Louis Mostyn

The applicant insurer sought repayment of income replacement benefits paid to the respondent after he had returned to work.

The respondent had entered into a settlement agreement to repay the funds but failed to make consistent payments.

The Tribunal found that the respondent committed wilful misrepresentation by failing to advise the insurer of his return to work while continuing to receive benefits.

The Tribunal ordered the respondent to repay the outstanding balance of $4,528.56, plus interest.

The moving party, Stefano Carella, brought a motion for leave to appeal the order of Dietrich J. dated February 20, 2020.

The Divisional Court dismissed the motion for leave to appeal.

No order was made as to costs due to an outstanding issue regarding whether the moving party was capable of instructing counsel.

The court reconsidered a previous costs endorsement after the applicant's counsel identified a factual error regarding the mother's living arrangements.

The original endorsement, issued on April 14, 2016, had ordered no costs following the settlement of access and child support issues.

The judge acknowledged and apologized for the factual mistake and invited both parties to submit additional written submissions on costs, specifically requesting copies of settlement offers from the applicant to assess the respondent's alleged failure to follow procedures and respond to offers.

The parties appeared for a trial regarding access and child support, which were resolved on consent.

The applicant mother sought costs of $14,653.61, and the respondent father sought disbursements of $1,150.

The court declined to award costs to either party, noting that the mother had been unreasonable regarding access and her position on child support was unrealistic given the father's prior contributions to her housing expenses.

No order as to costs was made.

The respondent father sought an order to change the child's registered surname from the mother's maiden name to a hyphenated surname including his name.

The child was born during the parties' brief marriage and registered by the mother alone under the Vital Statistics Act.

The father argued that the mother's refusal to acknowledge him for registration purposes was unreasonable and that the court should exercise parens patriae jurisdiction to order the change.

The court dismissed the motion, finding that the Ontario Court of Justice lacks parens patriae jurisdiction and that even if it possessed such jurisdiction, the evidence supported the mother's decision not to acknowledge the father for registration purposes.

The parties separated in 2003 and the mother has had primary care of their son since.

The father's access was restricted to supervised visits after incidents of inappropriate behavior, including threatening the mother with a baseball bat and breaching court orders.

The father sought unsupervised access and a finding of contempt against the mother, while the mother sought sole custody and continued supervised access.

The court granted sole custody to the mother and ordered that the father's access remain supervised due to his poor judgment and disregard for court orders.

The father was also ordered to pay table child support, and his contempt motion was dismissed.

The applicant filed a human rights application alleging workplace harassment, discrimination, and reprisal.

The respondents and the applicant's union requested that the Tribunal defer the application because the underlying facts were the subject of an ongoing union grievance.

The Tribunal found that deferral was the most fair, just, and expeditious way to proceed, as the grievance process was initiated prior to the application and there was a clear overlap in facts, issues, and remedies.

The application was deferred pending the conclusion of the grievance proceeding.

The applicant filed a human rights application alleging discrimination, harassment, and reprisal in employment.

The Tribunal noted that a related union grievance proceeding was in progress and requested submissions on whether the application should be deferred.

Due to contradictory information and a lack of submissions from the respondents and the union, the Tribunal directed the respondents to file a Response addressing the deferral issue, and requested further submissions from the applicant and the union.

The personal respondent, Muhamad Omarbach, applied for costs against the Ontario Human Rights Commission after the human rights complaint against him was dismissed.

The Tribunal found that the Commission's decision to amend the pleadings to allege the respondent's personal involvement, without adequate investigation and based solely on a belated identification at mediation, rendered that aspect of the complaint trivial or frivolous.

The Tribunal exercised its discretion to award costs, discounting the amount due to the respondent's conduct during the hearing, and ordered the Commission to pay $8,000.

The complainant, a black Christian from southern Sudan, alleged discrimination in the provision of services by a butcher at a hallal meat store.

The adjudicator found that the butcher initiated a verbal altercation regarding religion and ethnicity, which escalated into a physical attack with a meat cleaver.

The adjudicator concluded that the butcher discriminated against the complainant on the basis of creed and ethnic origin contrary to section 1 of the Human Rights Code.

The corporate respondent was held jointly and severally liable under section 45(1) of the Code.

The complainant was awarded $10,000 in general damages and $5,000 for mental distress.

The respondents brought a motion for non-suit at the conclusion of the Commission's case, arguing the evidence failed to establish a prima facie case of discrimination in the provision of a service under section 1 of the Human Rights Code.

The adjudicator exercised his discretion to allow the respondents to bring the motion without electing to forego calling evidence.

However, the adjudicator dismissed the motion on its merits, finding that the testimony, if believed, provided a sufficient nexus between the events complained of and a prohibited ground of discrimination to establish a prima facie case.

During the hearing of a human rights complaint, respondents' counsel conceded to breaching the rule in Browne v. Dunn by failing to put contradictory evidence to the complainant and a witness during cross-examination.

The Tribunal ruled that the complainant could return to the witness stand to respond to the contradictory testimony.

However, the Tribunal declined to recall the other witness, who had been inappropriately followed and harassed by one of the respondents during a recess.

Instead, the Tribunal held that the breach regarding the witness's testimony would be addressed by discounting the weight of the respondent's contradictory evidence.

Following a decision denying the applicant's claim for other disability benefits, the parties were unable to resolve the issue of expenses.

The insurer argued the applicant should be denied expenses because he was not a credible witness and had caused the insurer to incur significant costs by changing his position on the claim period at the last minute.

The arbitrator found that while the applicant's case was not entirely without merit, his late decision not to pursue benefits beyond the 104-week point caused wasted expenses and prolonged the proceeding.

The arbitrator awarded the applicant one-half of his assessed expenses, fixing the total payable by the insurer at $6,471.45.

The applicant sought other disability benefits following a second motor vehicle accident in October 1996.

The insurer denied the claim.

The applicant argued the insurer breached procedural requirements by failing to respond within 14 days, but the arbitrator found substantial compliance and no prejudice.

On the merits, the arbitrator found the applicant lacked credibility, noting he failed to disclose the second accident to multiple health care practitioners and his pre-accident condition was significantly worse than he claimed.

The application for benefits was dismissed as the applicant failed to prove his impairment resulted from the second accident.

The applicant was injured in a rear-end motor vehicle accident and claimed income replacement benefits (IRBs).

The insurer terminated IRBs, arguing the applicant could return to her pre-accident jobs as a bus driver and special needs rehabilitation specialist.

The arbitrator found that while the applicant had pre-existing psychological issues, the accident materially contributed to a substantial psychological inability that prevented her from performing the physically demanding tasks of her pre-accident jobs.

The applicant was awarded IRBs for the disputed period.

However, the arbitrator rejected the applicant's claim to include income from a photography business in the IRB calculation, finding insufficient evidence that she performed the essential tasks of that business or that she was disabled from doing so.

The applicant was injured in a motorcycle accident and received statutory accident benefits until the insurer terminated them, claiming he could return to his pre-accident employment.

The parties disputed the physical demands of his pre-accident job as a folding wall installer and service coordinator.

The arbitrator found the job involved medium to occasionally heavy physical demands.

Relying on medical and functional capacity evidence, the arbitrator concluded the applicant remained disabled until he completed a functional restoration program on April 8, 1994.

The insurer was ordered to pay arrears of weekly income benefits totaling $12,167.94, plus interest, and supplementary medical and rehabilitation expenses.