Joanne Ferguson

The Respondent Mother brought an urgent motion seeking clarification on access arrangements after the Durham Children's Aid Society suspended all face-to-face access due to COVID-19.

The court clarified its previous endorsement, stating that parties should consider all options for meaningful contact, including in-person visits, while prioritizing child safety and adhering to the Child, Youth and Family Services Act, 2017.

The endorsement reiterated principles from Ribeiro v. Wright regarding parenting arrangements during the pandemic.

The Respondent Mother brought an urgent motion in response to the Durham Children’s Aid Society's decision to suspend all face-to-face access at its Supervised Access Centre due to the COVID-19 crisis.

The court found the matter urgent, emphasizing the need to balance child protection with maintaining parental relationships during the pandemic, and ordered a teleconference to establish an appropriate access regimen.

The appellant sued multiple defendants for malicious prosecution, defamation, and other claims arising from a child sexual abuse investigation that resulted in criminal charges which were later stayed.

After his civil action was dismissed at trial, he appealed, primarily arguing ineffective assistance of counsel.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that the ineffective assistance claim was an abuse of process because the appellant had already sued his trial counsel for negligence and settled that action.

The court also rejected arguments that the trial judge should have ordered a mistrial and that the trial judge erred in dismissing the defamation claim against the child's grandmother.

The respondents in a civil appeal brought a motion to quash the part of the appeal that relied on the alleged incompetency of the appellant's trial counsel.

The moving parties argued that incompetence of counsel is not a recognized ground for a civil appeal, that the appellant had already recovered damages from his former lawyer, and that the appeal lacked merit.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the motion to quash, finding that the ground relating to a mistrial was sufficiently interrelated with the other grounds and should be considered by the panel hearing the appeal.

The court also directed that the appellant's former counsel be served with the materials and given an opportunity to respond.