Krista Springstead

The appellant episcopal corporation appealed a finding of direct liability for sexual assaults committed by a parish priest over two decades.

The respondents cross-appealed, arguing the corporation was also vicariously liable.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal, confirming the corporation was directly liable because the bishop's failure to properly direct and discipline the priest constituted negligence by the corporation.

The Court also held the corporation vicariously liable, finding a sufficiently close relationship between the diocesan enterprise and the priest, and a strong connection between the employer-created risk and the wrongful acts.

Following the release of reasons on October 19, 2002, the Court of Appeal received written submissions on costs.

The Court fixed the costs of the motions before the motions judge at $6,000 all inclusive, and the costs of both appeals at $6,500 all inclusive, payable to the appellants forthwith.

The appellant was injured in a motor vehicle accident.

In a prior arbitration for accident benefits, the arbitrator found the appellant was uninsured at the time of the accident.

The appellant subsequently brought an action against the tortfeasor for negligence and against his insurer for breach of contract and negligence.

The motions judge dismissed both actions on the basis of abuse of process and issue estoppel.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding that the tort action was separate from the contractual dispute, and the negligence claim against the insurer raised different issues than those decided in the arbitration.

The applicant, a pedestrian injured in a motor vehicle accident, applied for income replacement benefits and non-earner benefits.

He claimed he had two future contracts of employment made before the accident.

The arbitrator found the applicant's evidence regarding the employment contracts to be fabricated, illogical, and inconsistent, concluding he did not meet the eligibility criteria for income replacement benefits.

The claim for non-earner benefits was also dismissed as the medical evidence and the applicant's continued university attendance did not support a complete inability to carry on a normal life.

The applicant was ordered to pay the insurer's arbitration expenses due to his conduct and fabrication of evidence.

The appellant appealed an arbitration order that denied her further weekly income benefits and required her to pay half of the insurer's arbitration expenses.

The appellant argued she was denied a fair hearing due to the arbitrator's procedural rulings (dismissing an interpreter and refusing to consider a second accident), her counsel's incompetence, and the arbitrator's alleged bias stemming from frustration with her counsel.

The Director's Delegate dismissed the appeal, finding that the absence of an interpreter did not prejudice the appellant, the arbitrator correctly refused to hear the unmediated second accident claim, the Charter right to effective counsel does not apply to private economic disputes, and the arbitrator's frustration with counsel's delays did not amount to bias.

The appellant challenged a jury verdict in a personal injury action on the basis that the trial was unfair, relying on late service of expert reports, the applicability of a building code regulation, counsel's addresses, a Brown v. Dunn ruling, the jury charge, and cumulative unfairness.

The court held that no prejudice was shown from the timing of the reports, there was ample evidence of dangerous construction of the ramp regardless of the regulation's applicability, and the remaining complaints disclosed no reversible error.

The court also upheld the trial judge's treatment of gross-up.

The appeal was dismissed with costs.

The applicant was injured in a motor vehicle accident and received income replacement benefits until the insurer terminated them based on an occupational medicine examination.

The applicant was subsequently involved in a second motor vehicle accident but only sought benefits related to the first.

The arbitrator found that the applicant's evidence was inconsistent and that multiple medical specialists noted exaggerated pain behaviour and illness behaviour.

The arbitrator concluded that the applicant did not suffer a physiological or anatomical impairment from the first accident that disabled her from working, and that her psychological impairment did not prevent her from performing the essential tasks of her employment.

The application for arbitration was dismissed.