11 total
Absolute discharge granted to NCR accused who remained stable off medication with no active psychiatric diagnosis.
The accused was found not criminally responsible for dangerous driving causing death following a single psychotic episode.
At her annual Review Board hearing, the hospital and her counsel sought an absolute discharge, while the Attorney General sought a conditional discharge.
The Board excused the accused during the reading of Victim Impact Statements to protect her mental health.
Relying on psychiatric evidence that the accused no longer had an active psychiatric diagnosis, had been stable off antipsychotic medication for over two years, and had developed strong insight and community supports, the Board concluded she no longer posed a significant threat to public safety.
An absolute discharge was granted.
NCR accused granted conditional discharge with reporting and firearms conditions, but no driving prohibition.
The accused was found not criminally responsible for dangerous driving causing death and failure to stop after an accident.
At her initial disposition hearing, the Ontario Review Board found that she continues to pose a significant threat to public safety due to her history of schizophreniform disorder and lack of insight into potential relapse.
The Board ordered a conditional discharge with conditions including a two-week reporting requirement, a firearms prohibition, and travel restrictions, but declined to impose a driving prohibition.
Offender sentenced to two years less a day imprisonment for sexual interference following joint submission.
The offender pleaded guilty to touching a person under the age of 16 for a sexual purpose.
The offence involved a 15-year-old victim whose family was close friends with the offender's family.
The court accepted a joint submission from counsel, emphasizing denunciation and general deterrence while noting the offender's guilty plea and lack of prior record as mitigating factors.
The offender was sentenced to two years less a day of imprisonment, followed by three years of probation, along with ancillary orders including a 20-year SOIRA order and a section 161 prohibition.
The defendant was fined and placed on probation for careless driving causing bodily harm.
The defendant pleaded guilty to driving a motor vehicle on a highway carelessly causing bodily harm contrary to section 130(3) of the Highway Traffic Act.
The incident occurred on August 18, 2019, when the defendant failed to stop at a stop sign and collided with another vehicle, causing severe spinal cord injuries to the victim resulting in full paralysis.
The court imposed a $2,000 fine with one year to pay, a two-year probation order prohibiting driving for the first year and restricting driving to employment or education purposes in the second year, and required completion of an approved educational driving program.
The accused was acquitted of an Over 80 charge because an unexplained 39-minute delay in calling duty counsel meant breath samples were not taken as soon as practicable.
The accused was charged with impaired operation of a motor vehicle and operating a motor vehicle with over 80 milligrams of alcohol in 100 millilitres of blood.
The Crown proceeded on the Over 80 charge after withdrawing the impaired operation charge.
The central issue was whether the Crown could rely on the statutory presumption of identity under section 258(1)(c) of the Criminal Code, which requires that breath samples be taken "as soon as practicable." The court found that a 39-minute gap between the accused's arrival at the police station and the initial call to duty counsel, combined with a 20-minute delay before a second call to duty counsel, was not adequately explained.
The Crown failed to establish that the breath samples were taken "as soon as practicable," and therefore could not rely on the statutory presumption.
The accused was acquitted.
The accused was convicted of driving over the legal limit after the court found police delays in obtaining breath samples were reasonable.
The accused was charged with operating a motor vehicle with more than 80 mg of alcohol in 100 ml of blood.
The defence brought a Charter application alleging breaches of sections 8, 9, 10(a) and 10(b) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, which was abandoned during submissions.
The central issue at trial concerned whether the breath samples were obtained in compliance with the statutory requirement that they be taken "as soon as practicable" under section 254(3) of the Criminal Code.
The court found that the police acted reasonably in all the circumstances, including the time taken to arrange vehicle impoundment, the delay at the police station, and the time required to facilitate the accused's access to duty counsel.
The breath samples were obtained within the two-hour statutory window and the Certificate of the Qualified Breath Technician was admitted into evidence.
The accused was convicted.
Respondent declared a vexatious litigant after bringing multiple abusive proceedings and harassing opposing counsel.
The applicants sought an order under s. 140 of the Courts of Justice Act declaring the respondents vexatious litigants.
The individual respondent had commenced multiple actions in Ontario regarding matters already settled in California, all of which were dismissed for lack of jurisdiction or abuse of process.
He also engaged in harassing and abusive communications with opposing counsel.
The court found the respondent's conduct met the criteria for a vexatious litigant and ordered that he and his corporations require leave to commence any new proceedings in Ontario.
Requests to stay existing appeals and seal the court file were dismissed.
Costs awarded on a partial indemnity scale following the dismissal of an action for want of jurisdiction.
The defendants successfully moved to dismiss the plaintiffs' action for want of jurisdiction and sought their costs.
The plaintiffs argued they were impecunious and that no costs should be awarded.
The court held that impecuniosity does not immunize a party from costs, particularly where the action should not have been brought.
The court declined to award full or substantial indemnity costs, finding the plaintiffs' conduct did not reach the required threshold of reprehensible behavior.
Partial indemnity costs were awarded to the defendants, fixed at $25,000 and $35,000 for fees, plus disbursements and HST.
Offender sentenced to five years in jail for possessing two kilograms of cocaine for trafficking.
The offender pleaded guilty to possession of cocaine for the purpose of trafficking after acting as a delivery person for two suitcases containing two kilograms of cocaine.
He admitted to wilful blindness regarding the contents.
The offender fled the country while on bail but voluntarily returned years later due to his mother's terminal illness.
The court weighed the significant aggravating factors, including the large quantity of drugs and his flight from justice, against mitigating factors such as his guilty plea, lack of related record, and family circumstances.
The offender was sentenced to five years in jail.
Motion for leave to appeal denial of certificate of pending litigation dismissed.
The plaintiff sought leave to appeal an order that dismissed her appeal from a Master's order denying leave to issue a certificate of pending litigation.
The Divisional Court found that there were no conflicting decisions and no good reason to doubt the correctness of the motion judge's order, which involved the exercise of judicial discretion.
Furthermore, the issues raised were specific to the facts of the case and not of general importance.
The motion for leave to appeal was dismissed with costs.
The court dismissed the defendant's Charter applications and convicted him of driving with excess blood alcohol.
The defendant was charged with operating a motor vehicle with excess blood alcohol on September 28, 2014.
The defence raised two Charter issues challenging whether the arresting officer had reasonable and probable grounds for the approved screening device demand, alleging breaches of sections 8 and 9 of the Charter.
The court found that the officer had both subjective and objective grounds to stop the vehicle based on speeding and mounting a curb, and that the approved screening device was in proper working order despite being calibrated on the 14th day prior to use.
The defendant was found guilty.