued the capacity restrictions infringed their freedom of religion under s. 2(a) of the Charter.

The court found that the numerical and percentage capacity limits did infringe s. 2(a) by interfering with the claimants' ability to engage in religious activity as a collective in-person congregation.

However, applying the Oakes test, the court concluded that the restrictions were demonstrably justified under s. 1 of the Charter as a reasonable limit in a free and democratic society to protect public health during the pandemic.

The motions were dismissed.