John Weingust

The plaintiff advanced $90,000 to his daughter and son‑in‑law following the sale of his home.

The court held that equity presumes bargains rather than gifts and found the defendant failed to rebut the presumption that the advance was a loan.

However, the court determined that the loan constituted a demand obligation created prior to January 1, 2004, making the former six‑year limitation period under the Limitations Act applicable.

Because the claim was issued more than six years after the date of advancement and there had been no acknowledgment of the debt or payment to extend the limitation period, the claim was statute‑barred.

The action was dismissed and costs were awarded to the defendant.

The appellants appealed the dismissal of their application under the Road Access Act to close an access road on their land, which provided the sole motor vehicle access to the respondents' cottage.

The parties had been litigating over the road for 20 years.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding that the appellants' application was an attempt to relitigate an issue that was res judicata due to a 2005 consent order.

The court also found that the respondents had a legal right to use the road based on previous agreements and court orders.

The appellant appealed a summary judgment granted against her regarding a mortgage she executed.

She argued the motion judge improperly determined credibility issues and shifted the burden of proof when rejecting her defences of misrepresentation, non est factum, lack of independent legal advice, and improvident sale.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the motion judge correctly applied the test for summary judgment and properly concluded the appellant's bald assertions and lack of evidence failed to raise a genuine issue for trial.

The appellant appealed a Small Claims Court judgment finding her liable under a conditional sales contract for a motor vehicle.

She argued the trial judge erred by admitting business records and hearsay evidence without compliance with the notice requirements of section 35 of the Evidence Act.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, holding that section 27(1) of the Courts of Justice Act permits the admission of relevant hearsay in Small Claims Court proceedings, and that section 35 of the Evidence Act is an enabling provision that does not restrict other statutory avenues for admitting business records.

The evidence was found sufficient to establish liability.

The appellant appealed a Small Claims Court decision regarding a conditional sales contract for a car loan.

The central issue was the jurisdiction of the Small Claims Court to admit hearsay evidence.

The Divisional Court noted a potential conflict between section 27 of the Courts of Justice Act and section 2 of the Evidence Act regarding the admissibility of hearsay.

As neither party addressed this issue in their factums, the court adjourned the appeal to allow the parties to amend their factums.

The appellant was convicted of selling professional lacrosse tickets without a licence under s. 2(20) of By-Law 20-85.

On appeal, he argued that tickets are not 'goods' within the meaning of the by-law and that the municipality lacked the authority to enact the provision.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that tickets fall within the ordinary meaning of 'goods' as movable personal property, and that the municipality had the necessary authority under the Municipal Act to enact the licensing by-law.

The appellants sought to overturn a trial decision in a will challenge involving testamentary capacity, undue influence, and suspicious circumstances.

The Court of Appeal held that the appeal improperly asked the court to retry the case.

Finding no palpable or overriding error in the trial judge's review of the evidence, the court declined to interfere.

The appeal was dismissed with costs to the respondent on a party and party basis.

In a long-running access road dispute, the appellant challenged an order requiring removal of gravel placed on the respondents' property.

The court held that the proposed fresh evidence did not meet the established admissibility requirements.

However, the appeal succeeded because the record was insufficient to permit summary judgment on whether the work performed complied with an earlier order governing repair and maintenance of the access road.

The order below was set aside and the underlying motion was dismissed with costs.

The appellants challenged the dismissal of claims arising from a mortgage life insurance denial after an elderly borrower died shortly after closing.

The court held there was no enforceable contract of insurance for the deceased because he did not meet the policy definition of an insured borrower, which imposed an age limit.

Assuming the lender could in some circumstances act as the insurer's agent, the evidence did not satisfy the stringent waiver test requiring full knowledge of rights and an unequivocal intention to abandon them.

The negligence claims also failed for lack of proof that alternative insurance would have been available and thus lack of damages.

The complainants, a Black man and a Black woman, alleged that their former employer and its comptroller discriminated against them on the basis of race and colour by terminating their employment.

The Board of Inquiry found that while the comptroller likely made one racially prejudiced remark during a dispute over overtime, this single incident was not a proximate cause of either dismissal.

The Board concluded that the male complainant was dismissed due to strained personal relations, his resentment, and the employer's fear that he would leave suddenly, while the female complainant was dismissed for destroying company property and insubordination.

The complaints were dismissed.